LEVERAGING A MEGA-EVENT WHEN NOT THE HOST CITY
lessons from pre-Olympic training

Sarah Gardiner & Laurence Chalip
Lessons from Pre-Olympic Training

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National Library of Australia Cataloguing in Publication Data
Gardiner, Sarah.
Leveraging a mega-event when not the host city: lessons from pre-Olympic training.
Bibliography.

1. Tourism. 2. Place marketing. 3. City promotion. I. Chalip, Laurence Hilmond. II. Cooperative Research Centre for Sustainable Tourism. III. Title.

338.4791

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Acknowledgements
The Sustainable Tourism Cooperative Research Centre, an Australian Government initiative, funded this research.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Around the world today, sport is viewed to be a valuable instrument to promote a region as a tourist destination, business location, and an attractive place to live and work (French & Disher 1997; Getz 1997a; Judd 1995). In other words, sport is being used as an instrument of place marketing. In a recent study of five European cities, van den Berg, Braun and Ougaar (2000) explored the potential to synergise sport and city marketing policy. They suggest: ["The] interaction between sports and city marketing is best achieved when sports is [sic] the catalyst to an integrated urban regeneration process" (p. 137). The tourism literature refers to the marketing of a place as destination marketing. As Goodall (1990, p.201) puts it: "destination marketing organisations often devote considerable time to creating images and to channelling these through various media to targeted consumers who, it is hoped, will decode the messages and respond appropriately". When the destination is an urban location, the urban planning and policy literatures refer to the marketing of a place as urban or city marketing (Paddison 1993). Place marketing regards a place as a collection of products (Bramwell 1998) and therefore has a more holistic interpretation of place (van den Berg et al. 1990, p.340). In this study, the phrase place marketing is used, although it can be considered interchangeable with city, urban, or destination marketing.

In recent years, competition between regions has intensified. As a result, regions have begun to think strategically about their marketing. Today, many regions throughout the world have developed a customer-service orientation. The aim of this orientation is twofold: to better satisfy the region’s customers, and to attract more customers to the region (van den Berg et al. 2000). In 1990, Ashworth and Voogd published Selling the City. Their book showed that regions could gain a competitive advantage through marketing the entire location as a product, designed to satisfy the needs of the targeted market. In addition, they recommended that urban planning be guided by the strategic vision of the region. "The intention is to maximise the efficient social and economic functioning of the area concerned" (Ashworth & Voogd 1994, p.41). This marketing strategy has evolved into the region’s urban management plan. In this plan, the place’s resources are commodified and shaped into products demanded by the user (Bramwell 1998). In 1993, Kotler, Haider and Rein further explored this concept in their publication Marketing Places, suggesting that regions are engaged in a ‘place war’. Accordingly, strategic planners need to market regions to become attractive market-driven products, an end that can be achieved when a region improves its industry base by identifying and attracting place-compatible companies. Regions must also communicate their special qualities to tourists, businesses, residents, and investors, becoming entrepreneurial. To cultivate a place marketing approach, planners have begun to investigate the political, social, and cultural decision-making processes affecting market interest in their cities (Bramwell 1998; Judd 1995; Tyler 1998).

There is a growing interest in the use of sport, and particularly sport events, in place marketing (Chalip 2001; De Knop 1998; Gibson 1998; van den Berg et al. 2000). When surveying the evolution of the modern Olympic Games, it is apparent that host cities are increasingly leveraging the promotional opportunities through the international exposure of the event (Tourism Forecasting Council 1998). The use of sport events to market cities is often part of a broader tourism strategy aimed at increasing awareness of the city, which is thought to persuade people to visit that location. As seen in recent Olympic Games, such as Barcelona, Calgary, Lillehammer, and Atlanta, host cities record significant growth in tourism in the post-Olympics period (Klausen 1992; Standeven & De Knop 1999; Tourism Forecasting Council 1998). The relationship between hosting an event and increased visitation to a city has been demonstrated anecdotally or using econometric techniques after the fact. External factors (such as world events, exchange rates) may also have influenced visitor numbers. Furthermore, the sport and events literature has largely concentrated on the effects of sports tourism numbers. The potential to leverage these events to capitalise on opportunities to market the city for business, residents, and investors has been neglected.

Scholars have questioned the exploitation of events to pursue a region’s economic development policies and create a local identity which benefits a small group of politic elites rather than the community as a whole (Burbank, Heying & Andranovich 2000; Hiller 2000). Whitson and Macintosh (1996) analysed the use of baseball sporting franchises in United States cities to stimulate economic growth and to enhance the city’s status as world class. They suggested that the adoption of this strategy is motivated by civic boosterism, defined as: "a collective action on the part of the local leaders … to ‘sell’ prospective businesses and residents the advantage of locating in their town rather than somewhere else" (p. 3).

In 1995, Judd investigated the importance of sport franchises as civic boosters in United States cities, stating: "Sports carry huge symbolic power in American culture. Having professional sports teams allegedly is necessary to make a city ‘big league’" (p. 181). Yet, Judd also warns that sport stadiums lose money (therefore requiring generous public support), and questions the multiplier effects sport stadiums claim to have on the local economy.
According to Judd, cities may be driven to pursue visions not of their own invention as a result of their competition for tourists and sport teams.

Throughout the world, there is a trend towards the use of events to promote a city, encourage redevelopment, and stimulate the local economy (French & Disher 1997). Sport events have gained increased attention of urban planners as a way to market and attract visitors to a region (Law 1993), a trend illustrated by the growing number, size, and diversity of events in regions throughout the world (Getz 1997a). Many regions now have an event development corporation, usually an arm of the tourism body that identifies, bids, and, in some cases, manages events. Getz (1997b) emphasises that city planners need to develop an events portfolio to attract events appropriate to their region, and that the type and size of sport events should mirror regional marketing objectives.

One of the primary objectives of hosting these events is to attract tourists and stimulate increased visitation numbers to the host region. Visitors will travel from other cities, regions, and countries to participate in or be a spectator at an event. The convergence of sport pursuits and tourist endeavours has provoked an escalating interest in the nature of this behaviour (Chalip 2001), known as 'sport tourism' (Delpy 1998; Gibson 1998).

Although the behaviours of sport tourists are not new, recognition, knowledge, and development of strategies to target this market are in the formative stages. There has been considerable debate on the definition of sport tourism, prompting Standeven and De Knop (1999) to propose that sport tourism be defined as: "All forms of active and passive involvement in sporting activity, participated in casually or in an organised way for non-commercial or business/commercial reasons, that necessitate travel away from home and work locality" (p. 12). Gibson (1998) defines those visitors who actively participate in the event as active sport tourists, while those who attend the event as spectators are known as event sport tourists. Gibson identified nostalgic sport tourism as a third type of behaviour referring to tourists who visit a place to pay homage to sport.

The literature on event tourism focuses on the use of events for economic development. Determining the effect of hosting an event has traditionally centred on assessing its acute impact on the local economy (Crompton 1995; Getz 1997a; Gratton & Taylor 2000; Mules & Faulkner 1996). To maximise the impact of the event, regions should aim to enhance visitor spending while in the region, and to foster longer stays (Frechtling 1987; Mules 1998). Studies of tourism also suggest that places can benefit from developing brand loyalty strategies to encourage repeat visitation to their region (Gitelson & Crompton 1984; Opperman 1996, 1997, 1998; Pearce & Moscardo 2001). While research on the leverage of events to optimise economic impact is still in the formative stage, the relationship between sport events and repeat visitation strategies has yet to be investigated.

The tourism industry has successfully shown it can generate activity in other productive enterprises (Frechtling 1987; Go & Jenkins 1997; Judd & Fainstein 1999; Law 1992; Smith 1995; Vellas & Bécherel 1995; Williams & Shaw 1991). Tourism has a direct impact on the retail and agricultural industries as visitors demand souvenirs and gifts, food and drink (Richardson 1995). Additionally, it has been argued that the tourism industry has a far-reaching effect on the economy (Frechtling 1999). Tourist-generated sales have a multiplying effect, given that every dollar a tourist spends is re-spent in the local economy (Richardson 1995). In 2000, the Australian Tourism Satellite Account (Australian Commonwealth Government 2000a) indicated that tourism added 4.3 percent to the economy as visitor spending rippled through the nation (Bureau of Tourism Research 1996). Absent from the literature, however, is research investigating strategies and tactics to stimulate spending by sport tourists when they visit the region to attend an event. At present, the majority of the research in this area has concentrated on measuring visitor spending rather than on ways to generate it. Consequently, most sporting activities and events are not leveraged; as a result, the potential impacts of sport tourism and events on the local economy are not realised (Chalip 2001).

Within the events context, Getz (1997a) suggests there are four key reasons for the failure to realise the potential impact of events on the host region. First, regions fail to effectively utilise the attractiveness of events in product development, marketing, and image making, and could benefit by making a greater effort to integrate sport into their place marketing strategy. Second, a mass marketing approach is adopted in preference to niche marketing; an approach that Getz (1997a) suggests may be more suitable for this target market. Third, regions have incomplete portfolios of events with each event being an individual activity or commodity, rather than an integrated into a complementary portfolio of events that reflects the image of the region (Chalip 2001). Finally, media attracted to the region by the event are not always effectively utilised. Getz (1997a) suggests that regions should seek to correct negative images through the creation and publicity of positive events and develop a strategically planned event portfolio, managing events to maximise their impact on the host region.

The literature also neglects to define the potential long-lasting effect an event can have on the region, often referred to as a legacy (Cashman 1999). A region may sponsor an event to stimulate long-term structural changes. In the case of the Olympic Games, preparation to host the event has resulted in Olympic legacies that have included infrastructure, relationships, urban re-development, and enhanced international profile (Essex & Chalkley 1999; Faulkner & Tideswell 1999; French & Disher 1997). Consequently, the Olympics have been described as a change accelerator and concentrator (Herr 1988) and a way to 'fast track' planning schemes (Essex & Chalkley 1999). According to Herr (1988) capital expenditures, such as new infrastructure and organisational transformation, that normally occur in the host region are often implemented sooner in preparation for the Olympic Games. Overall, the event can affect how the local economy develops in the future by catalysing the
re-development of the region, stimulating investment in new facilities and amenities, and providing a platform to showcase the region (Kidd 1992; Miller 1994). 

An analysis of the Calgary Winter Olympic Games finds three perceived benefits from hosting an event: (1) honour and recognition; (2) infusion of economic funding to stage the event; and (3) economic stimulus to the region in preparation for the event, during the event itself, and as new opportunities develop post-event (Syme, Shaw, Fenton & Mueller 1989). To successfully stage the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, Barcelona spent US$8.1 million on new roads, an airport, hotels, telecommunications, and a new seafront resort (Cashman 1999). The region also utilised the Olympics to springboard their international meetings and convention business. As a result, the number of international delegates increased from 36,155 in 1989 to 118,899 in 1996, and the total number of visitors to Barcelona increased from approximately 1.7 million in 1990 to approximately 3.0 million in 1995 (Lange 1998).

It is evident that in order to capitalise on public investment in the long-term, Olympic host countries need sustainable growth. In recent years there has been substantial debate about the value of the Olympic Games to the host city, and more generally, to the global community (Cashman & Hughes 1999; Kidd 1992; Lange 1998; Waitt 1999). Although the Olympic Games occur over a three-week period, the effects of the Games may continue for years or even decades.

There has been some discussion in the literature about the increasing need to undertake formal strategic planning to derive long-term legacies from hosting an event (Bramwell 1997a; Cashman 1999). Inskip (1994) warns that without long-term strategic thinking, planners may create unexpected and unwanted impacts. In his study of the 1991 World Student Games, Bramwell (1997a) investigated strategic planning before and after this event and suggested that pre-event planners adopt a long-term perspective of integrating the event into broader development planning. Although Bramwell's findings are significant, further research is required given that his data collection concentrated on local documentation and media analysis. The scope and depth of Bramwell’s findings are further restricted given that he conducted no more than six interviews of local tourism managers four years after the event. Nevertheless, Bramwell’s study demonstrates the importance of strategic planning to optimise the impact of an event.

As part of a broader tourism strategy, host cities are seeking to benefit from the international exposure of the event by increasing awareness and encouraging tourists to visit the city (Faulkner & Tideswell 1999; Klausen 1992; Standeven & De Knop 1999; Tourism Forecasting Council 1996, 1998). Furthermore, it has been suggested that the awareness surrounding an event has also been used to alter the perception of a region in a relatively short period of time (Getz 1997a; Mules 1993; Whitson & Macintosh 1996), a strategy described in the literature as re-imaging or re-branding. Several studies have investigated the positive relationship between a destination’s image and a person’s preference or visitation intentions (Ahmed 1991; Milman & Pizam 1995). Because the image of a place is depicted by its brand, a place’s brand should showcase its core strengths and personality, thus establishing a clear identity for the place (Baloglu & McCleary 1999; Font 1996).

Crockett and Wood (1999) studied the Western Australian Tourism Commission’s brand, known as Brand WA, and described the core personality of the brand as fresh, natural, free, and spirited. This branding strategy reflected the desire to develop a nature-based image of the state, and its elements were integrated into all marketing and visual communications, such as advertising and publicity. In addition, Events Corp Western Australia also integrated the images of the Western Australia Tourism Commission brand into their marketing campaigns to attract events to Perth and Western Australia. Events Corp Western Australia specifically targeted and developed events to reflect and reinforce this brand (e.g. the Rally Australia event through Western Australia’s outback and Coca-Cola Surfing Masters at Margaret River). Events Corp Western Australia suggested that these events represented the fresh, natural, free, and spirited personality of the brand (Events Corp Western Australia 2001). On the whole, it was anticipated that this brand would attract more nature-based tourism to the state. Although the Western Australia example provides only anecdotal evidence, it may illustrate that events are a key ingredient of a region’s image and are therefore crucial to the place’s brand.

Brown, Chalip, Jago, and Mules (2002) suggest that events themselves cannot build a brand without tactical leveraging to integrate each event into the city’s product and service mix and encourages regions to adopt co-branding strategies in which events with a particular personality are targeted or developed to reinforce the brand of the region. At present, the literature lacks the empirical research to clearly understand this relationship, underscoring the need for further investigation of ways regions can integrate events into their branding strategy. Similarly, there is evidence to suggest that the influence of heightened awareness created from hosting an event is transitory. As a consequence, the benefits of the increase in tourism through heightened awareness may be short-lived. A study of the 1988 Calgary Olympic Winter Games (Ritchie & Smith 1991) showed a dramatic increase in international awareness of Calgary. Ritchie and Smith found that after several months there was a significant decay in the level of awareness and Olympic image of Calgary. Their findings suggest that planners who seek to build destination awareness should develop strategies to capitalise and retain event-generated awareness to attract visitors beyond the event period.

Still absent from the literature is discussion of use of the Olympic Games by host cities to foster new relationships and enhance existing ones. This includes creating international relationships for trade purposes, building relationships with the private sector particularly through the sponsors of the event, and fostering
relationships with corporate and political VIPs attracted to the event. Further research is therefore needed related to facilitating these relationships and integrating them into place marketing efforts.

Hosting an event the size and scale of the Olympic Games is expensive, requiring a significant public (i.e. government) and private investment, the proportion of which varies by event and country. Also debated in the literature are the taxpayer subsidies required to host large hallmark events (Black & Pape 1995; Jones 2001; Mules 1998; Sack & Johnson 1996). Central to this debate is the need for accountability of public expenditure. The potential multi-level government investment and widespread impact of the event compels planners to meet objectives across federal, state, and local government borders (O’Faircheallaigh, Wann & Weller 1999).

In the case of the Sydney Olympic Games, the local, state, and federal governments sought to identify opportunities to distribute the impact from hosting the Olympic Games and create a positive Olympic legacy for regional Australia. One opportunity that was identified was the hosting of pre-Olympic Games training camps in towns and cities throughout Australia. This activity became known as pre-Games training. The practice of conducting training camps in the off-season and prior to major competition has existed for many years. Sport scientists have shown that a period of pre-game acclimatisation will improve an athlete’s performance as they adapt to their environment and become familiar with the surroundings of the host country prior to competing (e.g. McArdle, Katch & Katch 1999; Wilmore & Costill 1999). In the past this activity was undertaken informally and in some cases in secret, as a result, going unnoticed or overlooked by the hosts. Off-season training camps were not considered part of the event, nor were event organisers involved. Today, however, many elite athletes undertake a period of training in the host country prior to competition.

Because pre-game activity was not recorded or documented, research on the marketing and management of these training camps does not exist in the literature. Prior to the study reported in this report, the only knowledge of this phenomenon was limited to the rather haphazard transfer of information among host countries. The first evidence of discussion of pre-Games training was in preparation for the Atlanta 1996 Olympic Games. For this event, the Georgia Olympic Training Alliance implemented a marketing campaign targeting National Olympic Committees and National Sport Federations to attract pre-Games training to the state of Georgia (Georgia Department of Industry, Trade and Tourism 1996). In preparation for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, it was expected that, given the geographical location of Australia in relation to the northern hemisphere, a number of athletes would undertake pre-Games training in Sydney or in other regions throughout Australia.

Research Goals

The goal of this research is to gain a better understanding of how to use (e.g. leverage) sport as a tool in the place marketing strategy to develop the local economy. This study will investigate the policy process in sport and place marketing strategies by examining the planning, marketing, and implementation of pre-Games training for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Pre-games training provides an insightful context in which to consider policy processes and outcomes associated with marketing places through events. In 2000, Australian public officials and businesses recognised the value of pre-games training prior to the Sydney Olympic Games and mounted an aggressive effort to leverage Olympic opportunities in the country (Faulkner & Tideswell 1999).

The primary research questions are:

- How did stakeholders respond to the pre-Games training opportunity?
- What factors account for effective and ineffective leveraging of pre-Games training?

Derivative questions are:

- What strategies were adopted?
- Who was involved in the development of the strategies?
- What factors influenced the development of particular strategies?
- How did these factors influence the outcome?

From this study, a normative question also emerges:
- How can sport be leveraged as part of the product and service mix in place marketing?

From the standpoint of sport tourism, this research will provide new insight into the ways that regions can develop strategies and tactics to leverage future sport activities (including training camps and events) in order to maximise the impact of sport on their region. From the perspective of the policy analyst, the study will show how the events can influence policy process, particularly the agendas imposed upon the process. For future event organisers, it will showcase their role in event leveraging and the potential strategies and outcomes that surrounding regions can undertake to leverage their investment in the event. Finally, it is hoped that the research will provide evidence of the impact and reach of the Olympics, as well as highlight strategies host nations can employ to extend the impact of the Olympic Games throughout the host country.
Chapter 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

This chapter reviews the theoretical and conceptual literature relevant to this study, beginning with the value of events, tourism, and sport to local economies. The use of sport to foster linkages and form alliances with other stakeholders both within the community and with external organisations is then discussed. This literature is used to identify the variety of opportunities that can be derived from hosting sport teams and events in a city and the strategies that must be formulated and implemented to realise these opportunities. Accordingly, concepts of strategy, shared vision and learning, and strategic planning are examined. In the context of pre-Games training, this study investigates the stakeholders’ strategies and tactics developed to realise potential opportunities from hosting training camps in their city. Thus, this literature review includes the analysis of planning undertaken in each of the cases.

Given the complexity of the planning process and the multiple stakeholders involved, policymaking plays an important role in understanding sport and place marketing. In this literature review various models and concepts are used to describe the policy process. The models and concepts examined include classical rational decision-making (Hall 2000; Robbins & Barnwell 1998), incrementalism (Lindblom 1959), the garbage can model (Cohen, March & Olsen 1972), and Kingdon’s (revised) model (Kingdon 1995). Political legitimation, frames of reference (Allison 1971), and collective action (Hardin 1982) in the policy process are also examined. These concepts are important given the various interests represented in the stakeholder groups that were involved in the pre-Games training response. In conclusion, these concepts and constructs will be integrated into a framework for the subsequent analysis.

Sport and Economic Development

Today, local communities and governing bodies are, to a greater extent, taking control and directing the long-term growth of their economic environment through local economic development strategies. Blakely (1994) suggests that even though people-and-place strategies are not new, strategic local economic development is still in its infancy.

Traditionally, local economies relied on single industries, which made them vulnerable in the transition from manufacturing-based economies to information and service sectors. Too often communities were facing ruin after the single major employer, usually a manufacturing firm, closed. These communities and other pro-active regions progressively began to realise the need to strengthen their economic base through diversification. They began employing strategies that would make them more socially, economically, and physically viable (Bramwell 1998).

In his book on local economic development, Blakely (1994) discusses what he calls a ‘zone of action’. He suggests that local economic development programs aim to work within this zone: “to intervene in the right place at the right time, affecting both people and place” (p. 80). Furthermore, he suggests that building community-level institutions for development must be inclusive, bring all players together, and satisfy both public and private objectives. These initiatives must achieve three objectives. Firstly, these initiatives should stimulate local ownership of business, thereby ensuring stability in the region and a community commitment. Secondly, strategies are required to build real, lasting, quality jobs rather than unstable jobs. Finally, yet equally important, a greater linkage between the public and private sectors through joint-venture projects needs to be developed.

Ultimately, it is the goal of the region to align its organisations in a clear, unified, strategic direction to facilitate sustainable economic development. To achieve this goal, it is important that effective value-adding collaboration take place between the regions stakeholders. Sarason and Lorentz (1998) suggest that a facilitator or a network coordinator is needed across the various local agencies to create a sense of community and shared commitment. As a result, the network should feel it has ownership of the local economic development strategy (Arsenault 1998).

In a sport and place marketing context, aligning event, tourism, and sport organisations is important to optimising the value of these activities within local economies. In the following sub-section, the value of event, the value of tourism, and the value of sport are discussed, and the importance of fostering linkages between these activities to develop the local economy is explained.

The Value of Events to Local Economies

In recent years, there has been growing recognition of the impact that sport events have on the local economy (Anderson 1999; Baade & Dye 1988; Euchner 1993; Johnson 1993; Okner 1974; Sack & Johnson 1996; Stevens & Wootton 1997; van den Berg et al. 2000). At present, the majority of this literature on sport and economic development concentrates on the ability of hallmark or mega-events to stimulate the local economy (Bramwell
Chalip (2001) suggests sport can also be packaged to market a destination. Should also be offered to secondary markets such as advertisers, sponsors, and affinity markets. Furthermore, consumers (including participants, spectators, and volunteers) who are also part of the product. In addition, sport products in the sport industry. From a sport marketing perspective, Brooks (1994) proposed that the core product offered to the customer” (p. 18). Likewise, Brooks (1994) also discussed the relationship between customers and the local economy, as shown in the case of the Sydney Olympic Games. As Tim Harcourt, Chief Economist from the Australian Trade Commission (Austrade), comments:

"The benefits are not confined to the two weeks of the Games. The overall impact is estimated to add an additional $6.5 billion to Australia's GDP over the 12 years from 1994-95 to 2005-06 with an additional 1.5 million tourists between 1998 and 2004. In the build-up to the Games the construction projects were worth $3.3 billion providing an additional 7,500 jobs per year over the 1994-95 to 2005-06 period" (Austrade 2000).

As demonstrated in the case of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, planners are increasingly realising the broader economic benefits that result from staging an event (Gratton & Taylor 2000). Clearly, the aim of hosting these events is to maximise the opportunities that hosting the event affords, and ultimately, to attain long-term benefits for the host region.

There is also a political value in hosting events. Ritchie (1990) identified the positive and negative political manifestations of hosting a mega-event. He suggested that the positive political manifestations included enhanced recognition of the region and its values, and propagation of political values held by that government and/or population. Conversely, there can also be negative impacts such as economic exploitation by political elites, and distortion of the event values to reflect the values of the political system.

Social and community value is often an 'afterthought' in event planning and management (Hall 1992), yet events can have an immense effect on their host community. Hosting an event can create employment opportunities, increase community support for sport and tourism, increase local organisational capabilities, and motivate participation in volunteering and sport (Austrade 2000; Clapés 1995; Getz 1997a; Miguélez & Carrasquer 1995; Mihalik & Simonetta 1999). Events can also have a lasting effect on community spirit, sense of identity, self-image, and social cohesion. Studies have suggested that the community's support of and enthusiasm for hosting the Olympic Games are symbols of pride in their city, presenting evidence of a social legacy, as cities and their people define themselves and enhance their national and international visibility and position through hosting an event (Chalip 1987, 1990, 1995; MacAlloon 1995; Ritchie 1990).

The Value of Tourism to Local Economies
Tourism has enormous value to the economy (Hall, Jenkins & Kearsley 1997). The Australian Tourism Satellite Account (Australian Commonwealth Government 2000b) estimates the Tourism Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at AUS$25.2 billion, representing 4.5 percent of the total GDP. The tourism industry contributes a total of AUS$58.2 billion to the nation's economy. Accordingly, tourism has now become a central element in regional development strategies (Bramwell & Rawding 1994; Lankford & Knowles-Lankford 1997). The prospect of visitors can act as a catalyst for investment (Law 1992), stimulating the improvement of existing facilities, building new facilities for residents, and re-imaging a place. Tourism has the potential to create jobs, stimulate growth, and vitalise the local economy (French & Disher 1997).

Tourism can also have a negative effect on the city. Godfrey and Clarke (2000) note that tourism incurs costs as well as benefits. Local inflation, strain on local infrastructure and facilities, overcrowding, congestion, and the diversion of impact have all been identified as potential costs of tourism development. The seasonal nature of this sector and related fluctuation of jobs in the region have also been identified as potential negatives. However, given the seasonal nature of tourism, hosting events has been seen as a means to attract tourists in otherwise quiet periods (McDonnell, Allen & O'Toole 1999).

The Value of Sport to Local Economies
Sport also plays a key role in the local community as it links to many other elements of the economy and the community (Chalip & Mules 1997; Chalip, Thomas & Voyle 1996; De Knop 1998). Pitts, Fielding, and Miller (1994) define the sport industry as: “all sport related products – goods, services, places, people and ideas – offered to the customer” (p. 18). Likewise, Brooks (1994) also discussed the relationship between customers and products in the sport industry. From a sport marketing perspective, Brooks (1994) proposed that the core product (e.g. the competition, team, and experience) should be packaged and offered to primary markets or direct consumers (including participants, spectators, and volunteers) who are also part of the product. In addition, sport should also be offered to secondary markets such as advertisers, sponsors, and affinity markets. Furthermore, Chalip (2001) suggests sport can also be packaged to market a destination.
In Australia, the federal government has begun to investigate the business of sport, and hence the value of sport to their economy. The Australian Commonwealth Government (2001) recently released a report entitled *Game Plan 2006*, which discussed the impact of sport on Australia’s economy. According to the report, an estimated 276,000 people are employed in the sport and leisure industry. The majority of these people are employed in small and medium sized enterprises, and a small number in large businesses. In the report, the Australian Bureau of Statistics estimates that the industry turnover is AU$12.7 billion. Furthermore, in 1994-95 the gross product or value-added was AU$5.8 billion, equivalent to approximately 1.2 percent of Australia’s GDP. In the 1993-1994 to 1997-1998 period, export of sport and recreation goods increased by 8.2 percent per year. To some extent, this growth has been facilitated by government initiatives, such as Australia Sport International, an organisation established to promote and develop the export of sport and recreation goods and services (Australia Sport International 2000). The Australian Commonwealth Government has recognised that sport not only has a direct impact on the economy, but may also play an indirect role. For example, a growing body of work suggests that participation in physical activity may contribute to a decline in physical and mental healthcare costs (Confederation of Australian Sport 1998). As these examples demonstrate, events, sport, and tourism had a growing importance in the local economy, and they should be considered as key ingredients of a local economic development strategy.

**Strategy**

Today, place marketing is becoming an increasingly important component of local economic development strategies (Chalip 2001; Kotler et al. 1993). Because strategy is critical to local planning initiatives, development strategies seek to provide action plans to direct the way local economies interact with the environment to reach their goal of maximising economic development in their region (Blakely 1994).

In the following sub-section, various aspects of strategy are characterised. Firstly, fostering linkages to build a structure or network for the implementation and execution of the strategy is discussed. Secondly, the importance of shared vision and learning is highlighted. Finally, the facets of strategic planning are reviewed.

This review will draw attention to three important aspects of strategy and inform the discussion of strategy in the following analysis.

**Fostering Linkages**

The links between planners in the region are important when developing a local economic development strategy (Blakeley 1994). In the context of sport and place marketing, increasing emphasis is placed on the importance of working together. Stakeholders from various sectors create relationships with each other and with potentially value-adding entities to maximise opportunities. However, in reference to sport tourism, Weed and Bull (1997) suggest that the relationship between sport and tourism institutions has been tenuous. Even though the relationship has historically been described as poor, it is suggested that this impacts the future of the long-term strategy.

Forming partnerships and nurturing links among sport, tourism, and economic development entities can lead to collaborative planning and contribute to economic growth (Chalip 2001). Local economic development strategies require the involvement of both public and private departments and organisations. These relationships among various actors are known as boundary-spanning networks (Erwee 2001) or inter-organisational networks (Benson 1975). Networks are required when individuals need to form linkages or interact (usually in the form of person-to-person relationships) to share information in order to achieve a common objective (Erwee 2001). In the political economy, Benson (1975) suggests that inter-organisational networks are orientated towards the acquisition and defense of resources that are a source of power, making negotiation and exchange central to network cooperation.

The literature highlights the importance of collaboration, partnership, and alliances among network members in relation to a common issue (Sautter & Leisen 1999). However, complexity and conundrums are faced on the path to forming these relationships (Arsenault 1998; Bardach 1999; Jamal & Betz 1995; Reed 1999; Sarason & Lorentz 1998), and participants should be aware that forming a network of relationships has both costs (e.g. resources, autonomy) and benefits (e.g. gain expertise, become more competitive). Three types of relationships have been identified: (1) customers with suppliers, (2) suppliers with organisation, and (3) organisation with other businesses in the market (Baum & Oliver 1991; Kraatz 1998; Oliver 1997; Stern 1979).

Fostering relationships between the organisation and its customers has been the focus of most networking activities. This strategy seeks to build and enhance relationships to encourage the customer to consume the product or service, be satisfied (Conrad, Brown & Harmon 1997; Ricard & Perrien 1999), and, where possible, repeat that behaviour and recommend it to others (Peck, Payne, Christopher & Clark 1999), as in a customer making a recommendation via word-of-mouth (Haywood 1989; Lindberg-Repo & Grönroos 1999). Through providing customer service and a satisfying experience, event and destination marketers may encourage participants to repeat that behaviour (i.e. repeat participation in the event and/or revisit the city), and a satisfying
experience may generate positive word-of-mouth communication about the event or region in the visitor’s home city.

Another important part of the network is the link between the organisation and the suppliers. Through fostering this link, the organisation can enhance its distribution channels for product and service delivery, share information on the state of the market, and extend sales and marketing efforts (Medina-Muñoz & García-Falcón 2000). In an events context, the suppliers of the event would be the organising committee, therefore inferring that an important relationship in the network is the link with the suppliers of the event (i.e., the event organisers).

The third type of link that can be fostered is the relationship with other businesses in the market, which can enhance information sharing about the state of the market, improve the organisation’s responsiveness, and reduce the waste of resources on inopportune activities. This includes such groups as private businesses, government bodies, investors, employees, the local community, and the media (Baum & Oliver 1991; Kraatz 1998; Oliver 1997; Stern 1979).

The aim of these linkages is to develop a network that creates and maintains profitable stakeholder relationships that drive brand value (Duncan & Moriarty 1998; Grönroos 1995). In place marketing, planners must be aware that while the customers and prospects are the primary focus of most relationship building and communications efforts, a wider stakeholder focus is advantageous.

**Shared Vision and Learning**

Stakeholders must also be aware that they are simultaneously being pulled towards and pushed away from goals by structural conflict. In his book, *The Fifth Discipline*, Senge (1990) suggests that stakeholders need a commonality of purpose and shared vision when attempting to complement each other’s efforts and undertake an innovative, coordinated approach to strategic planning. However, the purpose and vision must reflect their own personal vision for true commitment to the group. Likewise, Kingdon (1993) suggests that often participants in group initiatives do not concentrate on solving problems at all, because they have not precisely specified their goals or identified their problem carefully. It is often the case that strategic planning is undertaken without developing a shared vision or a clear, unified sense of the direction. Consequently, the strategy: “often reveals more about today’s problems than tomorrow’s opportunities” (Senge 1990, p. 210). Furthermore, strategic planning by multiple stakeholders is often short-term and reactive, as opposed to long-term and proactive, because new ideas conflict with deeply held beliefs of individuals and organisations. These beliefs limit ideas to familiar ways of thinking and acting, known as mental models (Senge 1990).

Senge argues that to avoid structural conflict, both organisations and individuals need to continually clarify what is important to them and seek to see the current reality more clearly through continual learning, stating that: “organisations learn only through people who learn” (p. 139). In organisational climates where personal mastery has been adopted, it is safe to create visions, inquiry is encouraged, commitment to the truth is the norm, and the status quo is expected to be challenged.

Senge suggests that team learning is important for the long-term, sustainable success of stakeholders groups. When stakeholders attempt to move toward a particular goal, their individual directions may be haphazard. Although their overall efforts may appear unified, they are actually working at cross-purposes. An unaligned team often works hard but wastes energy. Alternatively, team learning can assist the various stakeholders to align and successfully work towards a common goal. Senge (1990) describes this synergistic process:

> “… a commonality of directions emerges, and individuals’ energies harmonise. There is less wasted energy. In fact, a resonance or synergy develops, like the 'coherent' light of laser rather than the incoherent and scattered light of a light bulb. There is commonality of purpose, a shared vision, and understanding of how to complement one another’s efforts.” (p. 234)

As learning teams develop strategies, shape vision, and design policy and organisational structures, they develop a commonality of purpose, a shared vision, and an understanding of how best to complement one another’s efforts (Senge 1990). Also relevant, according to Senge, is the opportunity for team members to have roles within other teams to foster learning across groups. An outcome of this synergy is that teams learn to think more insightfully and become better able to generate innovative, coordinated approaches when faced with complex issues and tasks.

Blakely (1994) proposes that economic development specialists can facilitate the alignment and convergence of goals by acting to plan and/or direct the local development program, bringing focus and commitment from the total community to achieve an overall development strategy. Similarly, Dyer and Singh (1998) suggest that a source of inter-organisation competitive advantage is the development of knowledge-sharing routines, relation-specific assets, complementary resources and capabilities, and effective governance. Through employing this view and abolishing single-component strategies, organisations can incorporate several strategies to produce an integrated approach.

**Strategic Planning**

Strategy is often thought of as short-term operational responses (Robbins 1988). Planners may concentrate on achieving their defined objectives within a short period of time, usually one year (Hofer, Murray, Charan & Pitts 1984). As a result, most operation-strategic planning neglects the long-term planning required for sustainable
local economic development (Bramwell 1997a). Given the magnitude of relevant information, as well as insufficient time and resources, planners may not undertake a comprehensive review (Lindblom 1959), often operating in a crisis management mode, solving problems of the moment rather than considering the longer term. Within a given strategy, projects can begin to emerge that direct specific courses of action. Blakely (1994) states: “The distinction between strategies and project is necessary because, in too many instances, a single project or group of projects with no particular focus are often described as a local economic strategy. In most instances, these ad hoc efforts are reactions to current circumstance. The most common rationale for the majority of these uncoordinated efforts is that ‘something had to be done’” (p. 133).

Inskeep (1994) emphasises that long-range strategic planning is required for sustainable growth, and suggests that long-range strategic planning should be focused on the next 10 to 15 years, or a longer period such as 20 years. He states: “These may seem to be long planning periods, but it commonly requires this length of time to implement basic policy and structure plans” (p. 8). Given this time lag, it is imperative that regions begin to align their strategies, programs, and projects with their overall vision for their region (van den Berg et al. 2000).

Local economic development strategies need to reflect the city and community they seek to develop. For example, Fletcher and Cooper (1996) studied the strategic planning for tourism in the Central European region of Szolnok Country, Hungary. Their case study analysed the practical difficulties and issues of producing a tourism strategy and implementation plan in the process of planned economic change. The findings suggest that planners must be sensitive to regional constraints and to the operating environment when applying general principals of tourism development. A study of sport development in regional Australia by Mugford (2001) provides additional evidence that sport programs and facilities need to be tailored to communities and towns. Overall, these findings signal to planners that a generic, broad-brush approach to strategic planning should be replaced by initiatives and structures that are unique to the specific needs of the region.

The Policy Process

Decision-making on the strategic direction of a region is considered a complex process. Cullingworth and Nadin (1997) propose that the planning process requires that purposeful goals be set and policies developed to achieve those goals. Getz (1997a) represents the strategic planning process for events as a flowchart, suggesting that planning progresses from one defined stage to the next. This rational decision-making represents an incremental policy process. Other scholars have argued that decisions are made with less structure and are more haphazard; therefore, non-incremental policy models are more representative of the process (Cohen et al. 1972; Kingdon 1995). The following sub-sections discuss models of policy-making including rational decision-making, incrementalism, the garbage can model, and Kingdon’s (revised) model (Cohen et al. 1972; Kingdon 1995; Lindblom 1959). This review investigates the evolution of these concepts and develops the framework for further analysis.

Classical Rational Model

Traditionally, the policy process and resulting change have been thought to follow a rational process of planning, deciding, and acting (Hall 2000). In other words, policies would be produced through a sequential process of identifying and examining alternatives, considering the pros and cons of each, choosing the best option, building an implementation plan, and executing that plan.

Even when this model is not thought to be descriptive, it is thought to be prescriptive (Fulop & Linstead 1999). Robbins and Barnwell (1998) describe the organisational theory to implement this approach, arguing that in a classical decision-making process, when a solution or issue arises, information on the issue should be gathered to determine alternative approaches, which would then be interpreted and advice developed. The next stage would require an informed choice of proposals, and the selected proposal would be authorised and become policy. The final stage requires execution of the policy to produce a resulting action. This coordinated group effort results in a centralised policy decision.

Today, many academics argue that the classical rational-comprehensive model is a misconception that oversimplifies the decision-making process (Fulop & Linstead 1999; March 1999; Schermerhorn, Hunt & Osborn 1994). The model has also been criticised for its assumption of a unitary frame of reference (Allison 1971), and a lack of agreement on defining organisational goals and stable objectives, and the ‘best way’ to achieve them (Vecchio, Hearn & Southey 1992; Wood, Wallace & Zeffane 2001).March and Olsen (1979) criticise the model for assuming a stable predictable environment for decision-making where the outcome is not a direct consequence of the decision process. They suggest that a policy decision is embedded in the larger system, and argue that many decisions are made in unstable, ambiguous environments, where exogenous factors (such as context, relationships, beliefs, and values) influence the decision-maker’s choice. Financial considerations have also been identified as having an impact on the decision process (Hawker, Smith & Weller 1979). Fulop and Linstead (1999) point out that: “profit maximisation is not the only criterion applied to choice situations” (p. 307). Consequently, the classical model rationalises the process, but does not reflect the full
complexity of policy decision-making as it fails to reveal the sectoral, organisational, and individual interests in policymaking (Friedmann 1987).

**Incrementalism**

As a response to the limitations of the classical rational model, Charles Lindblom (1959) developed a model that considers the politics in the decision-making process. In the classical rational model, 'good policy' decisions are made by selecting the appropriate means to the desired ends. Lindblom proposed that policymakers do not consider each program or issue anew, but rather make small, incremental, marginal adjustments to what they are already doing. He stated: “Policy making is a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives in which what is desired itself continues to change under reconsideration” (p. 86). Accordingly, he suggests that issues are pushed onto the agenda in a 'bit-by-bit' process that reduces apprehension on a given issue.

Lindblom also warns that objectives have no validity except for the fact that they are agreed upon. Therefore, he suggests that analysis should focus on marginal or incremental values as well as agreed objectives. In Lindblom’s model, although policymakers choose to attain certain values, when they are given the choice between two policies that will achieve their objectives equally, they will pay attention to marginal or incremental values. Consider the case when decision-makers are confronted with two policies, policy X and policy Y. Policy X promises additional f and policy Y promises additional g. The decision-maker must decide if the additional amount of f is worth the incremental expense of g. This logic reduces the need to understand how the policy meets agreed objectives, and instead focuses on understanding the marginal values of the decision-maker when a policy is made. Even though Lindblom argues that incrementalism is superior to the classical rational model, he also concedes that incrementalism arbitrarily excludes policy alternatives through simplification, and neglects long-term considerations and objectives by omitting values and fragmenting the issues.

Lindblom produced a number of well-recognised publications on incrementalism (Lindblom 1959, 1965), including *A Strategy of Decision*, co-authored with Braybrook in 1963. In this study, the authors proposed that, when there is low understanding and incremental change, policy analysts should undertake disjointed incrementalism as a strategy for analysis to adapt to the difficulties of problem solving and evaluation to reach a point of convergence. The authors also comment on the downfall of this strategy:

 “…policy analysts do neglect the unimportant consequences of policies, but among those they concede to be important, they often rule out of bounds the uninteresting (to them), the remote, the imponderable, the intangible, and the poorly understood, no matter how important. Of course, they also sometimes omit inadvertently some important consequence." (p. 90)

Policy analysts may omit tasks to simplify and manage the policy process, resulting in a strategy that becomes overly simplified, orientated towards the means, and fragmented, and an analysis that is limited and neglects important consequences (Braybrook & Lindblom 1963).

Incrementalism has also received criticism (Arrow 1964; Boulding 1964; Dror 1964; Etzioni 1967; Lustick 1980; Matheson 1998; Schulman 1975), although most of its critics were those who attempted to formally model incremental decision-making, often using mathematical models or computer simulations (Bendor 1995). Given the complexity and contextual factors proposed in the concept of incrementalism, the process of ‘muddling through’ the policy process was difficult to capture in these models (Bendor 1995).

In 1979, Lindblom responded to incrementalism’s critics in the article *Still Muddling, Not Yet Through*, stating that policy analysts cannot expect to achieve completeness in analysis given the complexity of the process, and proposed that the best one could hope for is skilful incompleteness. As noted by Lindblom (1979), the model of incremental policymaking is strained when “big-step policies” (p. 521) are made. Similarly, Braybrook and Lindblom (1963) suggest when there is low understanding with grand change (such as policies in response to grand opportunities, wars, revolutions, and crises), policy decisions cannot be explained by this concept. Instead, incrementalism concentrates on small incremental changes as policymakers ‘muddle through’ the process.

**The Garbage Can Model**

Cohen et al. (1972) observed that, in the absence of consensus, organisations make choices without consistent, shared goals. Furthermore, the 1972 study of university organisations by Cohen and his colleagues suggests the existence of what they termed organised anarchies, which are characterised by three general properties. Firstly, decision situations are a loose collection of ideas rather than a coherent structure. This is known as problematic preferences. Secondly, the members do not understand their own process and thus operate on a trial-and-error basis with unclear technology. Thirdly, there is fluid participation in the time and involvement the members devote to the issue. Consequently, the organisation is in a constant state of flux, operating in an uncertain environment with changing decision-makers.

Cohen et al. agreed with Lindblom’s fundamental critique of rationalism, suggesting that time constraints limit the amount of time an individual can devote to an issue demanding attention. They argued:

"An organisation is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be an answer and decision makers looking for work." (p. 2)
Cohen et al. (1972) chose the analogy of a garbage can to explain the accidental nature of the policy-making process and this model became known as the garbage can model. The garbage can model proposed that four independent, exogenous streams operate in the system: (1) a stream of choices, (2) a stream of problems, (3) a rate of flow of solutions, and (4) a stream of energy from participants. A 'choice opportunity' is viewed as a garbage can where participants dump problems and solutions. Through the decision-making process, problems and solutions are randomly coupled, and a problem becomes linked to an unrelated solution. The garbage can model explains why decisions made by organisations are not always rational and objective.

The garbage can model provided an alternative explanation to the theories of rationality (Simon 1957) and highlighted the unsystematic politics, serendipity, and coincidence in policy making (Olsen 2001; Robbins 1996). However, other scholars have criticised it for a lack of rigour, discipline, and analytic power, which Bendor, Moe and Shotts (2001) suggest impedes scientific progress. In reply, Olsen (2001) suggests that Bendor et al. have misinterpreted the model as a theory. He states: “They suggest an approach that assumes away most of the complexity of political actors, the organised settings within which they operate, and institutional change, rather than make a serious effort to understand the complexity” (p. 191). Bendor et al. (2001) also recognised that the garbage can model had considerable influence on the policy literature and more broadly on institutional theory.

The analogy of the garbage can continues to feature in many texts on organisational decision-making (Fulop & Linstead 1999; Gordon 1999; Robbins 1996). Since the publication of Cohen et al.’s article in 1972, the original co-authors, March and Olsen, have elaborated on the model, in particular applying the model in ambiguous, changing environments (March 1978, 1988, 1994, 1999; March & Olsen 1979, 1983, 1989, 1995, 1996). The garbage can model has contributed to the development of additional institutional theories based on the original model, such as Kingdon’s Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (1985, 1995) which had a profound influence on the policy-making literature.

Kingdon’s (Revised) Model

As an extension of the Garbage Can Model, in 1985 Kingdon introduced a model of agenda setting to further explain the processes in government that influenced policy agenda. He proposed three major families of processes: (1) problems, (2) policies, and (3) politics. Each of these three streams has agendas that consist of a: “…list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, people outside of government closely associated with these officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time” (Kingdon 1995, p. 3). Kingdon suggested that problem recognition, generation of policy proposals and political events are important influences on the agendas and alternatives adopted, and yet the movement of an item onto the agenda often occurs as the result of a complex combination of factors. In the following sub-sections each of these three policy streams is discussed.

Problems

The government monitors activities through countable and quantitative measures known as indicators. Through monitoring indicators, governments become aware of and assess the magnitude of a problem. Kingdon (1995) stated: “Policy makers consider a change in an indicator to be a change in the state of a system; this they define as a problem” (p. 92). He warned, however, that indicators could often be exaggerated and manipulated when interpreted.

A sudden, attention-grabbing event, known as a focusing event, also plays an important role in attracting attention to a problem, and pushing an item onto the agenda (Birkland 1998; Kingdon 1995; Newmann 1998). Jones (1994) suggested that domestic and international political events also have this 'attention grabbing' effect on decision-makers. These relatively uncommon, sudden events have mainly been focused on the mobilisation of groups in the event of a disaster or crisis. Birkland (1998) suggested that focusing events have the potential to catalyse policy changes, as the impacts of the event are sudden, dramatic, and 'focal'. They are also described as concentrated to a geographical area and therefore obvious. In his investigation of oil spills and nuclear power accidents, Birkland highlighted the need for coalition groups to advocate change. He found that: “If no advocacy coalitions react, events will gain little more than passing attention” (p. 72). Clearly, the literature suggests that interest groups, government leaders, policy entrepreneurs, media, or the community need to be mobilised to engender change.

As opposed to small incremental changes (e.g. Lindblom 1959), large changes to policy are produced by sudden, attention-grabbing events that propel the issue onto the policymaker’s agenda. These events have been characterised as focusing events. The literature on focusing events has concentrated on negative events, such as disasters and crises (e.g. Birkland 1998; Cobb & Elder 1972; Faulkner 2000; Kingdon 1995), and indicates that through negative focusing events, less powerful groups can challenge the status quo and highlight problems requiring public discussion. To defenders of the status quo, change to the agenda is significantly more problematic than the growth of an agenda. Less powerful groups can, however, exploit a positive focusing event to mobilise pro-change groups and incite support to promote change. Birkland (1998) states: “Focusing events
serve as important opportunities for politically disadvantaged groups to champion messages that had been effectively suppressed by dominant groups and advocacy coalitions. Such events can therefore be an important tool for groups seeking policy change” (p. 54). This suggests that a focusing event may or may not facilitate promotion of an item onto the agenda of policymakers.

Problems may also become highlighted by feedback, because systems operate through the recognition of structures that occur again and again. Senge (1990) suggests that each system has its own agenda, which he describes as its implicit goal. A reinforcing (or amplifying) feedback system will engender growth of that structure. In some cases, a small amount of positive feedback can have a large consequence. As a result, a 'snowball effect' can be created. Conversely, negative feedback is known as a vicious cycle. Whenever there is an implicit goal, the system will exhibit goal-oriented behaviour. It will look like nothing is happening as the system maintains the status quo. Ultimately, through this balancing process the system seeks homeostasis. Senge (1990) indicates that: “whenever there is ‘resistance to change’, you can count on there being one or more ‘hidden’ balancing processes” (p. 88). This is reinforced by Kingdon (1995) who characterises a problem as: “a mismatch between the observed condition and one’s concept of the ideal state” (p. 110).

In a government setting, Kingdon (1995) suggests that both formal and informal channels of feedback exist through systematic monitoring and evaluation studies, complaints, casework, and the day-to-day administration of the program. As a result, Kingdon notes that: “…bureaucrats also have some interest in preventing feedback from reaching policymakers, especially if that feedback might reflect negatively on their stewardship or might raise serious questions about whether their programs should be continued” (p. 101). Therefore, it is important that a problem be appropriate to the government action by remaining unsolved and maintaining the enthusiasm of policymakers to avoid fading from the agenda. Through lobbying and issue management, agenda-setters can influence the channelling of feedback. Lobbyists seek to directly influence government actions with activities such as petitioning personal contacts and using the media. Through managing an issue, they can determine which issue becomes significant and can mould a potential threat into an opportunity (Chalip 1995).

In addition to feedback issues, new proposals must also be aware of their problem definition. The categorisation of the problem will structure people’s perception of that problem. New proposals to a problem may be a threat to someone else’s interests. As a consequence, in the initial stages most new problems must fit into governments’ preserved old categories for as long as possible. In summary, Kingdon (1995) suggests it is imperative that a proposal be linked to a problem to obtain a favourable position on policy agendas.

Policies

Kingdon (1995) uses the metaphor of primeval soup to illustrate the policy process, comparing the policy process to processes of natural selection in evolutionary biology. He suggests that the origins of policy are haphazard, yet the selection is not and notes that specialists in policy areas consequently engage in intimate, small interactions with each other and form policy communities. Closely-knit communities share a common language, generate common outlooks and therefore have better communication with one another. As Deutsch (1970) states:

“This co-operation between groups and bureaucrats can sometimes be a good thing. But it may sometimes be a very bad thing. These groups, used to each other's needs, may become increasingly preoccupied with each other, insensitive to the needs of outsiders, and impervious to new recruitment and to new ideas. Or the members of the various interest group elites may identify more and more with each other and less and less with the interest they represent.” (p. 56)

In fragmented policy areas, “The left hand knows not what the right hand is doing, with the result that the left hand sometimes does something that profoundly affects the right hand, without anyone seeing the implications” (Kingdon 1995, p. 119). In areas with a high degree of disassociation and lack of communication, the policy becomes fragmented and ultimately ineffective and inefficient.

In addition to policy communities, policy entrepreneurs can also become advocates for solutions to problems. These individuals invest their resources to seek a return in the future. Kingdon (1995) lists their incentives to include: personal and/or group interest, promotion of their values and the ability to affect the shaping public policy, and those who like the game (known as political groupies).

Both of these groups (policy communities and policy entrepreneurs) are actively involved in the evolutionary processes of mutation and recombination in their quest to survive. As a result, Kingdon (1995) suggests: “Wholly new ideas do not suddenly appear. Instead, people recombine familiar elements into a new structure or a new proposal” (p. 141). Consensus building is pursued, as ideas are short-listed. Kingdon describes a bandwagon effect (i.e. snowballing), tipping effect (i.e. growing realisation), and coalition building (i.e. widespread feeling) as an idea reaches the point of commonplace. Consequently, “Ideas fade in and out, but they never go away” (Kingdon 1995, p. 141). Likewise, Gray and Lowery (2000) suggested that new ‘idea factories’ have little influence on the policy process, implying that new ideas do not simply emerge on the agenda, rather they are the rehashed or reworked ideas from past iterations of the policy process.
Politics

Politics also play an important role in the policy process. Central to Kingdon’s revised model is the concept of political streams. Traditional policy- and decision-making literature has concentrated on the stages or steps of events defined in the rational-comprehensive model. Kingdon recognised the independence of each problem and solution in the policy process. Similarly, Allison (1972) identifies this process as the action-channel of policy-making.

Kingdon’s model suggests that problems and policies are independent streams flowing through the political system. Each stream (including politics) has a life of its own, and each stream has status equal to the other. When an item builds momentum or is promoted on the agenda, there is an opportune point when an opening emerges to put a proposal to the policymakers for endorsement. This is known as a policy window. When a policy window opens, the streams become coupled. Within each stream there are limited randomness, limits on coupling possibilities (i.e. some couplings are more likely than are others), and various constraints on the system (e.g. boundaries, budget constraints, rules of procedure, and a scarcity of opening windows). Kingdon suggests these limitations explain why some items are never promoted onto the active policy agenda.

Policymakers’ sense of national mood or public opinion has an important influence on policy agendas and policy outcomes (Herbst 1998; Kingdon 1995). The government’s sense of the climate of the country may promote or downgrade an item on the agenda (Kingdon 1995). Policymakers feel they can sense the national mood. Traditionally, they have used media coverage and interactions with their constituents (e.g. mail, visits, conversations) to attempt to gauge this feeling. Ultimately, there is no absolute measure of national mood. Kingdon (1995) suggests the objective of offering a solution when there is a problem. He refers to this opportunity as the policy window, which can be used to highlight and justify the importance of a pet proposal.

Sport Events and Political Legitimation

Other researchers suggest that large sport events open policy windows (Chalip 1995), which provide the opportunity for political elites to circumvent public scrutiny (Raco 2000; Whitson & Macintosh 1996). According to that argument, staging events provides a platform from which to avert the public’s attention and inquiry.

Scholars have questioned the validity of discourse surrounding the construction and re-development of infrastructure for events. Burbank et al. (2000) suggest that the influence of informal coalitions of business and political elites on the policy agenda diminishes the prospect of success for opponents of the growth of a regime. Likewise, Whitson and Macintosh (1996) question the identities and interests of the planners when cities pursue sport teams and events in order to be in the “big league” (p. 236) or become known as a world-class city. They suggest that primary beneficiaries of these policies tend to be the affluent end-of-town (i.e. the business and professional elites), at the sacrifice of community recreational facilities and unspectacular community services for the less fortunate residents.

Whitson and Macintosh propose that it is not only a coalition of elites that drives this economic development agenda, but also the general public who have ‘bought into’ the teams and events through the media and the integration of ’big league’ sport into the collective lives of cities and nations. They suggest the need for consultation through public debate and forums to encourage benefits for the community as a whole and identification with sport teams and events. Through this process, the whole community can derive benefit from living in a world-class city.

Likewise, Sack and Johnson’s (1996) analysis of the decision-making process for acquiring the Volvo International Tennis Tournament in New Haven suggests that the policy decisions were made by a small group of elites (including business elites and political figures), who neglected to consult with the general public until late in the planning stages. Consequently, the development policies benefited the political elites in the city and not the interests of the community as a whole.

Another example is Hiller’s (2000) study of the 2004 Cape Town Olympic bid. He suggests that planning a bid to host the Olympics has multiple agendas, and found that the 2004 Cape Town Olympic bid committee had the power and vast resources to mobilise policy issues and create event bid advocates. This group created a coalition of elites who promoted their own ideas and issues in planning the bid. By the same token, Raco (2000) warns: "Partnerships also provide a powerful way of legitimating policy programmes" (p. 596). Hiller (2000) suggests that the process promotes the public’s buy-in of the ’hype’ and mystique surrounding the hosting of a ‘world class event’, resulting in a trajectory that is difficult to disrupt regardless of costs or consequences.

Likewise, political elites can promote public buy-in for a private gain and sometimes will use the event at the expense of the public to justify the development of infrastructure (e.g. sporting facilities, hotels, restaurants, waterfront precincts) to support their own personal interests. Pelissero, Henschen, and Sidlow’s (1991) analysis of the politics of sport stadiums and economic development agendas in Chicago agrees with this notion. They stated:

“Corporate regimes then and now promote public stadiums as a common good, allegedly providing entertainment to residents, fans, broadcast audiences, jobs through stadium construction and operation, a competitive edge in attracting business to the community, and finally prestige to the city… Of course,
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corporate regimes also promote public stadium development because stadiums tend to be 'loss leaders' that require public subsidies." (p. 118)

In addition to public buy-in, policymakers are also concerned about justifying and legitimating their organisation's and department's public funding. Benson (1975) claims that the political economy causes these inter-organisational networks to form based on money and authority, stating that: “Organisation decision makers are orientated to the acquisition and defence of a secure and adequate supply of these resources” (p. 232). Benson also suggests that the degree of inter-organisational power is determined by three factors: “(1) the size of the group or groups which may be expected to support the organisation, (2) the degree of mobilisation of supporting groups, and (3) their social rank” (p. 234). Given these factors, organisations should be aware of where the inter-organisational power lies and put themselves in a strong position to leverage this power to control network resources. Exchanges between unequals are common, but may impose limits on their cooperation. When an organisation or individual within the network has limited power or does not hold something valued by other network memberships, their ability to function in the network is questionable, and they can become powerless (Benson 1975).

In a place marketing context, these networks are mobilised to facilitate public sponsorship of sport events. This reasoning is often justified by the anticipated economic impact on the region and civic boosterism. In Lynch and Jensen’s (1983) analysis of the 1982 Commonwealth Games (in Brisbane, Australia), they stated: “Certain opinions on the economic desirability of major events seem to be based more on personal convictions or political stance than on sound economic logic” (p. 11). They used this rationale to highlight the importance of economic indicators in the decision-making process, suggesting that economic indicators should not be the sole criterion to measure the desirability of hosting an event, but should inform public debate. Getz (1992) argues that, while research on events has proliferated, there is little consistency in research methodologies and a lack of standardised statistics to facilitate comparison. Today, procedures for modelling and estimating economic impacts are still debated (Black & Pape 1995; Crompton 1995; Dwyer, Mellor, Mistilis & Mules 2000; Jones 2001). As indicated in the focus group research conducted for the National Sport Tourism Strategy (Australian Commonwealth Government 2000c), cities throughout Australia still strive for a 'standardised' or 'best practice' model to measure the economic impact of hosting an event. Clearly, public sector players want to be able to provide evidence that validates government investment in hosting these events, and to justify to voters and private business that it is worthwhile for government to support these events.

Events need public funding and community support. In the case of the Olympic Games, the International Olympic Committee demands evidence that these elements exist in Olympic bid cities (International Olympic Committee 2001). This quest for support is highlighted in Bramwell and Rawding's (1994) study of city marketing and public-private partnerships. They state: "...many decisions in the public sectors are left to a narrow group of professional strategists and image-makers... Accountability is important, and a continual effort usually needs to be put into genuine public involvement and consultation in tourism strategies and initiatives." (p. 432)

In his case study of the Darling Harbour waterfront development in Sydney, Hall (1999) found a potential problem with community consultation when it was focused on specific questions. Consultation, according to Hall, did not ascertain the “wider issues of alternative developments and what communities actually wanted their city and waterfront to look like” (p. 20), and rules of the game were drawn up in such ways as to exclude many groups from the development process.

A clear challenge for groups and individuals who make policy decisions is to identify who is involved in the policy process and who is being left out (Hall 1999). Chalip (1995) suggests policies should be critically analysed to challenge the status quo, to mobilise policy stakeholders, and to provoke scrutiny of social problems and policy. Accordingly, he explains that focusing events can legitimise a policy, yet the problem definition and its attribution frame these actions. Others would suggest that the matter of policy frames needs to be understood from multiple levels of analysis. Allison (1971) argues that three levels need to be considered both separately and jointly: the rational actor level, the organisational level, and the political level.

Levels of Analysis

Allison (1971) argued that traditional policy and decision-making theories have concentrated on a rational-comprehensive model, possible reflecting alternative hypotheses. Through his analysis of the Cuban missile crisis, Allison challenged the unitary level of analysis of the political and organisational literature when investigating the decision making process for political events. His framework proposed that the way an analyst recognises alternatives and forms assumptions depends on the level from which the situation is viewed. Allison suggested that by applying a three-tiered analysis framework, the analyst would obtain a more comprehensive understanding of policy activities. Each of the three themes is reviewed below.

The Rational Actor Level

The first frame of reference is the rational actor. Scholars of classical decision-making and game theory suggest that problems are structured around choice, and that selecting from numerous alternatives can be reduced to a
rational decision that has a given set of consequences. Allison (1971) defines this rationality as: “consistent, value-maximising choices within specific constraints” (p. 30). Applications of this model suggest a unitary, rational decision-maker who chooses an action in a centrally controlled, well informed, and static environment. Therefore, this framework suggests a relationship between answering the question of why X rather than Y happened (i.e. explaining), answering the question of what is the preferred path for a government to achieve particular goals (i.e. problem solving), and determining the performance of the region in achieving its goals (i.e. evaluation).

The rational actor level has the benefit of maintaining consistent value-maximising actions that have a given pay-off function, fixed alternatives, and known consequences. Policy decisions can be rationalised, giving policymakers a sense of certainty and allowing their policies to be fully explained in terms of the goals they seek to achieve. The rational actor also must defend his or her rationality (i.e. show that the value-maximising alternative was chosen), but may neglect to consider all the possible alternatives and outcomes in an effort to make consistent value-maximising choices.

Organisational Level
Policy decision processes can be viewed from the organisational level. Allison (1971) proposes that investigating decisions requires an understanding of the conglomeration of loosely tied organisations that exist relatively independent of one another. He suggests that these organisations have rules to determine the way things are done, and have established routines known as standard operating procedures (SOPs). When addressing a new problem, the organisation will employ established SOPs. Minor modifications are constantly being made to SOPs, although changes typically follow rather than precede events. As a result, the adopted decision will be a function of an organisation’s pre-established procedure, rather than a coordinated choice.

Other authors also note that organisations rely on familiar ways of thinking and acting, known as their mental model (e.g. Porac, Thomas & Baden-Fuller 1989; Senge 1990). Deeply held beliefs within the organisation limit decision-making images to those that are familiar. Consequently, new insights often fail to be implemented because they conflict with existing mental models.

Critics of Allison's organisational process model suggest that SOPs do not adequately explain simple adjustments to standard policies or policy shifts (Newmann 1998). Others have argued that budgetary cycles may influence the regular scheduling of inter-departmental rivalry. Allison's SOP model does not explain who will win the war between these departments (Wildavsky 1992). These critics suggest, that although examination of SOPs is heuristically useful, it would also be helpful to differentiate routine from non-routine decision-making (Newmann 1998).

Political Level
The third level of analysis Allison (1971) proposed is focused on governmental bureaucratic politics. This frame of reference recognises that there are many actors, known as 'players', involved in any decision process. Players are focused on diverse, single strategic objectives, including organisational and personal goals. This model recognised that government decisions are not concentrated on unitary, rational choice, but rather on the political leveraging opportunities the situation presents. This intra-national game lends insight to each player's coalitions, bargains, and compromises as policy-making proceeds.

Allison proposed that a player’s position in the organisational hierarchy would also influence his or her role in the policy game, with the 'chiefs' usually being within the upper levels of the organisation hierarchy (e.g. presidents, directors). The 'staffers' are the immediate assistants to each chief. Within each department or agency there are 'Indians', the political appointees and permanent government officials. The final group is the 'ad hoc players', players within the wider government game. "Chiefs focus on an issue and look for a solution," Allison states: "Indians seek a problem" (p. 176). Therefore, chiefs seek to build coalitions of the relevant powers to highlight the 'hot issues' that they consider most important. Likewise, Indians compete with Indians in other departments to get their proposals to the attention of chiefs. Ultimately this crowded schedule means that players must ensure that each move counts. Accordingly, they must be able to hook their proposal or issue into what Allison identified as the action-channel of policy-making.

The action-channel of policy decisions is usually a combination of influences by various stakeholders, and pinpointing exactly who is responsible for the movement is difficult. As stated by Kingdon (1995): “Public policy is not one single actor’s brainchild” (p. 71). Attempts to attribute the origin of a policy to a solitary stakeholder can be difficult, and in most instances fruitless.

Collective Action
Policy decisions affecting place marketing depend on a number of actors from different sectors of the economy. To obtain an integrated strategy, it is critical that these actors come together to derive a collective or group good from an opportunity. In other words, effective place marketing requires collective action (Hardin 1982; Olson
1965; Sandler 1992). Place marketers encounter situations in which stakeholders from throughout the region must come together to create or take advantage of an opportunity (Kotler et al. 1993; van den Berg et al. 2000). Collective action problems arise when the outcome or reward for the individual is dependent on the action of others within a group that is built on the interdependency of its players.

In his book, The Logic of Collective Action, Olson (1965) suggests that collective action can be used to describe how decisions and consequent outcomes are derived from the internal motivations and incentives within the group. This is illustrated by the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In essence, it is proposed that: “there is a dilemma precisely because what it makes sense for the individual to do is not what it would make sense for the group to do” (Hardin 1982, p. 2). Olson’s logic of collective action is given in the equation: $A = V - C$ (where: $A$ is the collective good; $V$ is the gross benefit to the individual; $C$ is the total cost of the collective provision). He proposes that a group will succeed or be privileged when the net benefit to the individual from their contribution to the collective good ($A$) is positive. Conversely, if $A$ is negative then the group is latent: it will not form or will not function. In order to avoid collective failure or a latent group, Olson suggests that there must be other non-collective good (selective) incentives to induce contribution. For example, an individual’s involvement may promote a personal belief, improve their career, or their organisation may receive additional funding or status. Given this analysis, Olson suggests that both latent and large groups have a predisposition to failure. Studying the problems of collective action can inform our understandings of the behaviour of groups and the policymakers within them.

Research into collective action suggests that group members may be attracted to the group asymmetry, that is, they may be attracted by their greater degree of power within the group (Hardin 1982). The term ‘free rider’ has been coined to describe individuals who are attracted to the group to ride on the efforts of others and influence the outcome of the group for their own benefit. Other individuals may not work as hard in the group as they would individually, a behaviour known as social loafing (Schermerhorn, Hunt & Osborn 1994). Group members may also be attracted by selected incentives or by-products of group participation, such as friendship and social interactions, shared experience, enjoyment of the activities, pleasure in the life of the group, and career advancement (Hardin 1982). However, the key insight of collective action is that even when the aggregate collective benefit from a collective activity is positive, the requisite collective action may not occur, either because the group does not form, or because the group fails to perform as needed (due to free-riding or social loafing).

Another reason collective action may not occur is that it incurs its own costs, known as transaction costs, which are expended on the resources (e.g. time and energy) required to act collectively. The resources needed to form, build, and maintain relationships for a collective good may require a substantial investment of an individual’s time and energy, and collective action often fails given the high transaction costs of the activity.

Yet, there are ways to facilitate collective action (Sandler 1992), such as by the establishment of a central coordinator to drive the initiative. From this central position, a coordinator can facilitate the relationships required to act collectively, thereby reducing the resources required by each individual and the overall transaction cost. Social pressure can also be applied to benefit a collective action approach, and initiatives can be employed to raise both material and social capital.

When hosting an event, stakeholders have an opportunity to derive collective benefits for the economy through leveraging activities. Analysis of these activities requires an understanding of how collective action was (or was not) employed as well as the reasons for adopting a particular structure and behaviour to leverage an event.

**Implications**

This review of the literature has highlighted the potential to employ sport as a component of the place marketing mix, and has shown that place marketing can be considered a tool of the local economic development strategy. As noted in this chapter, events, tourism, and sport play increasingly important roles in many local economies. Through a better understanding of how to leverage and coordinate these activities in a region, local planners, economic developers, and destination marketers can maximise the opportunities and benefits afforded by hosting these events. Policymakers must take a long-term perspective when planning for these initiatives and, in doing so, towns and cities may be able to generate awareness and build relationships not possible previously, thereby creating sustainable legacies from their investment.

The diverse range of stakeholders necessitates coordination and places requisite tasks onto the local policymakers’ agenda. Various models of the policy process were discussed in this chapter, and factors that affect the way policies are made (i.e. the processes) and the agendas of the policymakers were identified. Aspects of legitimisation were also highlighted, and in particular, the concepts of rational decision-making, incrementalism, the garbage can model, collective action, and Kingdon’s (revised) model were described. This discussion will serve as the basis for subsequent analysis.

In conclusion, this review demonstrated the need for a coordinated approach to local economic development. Clearly, stakeholders must better understand the roles and processes of their own organisation and those of other
stakeholders as well. Ultimately, the aim of the local policy community is to align their programs and projects with the overall unified direction of the local economic strategy, and optimise the impact on the region. The inter-weaving of these various streams is depicted in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: The theoretical constructs](image)

As Figure 1 shows, place marketing is seen as a core activity of local economic development. Sport is a component of the product and service mix in place marketing, as are tourism, and other businesses. Within any local economic development strategy, it is also important to consider the stakeholders and contextual factors, which influence policy decisions. Similarly, the policy streams that underpin the process also need to be considered. The constructs identified in this review have been incorporated to illustrate the various aspects of the policy process. This framework will inform the analysis in the following chapters and provide the basis for subsequent discussion.

**Overview**

To examine policy processes in the local leveraging of an event, comparative case study methodology is employed. This method provides an in-depth investigation of the issues and responses to a particular event, pre-Games training for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. In the next chapter (Chapter 3), the methodology of this study is justified and explained. In Chapter 4, an analysis of the change in the national policy agenda and responses of event organisers to pre-Games training is undertaken. In the following chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7), a narrative description of each case study is provided. In the final section of each chapter, a discussion of the issues and lessons that arise from that particular case are given. In the concluding chapter (Chapter 8), a discussion integrating the case studies is provided. The chapter discusses the overall findings and implications of this study. Recommendations for place marketing, policy-making, and policy analysis are devised, and implications for future research are noted.
Chapter 3

METHOD

In order to explore the policy process of Australian cities’ strategic planning for hosting pre-Games training, it is necessary to adopt a research design that explores the decision-making and responses of policymakers. Accordingly, a comparative case study methodology was employed to provide within-case and cross-case analyses. The following sub-sections present the reasoning for selecting this methodology, the value of the case study method, the logic of site selection, and the sampling strategies used within each case study. The chapter concludes with a discussion of research procedures and data analysis.

Case Study Methodology

There is a growing interest in case study methodology to investigate research problems. Case studies permit in-depth investigation of social phenomena (Yin 1994). Eisenhardt (1989) argued that case studies are most appropriate when the researcher seeks to understand the 'how' and 'why' of a phenomenon. She suggests that this methodology encourages the 'unfreezing' of thinking to generate novel theory. Furthermore, emergent theory is testable given that the theory is directly tied to the data. Arnould and Wallendorf (1994) propose that case study fieldwork can illuminate social behaviours not evident previously. Case study research can provide new insights and develop theoretical frameworks for understanding social behaviour.

There are also disadvantages to the case study approach. Authors have warned of the complexity of using empirical evidence (i.e. the temptation to capture everything), the problem of generalising resulting theories about specific phenomena (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1994). Moreover, researchers must be wary of becoming too close to the process. To address these problems, Arnould and Wallendorf (1994) suggest that researchers should deliberately pay attention to marginal and specific aspects of people and events, debrief regularly, and develop holistic checklists to generate a detailed record of events. In this study the data collection and records focused on capturing the detail of explicit and implicit events, and regular debriefs were undertaken with Honours supervisors. Arnould and Wallendorf also suggest that researchers should randomise the selection of times and places for data collection. Given the timing and logistical limitations, convenience and availability were key criteria in determining the time and place for data collection in this study. Data collection planning centred on the Olympic Games in September 2000, given that pre-Games training would be undertaken in the preceding month.

Yin (1994) proposed a typology of case study research and discussed the characteristics of a single and multiple case study design. In some instances, case study researchers have used a single case. Yin suggested that a single case design should be employed when the case is critical to test theory, when studying a unique or extreme event, or when the case has a revelatory purpose. A single case approach is used when there is a holistic design with embedded units of analysis. In contrast, it can sometimes be useful to use multiple case studies. Yin suggests that the multi-case approach is more compelling and robust and can provide generalisability through replicating or contrasting results. Since the purpose of this study is to consider variations in response, as well as the associated processes and outcomes of those variations, a multiple case study approach is adopted.

Case study methodology can incite inductive theory building. Traditionally, scientific reasoning has employed methodologies in which deductive reasoning moves from general principles to specific cases. Conversely, inductive reasoning progresses from specific cases to general principles. For example, a particular organisation is studied intensely to generate lessons for organisations in general (Elmes, Kantowitz & Roediger 1989). In case study research, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that the researcher should identify the research question or research focus and identify possible variables or tentative constructs from the literature, known as a priori constructs. She suggests that this provides a better grounding of construct measurement than heading directly out into the field. She warns that these constructs are tentative, and the researcher retains theoretical flexibility as she inductively builds theory through case study research. In this study an inductive theory building approach was employed, and a research focus (i.e. pre-Games training) and a priori constructs were identified, then modified and altered given the findings in the field.

Another feature of case study research is that it can include both quantitative and qualitative data. Typically, case studies involve a combination of data collection methods, including archival analysis, interviews, experiments, questionnaires, and observations (Eisenhardt 1989; Spradley 1980). Ultimately, the data required should be guided by the research problem or focus, and the type of data collected should reflect the specific objectives of the research. In the study of pre-Games training, the majority of the data was qualitative (e.g. interviews, photographs, marketing collateral). Quantitative data (e.g. the economic impact of the training camps, the number of teams) were collected through secondary sources.
Because many case study methodologies employ qualitative data, issues of analysing and interpreting talk (e.g. from interviews), text (e.g. from reports and archives), and interaction (e.g. from observations) have been discussed. In his book *Learning from Strangers*, Weiss (1994) describes the art of conducting and analysing interviews. He suggests that through interviews, researchers can learn about a phenomenon through the person’s interior experience, obtaining information about how the person perceives and integrates the problem.

Text also forms an important part of case study data collection, and can be used singularly or in conjunction with other data. Silverman (1993) emphasises the problem of treating one actor’s point of view as an explanation. In case study research, reports, minutes, archival and other data are often cross-referenced with interview data. Observational data are also a layer in the multi-layered interpretation of phenomena. In this study, multiple sources of data were collected (e.g. interviews, reports, observations), and multiple informants were used to provide insight into different perspectives of the research problem.

A methodology that is often associated with observational data collection is ethnography. Arnould and Wallendorf (1994) demonstrate that it is possible to build a marketing strategy from data collected by means of participant observation. Spradley (1980) also describes participant observation. Although not all case studies (including this report) include a comprehensive ethnographic study, Spradley suggests that observational data are important to frame the research problem in context. In this study, observation provides the opportunity to get a feeling for the shared cultural knowledge among those involved in pre-Games training.

Researchers who use multiple methodologies often triangulate their data. This technique is known as triangulation, and forms the basis of methodological pluralism. It is argued that using one technique to confirm another can develop a more complete picture. As a result, weaknesses and competing perspective become evident. This methodology is supported by Yin (1994) who suggests that through cross-referencing multiple sources of evidence, a converging line of inquiry is established. Yin suggests that by triangulating data, the researcher can enhance the validity of findings. Patton (1987) suggests there are four types of triangulation: (1) data triangulation, in which the researcher evaluates the research problem from different sources of data; (2) investigator triangulation, in which data are viewed by multiple evaluators; (3) theory triangulation, in which research looks from a different perspective at the same data set; and (4) methodological triangulation, in which multiple methodologies are employed. In this study, data triangulation, theory triangulation, and methodological triangulation are used.

Another aspect of case study research is the cycle of inquiry. Given the in-depth nature of case study research, data collection and theory development are often iterative or cyclical processes. The case study research process has also been related to grounded theory building. As Glaser and Strauss (1967) and later Strauss (1987) explain, a grounded theory approach requires the researcher to continuously compare data with theory in an iterative process, and there is a frequent overlap between data collection, analysis, and theory development. Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that the benefits of an iterative process of inquiry are that it permits flexibility in data collection, gives the researcher the freedom to make adjustments to the path of inquiry, enables the collection of additional data sources, and allows the researcher to probe for emergent theories and take advantage of special opportunities. She describes this as: “controlled opportunism in which researchers take advantage of the uniqueness of a specific case and the emergence of new themes to improve resultant theory” (p. 539). In this study, a grounded theory approach was adopted.

Given that case studies seek to explain social behaviour in the past, the research is based in history (Weiss 1994). The researcher should seek to see the phenomenon through the eyes of the people they are studying (Bryman 1988). The researcher should also be aware of the historical, cultural, political, and contextual influences on the methodology and data (Silverman 1993). Vincent (1996) warns of three primary methodological problems when collecting historical data. Firstly, the subjects are aware that the findings will be released for public scrutiny, and as such, their responses may be influenced. He states: “Records, like compost, are best well rotted” (p. 7). To reduce the disparity between evidence and reality, subjects need to know their words will be protected. Secondly, Vincent proposes that the researcher should be aware of too much evidence. For example, an organisation may produce endless reports to promote its successes. Historical evidence usually tells the story of winners, not losers. Finally, subjects may seek to highlight their successes and hide their failures. It is impossible to remove all external influences and biases from the research. Given that history is in the past, it is important that researchers acknowledge any bias and record that bias in the data. Given the historical, cultural, political, and contextual nature of pre-Games training, it was important to be aware of these influences when this study was undertaken.

In summary, this section has discussed issues in case study research, and has included a review of the advantages and disadvantages of case study research, inductive theory building, issues of data typology, data collection and triangulation, case study typology, the iterative cycle of inquiry, and historical issues in research. This provides a basis for discussion of the methodology used in this study. In the following sub-sections, the selection of case studies, sample frame, procedure, data analysis, reliability, and validity are outlined.
Sample Frame

The Selection of Case Studies

Yin (1994) suggests that each case study should provide replication, and must be chosen to either predict similar results (literal replication) or produce contrasting results but for predictable reasons (theoretical replications). This study was centred on inductive theory building from case study research (Eisenhardt 1989). Given this focus, it was important to achieve theoretical replication. Cases were selected on the basis of their ability to provide contrasting results, but for predictable reasons (Yin 1994), and needed to be comparable or have a degree of 'sameness', but also provide contrast with one another. To identify these cases, the literature was consulted and theoretical criteria were established. Throughout the research process, these criteria were refined through repetitive iterations between the theory and the data. The initial theoretical criteria used to select case study sites were: (1) their comparability, including their distance from Sydney and their population size; (2) their difference in terms of policies and objectives (highlighted in the scoping study); and (3) access to data.

Based on these criteria, three case study sites were selected: the Gold Coast, the Hunter, and Canberra. As shown in Table 1, the three case studies were comparable as they were each two hours or less travelling time to Sydney, had domestic airports, and had a similar size population (i.e. less than or equal to 500,000). Furthermore, interviewees at each site expressed a desire to establish a sustainable sport tourism industry in their region, particularly through hosting sporting events and international training camps.

Table 1: Characteristics of the case study sites selected for this study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Gold Coast</th>
<th>The Hunter</th>
<th>Canberra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy Driver</strong></td>
<td>Gold Coast City Council</td>
<td>Hunter Economic Development Corporation</td>
<td>ACT Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leveraging activities</strong></td>
<td>Media hosting International Media Centre Cross-promotion</td>
<td>Business delegations and relationships Media hosting</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distance from Sydney</strong></td>
<td>900 km 1 hour by air, 12-14 hours by road</td>
<td>171 km 40 minutes by air 2 hours by road</td>
<td>300 km 35 minutes by air 3.5 hours by road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>320,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Airport</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assets</strong></td>
<td>Popular tourist destination Beaches Climate</td>
<td>Strong primary industry base &amp; shipping port Beaches Wine country</td>
<td>National capital Australian Institute of Sport</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three sites were also distinctive from each other, in particular, their geographical and political locations within Australia. As shown in Figure 2, they were located in different states/territories within Australia, and each site had a different government and political climate. They also had varying organisations with different agendas driving their response, and each case had different assets to sell. Thus, each case revealed a different response, but for understandable reasons. Key aspects of each case study site are described in the following sections.
The Gold Coast

The Gold Coast region is located in the southeast region of the state of Queensland. This state is located in the central-northern aspect of Australia on the eastern seaboard. The Gold Coast City Council governs the region, which extends from the state border with New South Wales, to the Logan River in the north, and the hinterland (adjoining Beaudesert Shire) in the west. The Gold Coast is a popular tourist destination with a sub-tropical climate and surf beaches. A prominent tourist destination is the Surfers Paradise precinct.

The Gold Coast was included in this study for several reasons. This coastal strip is a popular holiday destination, particularly for the domestic market. The region has extensive tourism infrastructure and offers an excellent climate for elite sport training camps. The Gold Coast case study highlights the response of a local economy that is highly attuned to tourism. As will be demonstrated, this characteristic had an enormous impact on the potential to attract and leverage Olympic teams and athletes. The Gold Coast’s pre-Games training initiative was driven by the local city council, although a non-governmental entrepreneurial relationship precipitated an early triumph for the region in that the Gold Coast successfully secured the entire British Olympic team and hosted the largest training camp in Australia. In many ways, the Gold Coast was ahead of other regions in Australia (and even their own state government decision-makers) in planning to host pre-Games training. Securing such a large team had an enormous impact on local planning and decision-making in the time prior to the Games.

The Hunter

The Hunter region is located in the state of New South Wales (host state of the 2000 Olympic Games). From the Great Lakes in the north, to Merriwa to the west and Lake Macquarie in the south, the Hunter region is comprised of thirteen local government areas. The local governing bodies come together under the umbrella organisation, Hunter Region Organisation of Councils. The major city in the Hunter is Newcastle. Apart from its strong primary industry base and shipping port, the Hunter region also has a growing tourism industry owing to the development of the region’s wine country, and the attraction of its beaches and natural environment (Hunter Economic Development Corporation 2001; Hunter Region Organisation of Councils 2001).

The Hunter provides an interesting example of a pre-Games training initiative because the strategy was closely tied to local economic development, and displays how pre-Games training camps were used to build relationships beyond sport for business and trade opportunities. This case study will show that, early in the planning stages, the Hunter’s pre-Games training initiative was positioned (similar to the Canberra and Gold Coast strategies) within local government. However, a dramatic change in the players who drove the strategy had a profound influence on the objectives and ultimately the outcomes derived from pre-Games training.
Canberra

Canberra is the capital city of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The ACT is an independent territory surrounded by the state of New South Wales. Canberra is the national capital of Australia, and home to the Australian Federal Government and Australian Institute of Sport (Canberra Tourism and Events Corporation 2001). For the purpose of this study, this site will be referred to as Canberra; however it will include the city of Canberra and the surrounding regions that comprise the ACT. The ACT has a single-tier government that is responsible for state/territory, regional, and local level policy.

Canberra provides a useful contrast to the other cases and particularly interesting as pre-Games training was not central to the agendas of the primary players (the ACT Government). Furthermore, the government’s agenda was also being stretched or crowded by other Olympic-related activities, such as the Olympic Football Tournament. Consequently, pre-Games training was contracted to an external, private organisation. As a for-profit entity, this organisation had no stake in deriving benefit for the public good. The outcome of outsourcing this project was that pre-Games training in Canberra was not leveraged. As such, Canberra provides insight into how competing agendas deflected the stakeholders from fully leveraging the pre-Games training opportunity.

Sample Population

A theoretical sampling procedure was employed to select interviewees in each of the case study sites (Malhotra, Hall, Shaw & Crisp 1996). From this initial contact, a snowball sampling method was employed (Page & Meyer 2000), and a chain of personal contacts was obtained through previous respondents. The literature review demonstrated that tourism, sport, business, and local governing authorities each have a critical stake in the development and implementation of place marketing policy (cf. Kotler et al. 1993). These stakeholders have a legitimate interest in the development and performance of the region’s marketing and ultimately the local economic development strategy. Donaldson and Preston (1995) define a stakeholder as: “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives” (p. 67), and they propose that a stakeholder must have the power to affect the organisation’s performance. Blakely (1994) states: “People and organisations with vested interests in an area’s economic development must be drawn into the formation and policy processes for an economic development organisation. Different stakeholders will have different goals that must be made explicit and considered” (p. 284). Explicit, or agreed upon, values of multiple stakeholders will also play a significant role in the planning process. Considine (1994) states that: “values express their preference and explain their purpose in undertaking or refusing different forms of behaviour” (p. 49).

Several groups were established to leverage the Olympic Games. According to stakeholder theory, these groups are not stakeholders. Rather they are temporary organisations comprised of representatives from other stakeholder groups. These groups did not exist prior to the Games, and were not designed to exist after. In other words, the stakes are there only because of mission. These groups were made up from a collection of stakeholders, and their goals and actions represent compromises among the collection of member stakeholders. Their point of reference is not the organisation per se, but the organisations from which they come, those organisations being the ultimate winners and losers (i.e. ones with true stakes). These groups are evident in each of the cases in this study: the Gold Coast – the Gold Coast Olympic Task Force and the Queensland 2000 Task Force; the Hunter – the Dash for 2000 Committee and Hunter Olympic Business Task Force; Canberra – the Project 2000 Task Force. These groups represented an assortment of stakeholder interests, with members from the tourism, sport, arts, culture, and business communities. Their members represent a diverse array of organisational backgrounds from public and non-profit to the private sector. When referring to these groups as stakeholders, the term is really a shorthand for a more complex set of underlying dynamics. Labelling these groups as stakeholders also has a heuristic value, given that the group members have come together and acted collectively as a unit pursuant to a common mission. In this study, these organisations are made stakeholders by proxy, as representative of a collective group of stakeholders. In each instance, the composition of stakes represented by the proxy stakeholder group will be described.

The literature suggests that many stakeholders could derive value from hosting sporting activities and events in a region (Ashworth & Voogd 1990; Cashman & Hughes 1999; Getz 1997a; Hall 2000). These stakeholders can be divided into four groups according to the value they can derive from a pre-Games training initiative, including (1) tourism value, (2) sport value, (3) political value, and (4) community and social value. These values and the associated stakeholders are not mutually exclusive, and a stakeholder may derive one or more values from pre-Games training. For example, a sport government agency may attain both sport value (e.g. upgraded facilities) and also political value (e.g. increased importance of sport on the government’s agenda) from pre-Games training. This framework provides a basis from which the various stakeholders groups can be identified.
Tourism Value
Stakeholders are interested in attaining benefits from tourists visiting a place. Stakeholders can include government tourism bodies, regional tourism bureaus and convention centres, the private sector (primarily accommodation and travel providers, retailers, and restaurants), and event development entities. These stakeholders would seek to derive tourism value from sport events (such as pre-Games training camps).

Sport Value
Other stakeholder groups with legitimate interest in pre-Games training are those seeking sport value from the training camps. These stakeholders may include government sport and economic development agencies, local sport clubs, event development entities, and local schools and facilities. This stakeholder group has a legitimate interest in obtaining sport benefits (e.g. facility upgrades, sport equipment) from hosting pre-Games training in the region.

Political Value
There may also be a stakeholder group interested in obtaining political value from pre-Games training. This group may include government agencies across sport, tourism, and business at federal, state and local levels. In addition, media, sport groups, economic development agencies, event management entities, and local facilities have a stake in deriving political value from pre-Games training, as they can use these events to attract attention to political issues.

Community/Social Value
The community hosting the teams has a stake in pre-Games training because of the potential to impact the public good and enhance social capital. Primary stakeholders in this case would be the government. Apart from a general public benefit, those who will particularly benefit from the government’s involvement in pre-Games training could include local schools, community groups (including ethnic groups), and volunteer groups.

In each case study, data from each stakeholder group were collected. To attain a comprehensive picture of pre-Games training in Australia, 26 pre- and 16 post-camp interviews were conducted throughout Australia, encompassing national, state, and regional levels. In addition, 16 and 27 interviews were collected prior to and after the pre-Games training camps respectively in the three case study sites. Overall, 85 interviews were conducted for the study.

Procedure

Data Collection Procedure
In the early stages, an action plan for research was developed (Spradley 1980; Yin 1994). A key planning date was the Opening Ceremony for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games on 15th September 2000. It was expected that most of the pre-Games training camps would occur up to four weeks prior to this date. Therefore, it was desirable that all pre-event interviews be conducted before mid-August 2000 (Phase One) and observational data collection would occur during the training camps from mid-August to mid-September 2000 (Phase Two). All post-event interviews would be conducted from September 2000 to April 2001 (Phase Three). As described above, this research procedure consisted of four key phases. Specific procedures in each of these phases are explained below.

Phase One
An initial phase of data collection was undertaken from January 2000 to August 2000. The objective of the first phase was to investigate strategies employed across the country at state, regional, and local levels to establish the state-of-play in pre-Games training in Australia. A scoping study was undertaken throughout Australia to gain an understanding of issues related to pre-Games training as well as stakeholders’ perspectives and responses related to pre-Games training opportunities. Semi-structured interviews (Weiss 1994), each lasting 45 to 90 minutes, were conducted across Australia during this stage. Interview questions were directed towards understanding plans undertaken to develop the strategy, the response to the Olympics, reasons behind decisions made, expectations, and relationships with other stakeholders. These questions were directed to the individual interviewee (e.g. the individual’s role in the response), the organisation (e.g. the organisation’s role in the response), and the destination as a whole (e.g. the destination’s role in the response).

Interviews were tape-recorded and recordings were transcribed. In those few cases where recording was not possible, field notes were taken during the interview. These notes were then reflected upon, and written as a report-style document. During the interviews, other relevant data were collected, including marketing materials, media kits, videos, strategy documents, and reports.
During this stage, a letter was sent to the central pre-Games training contact in each state, territory, and region throughout Australia. The letter indicated the intention to conduct further research in the region and sought support for the research. The contacts were telephoned two weeks later; all agreed to participate in the study.

**Phase Two**

The second phase of data collection occurred during the pre-Games training camp period (mid-August to mid-September 2000). Through this period, observational data were recorded in Canberra, Wollongong, and the Gold Coast. At this point, case study sites had not been selected, and the city of Wollongong was included as a potential site. Observations of training camps in the Hunter were not undertaken due to time and resource limitations.

Three days were spent in each location. Observational data were not collected in other pre-Games training locations given time and travel limitations (i.e. most pre-Games training camps were held within the same two- or three-week period). At each of the sites, field notes, verbal reports, and photographs were collected (Arnould & Wallendorf 1994; Spradley 1980). Unstructured interviews were conducted where possible. Data collected from each of the regions were subsequently analysed and compared with interview data collected in phase one. The theories used to explain these data were re-investigated. From this process, the theoretical framework was further developed, and three sites were selected for in-depth case study analysis as described previously.

**Phase Three**

The third phase of data collection was conducted after the pre-Games training camps (from September 2000 to April 2001). In this phase, semi-structured interviews were conducted. During these interviews, respondents were asked to reflect on the pre-Games training experience, focusing in particular on outcomes, lessons, and any post-Olympic strategy. Each interview lasted 45 minutes to 2 hours. As in phase one, questions were asked regarding the individual interviewee, the organisation, and the destination. Some questions from the phase one data collection were re-asked to check accuracy (hence, validity) of the information. Additionally, in the third phase, inquiries were made regarding the findings across multiple cases, as well as the entire study. Examples are: “Have the Olympic Games changed people’s thinking about the events in your region? Explain”, “How did your response compare to pre-Games training strategies in other regions?” Normative questions solicited information about policy recommendations and conclusions, inquired beyond the study of pre-Games training, and explored sport and place marketing more generally. Examples are: “What lessons are transferable to future training camps, or more broadly, future sport events?”; “How would you go about leveraging a training camp now?” Interviews began with questions about the interviewee’s specific case and proceeded to normative questions related to sport and place marketing in general.

**Data Analysis**

As the procedure specified, three types of data were analysed. Data included interview transcripts, marketing collateral (including pamphlets, kits, brochures, magazines, and videos), field notes and observations, photographs, and archival data (including strategies and reports). To analyse the data, a within-case and across-case design was used (Yin 1994).

**Within-Case Analysis**

A within-case analysis was undertaken to establish the implications of each specific case. Informal content analysis was conducted, and involved multiple readings of the transcriptions to become familiar with the content and to gain an understanding of the recurring ‘themes’ or ‘categories’ in the text. The within-case analysis looked for patterns of analytic generalisation in the data. Pattern matching was employed to build explanations about the case. This analysis was then compared with the theoretical constructs and frameworks presented in the literature (Yin 1994). Through iterating between the data and the theory, key theoretical constructs were identified. These constructs formed a summary framework (theory) which built into an argument that conveyed the processes and produced a basis for organising the case study (Potter 1996). Data were interpreted given these constructs.

Given that time was an important construct in the policy process for pre-Games training, chronologies in each case were also investigated, and a time series analysis was undertaken. Together, the combination of pattern-matching and time-series analysis produced a program logic model, whereby a complex chain of events (pattern) was explained over time (time series). This process was repeated in each case study analysis. Individual reports on three individual cases with multiple narratives were produced and then compared (Yin 1994).

**The framework of each case study**

To examine the policy process for pre-Games training, the analysis is separated into three sections: (1) the national response is examined, (2) within-case analysis is conducted, and describes the response at each case
study location, and (3) a cross-case analysis is undertaken, which provides an over-arching discussion about the policy implications of the study.

In each case study, specific aspects of the response were used to analyse the destination as a whole, the organisational response and the political response. Allison’s (1971) use of conceptual lenses served as the basis for this analysis. The framework for each case study includes the profile and the strategy (i.e. the agenda of destination as a whole), the frame of reference and linkages (i.e. the organisational agenda), the response (i.e. the political agenda), and resulting leveraging efforts and outcomes. Each of these sections is discussed below.

The profile
The profile and assets of the region play an important role in the response and leveraging efforts of the destination. Data were collected on the geographical location, population, and social and economic fabric of the region. These data were analysed to establish a profile of the region.

The strategy
Data were collected and analysed to identify the agenda of the destination as a whole, and how this agenda influenced strategy and tactics for pre-Games training.

The stakeholders and linkages
To gather data on organisational frames of reference and standard operating procedures, data were collected and analysed from each of the key stakeholders involved in the pre-Games training response. Their funding source, reference point to the response (e.g. sport, tourism, local economic development), objectives for pre-Games training response, and indicators were defined. Information was collected and analysed on each stakeholder’s position and linkages to other players in the region involved in pre-Games training.

The response
Building on the information referred to above, data on the response to pre-Games training were examined. Data pertaining to politics, including organisational and personal agendas, were collected and analysed.

Leveraging efforts
In this section, data on the efforts made to leverage pre-Games training was captured. Particular attention was given to activities that have long-term implications for the regions, such as the creation of awareness and the building of relationships.

Outcomes
The outcomes for the program and stakeholders involved in the strategy were also identified. Similar to the leveraging efforts section, particular attention was given to long-term or permanent changes. In addition, the data analysis identified any personal and/or organisational learning that occurred or did not occurred and offered reasons for the outcomes.

Cross-Case Analysis
Within-case analysis was used as a basis for a cross-case comparison. Recurring themes and categories across cases were identified, as well as replications and contrasts. A problem related to case study analysis is drawing premature conclusions. Eisenhardt (1989) proposes that these tendencies can be avoided by examining the data in divergent ways. Accordingly, the data were analysed to investigate within-group similarities coupled with inter-group difference (i.e. to look for patterns). In addition, pairs of cases (e.g. Canberra and the Hunter) were selected to discover similarities and differences. Emergent theories across cases were compared with the data to iterate towards a theory that closely fits the data. These iterations sharpened and refined the constructs and built the evidence. The final stage involved theory modification and the development of policy implications into an integrated cross-case discussion (Yin 1994).

Confidentiality and Ethics
Given the political nature of this research, safeguards were built in to protect informants’ rights, sensitivities, and interests. Ethical implications of the study were addressed as follows. As proposed by Spradley (1980), one of the primary considerations was to communicate the aims of the research to the informants. During the interviews, an outline of the research was given to the informants, who had the opportunity to ask questions about the research and the intended use of the findings. Furthermore, measures were taken to protect the privacy of the informants. Throughout this report informants remain anonymous. However, to render the data credible, reference is made to the relevance of the informant to the information or quote, but the informant is not identified. Upon completion, informants received key findings, and the results of the study were made available to the public through the Sustainable Tourism Cooperative Research Centre (STCRC).
Definitions, Abbreviations and Acronyms
Several place terms, abbreviations, and acronyms will be used throughout this report. Tables 2 and 3 present the definitions of the place terms, and the abbreviations and acronyms respectively.

Table 2: Definition of terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Common to or characteristic of the whole nation of Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>One of the five communities that form the Commonwealth of Australia, including New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, and Tasmania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>An organised division of Australia that has not yet been given the full rights of a state; includes the Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>The most important town in the nation, state, territory, or region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>A town with a population of 100,000 or more.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>A district or area of land with marked boundaries or characteristics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Common to or characteristic of a region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Australia</td>
<td>Regions in Australia outside of the capital cities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>A neighbourhood or district within a region.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(cf. The Australian Oxford Dictionary [Moore 1999])

Table 3: List of abbreviations and acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT Government</td>
<td>Australian Capital Territory Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>Australian Institute of Sport</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Australian Tourist Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOA</td>
<td>British Olympic Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTEC</td>
<td>Canberra Tourism and Events Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC City Council</td>
<td>Gold Coast City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC Tourism Bureau</td>
<td>Gold Coast Tourism Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOBT</td>
<td>Hunter Olympic Business Taskforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HROC</td>
<td>Hunter Region Organisation of Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF</td>
<td>International Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Paralympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW DSRD</td>
<td>New South Wales Department of State and Regional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW Sport and Recreation</td>
<td>New South Wales Sport and Recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW Government</td>
<td>New South Wales Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Olympic Coordination Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOG</td>
<td>Sydney Olympic Committee for the Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team GB</td>
<td>[The Olympic] Team [of] Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNSW</td>
<td>Tourism New South Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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Conclusion
This chapter provides a justification for adopting a comparative case study methodology. Furthermore, the selection criteria for the case studies, sample frame, procedure, data analysis, and framework for the study are explained. In the subsequent chapters, the findings of this study are presented.
Chapter 4

THE OLYMPIC CONTEXT

In September 1993, the International Olympic Committee awarded the 2000 Olympic Games to Sydney. This event captured the attention of the nation, as planners rushed to get their policies on the agenda, and created a new focus, one that had a profound effect on government agendas at the federal, state and local levels. Chapter Four describes the policy context on the national scene, and reveals two important aspects of the context that influenced the response of the regional players: (1) the influence of tourism industry, and (2) the agenda of the event organisers (i.e. Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games [SOCOG]). In the first section, the analysis highlights the key events and indicators that positioned the tourism industry as the dominant agenda-setter in the policy process. The subsequent section, discusses SOCOG’s agenda of the event and its adoption of a risk adverse stance towards regional pre-Games training planning.

Australia Gets 'Olympic Fever'

Tourism organisations began lobbying policymakers and positioning themselves as dominant players at the time of the bid. To generate support for the bid, the KPMG Peat Marwick (1993) study was produced, and projected an additional 1.2 million Olympic-induced visitors to Australia in 1994-1995. Shortly afterwards, the Australian Tourist Commission (ATC), as part of its annual targeting exercise, predicted considerably larger estimates of 2.1 million extra visitors over the same period (Australian Tourist Commission 1994). These reports also considered the potential and leverage the Sydney Olympic Games to showcase Australia to the world to encourage tourism growth. In 1995, the Australian Commonwealth Government released the report, *Olympic 2000 ... and the Winner Is?* This report declared that one of the biggest beneficiaries of the 2000 Olympic Games would be the tourism sector. In later estimates, the Tourism Forecasting Council (1996) predicted an increase in international visitor arrivals from 4.12 million in 1996 to 6 million in 2000.

Responding to this information and other indicators, in 1998 the federal government developed its national action plan, *Tourism: A Ticket to the 21st Century* (Australian Commonwealth Government 1998a). One of the strategies proposed in this policy was coined ‘Getting it Right’. This component highlighted the importance of the ATC’s role in promoting Australia as an international tourist destination. Accordingly, the federal government announced that it would increase funding to the ATC by AU$50 million over the four years to 1998-2002. Total government funding for the ATC over this period was predicted to be approximately AU$359 million. The second component of the Federal Government’s strategy was called ‘Selling Australia Better’, aimed to capitalise on the tourism potential of major events, in particular the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Of the additional AU$50 million to be provided to the ATC over the four year period, $9 million (over three years, 1998-1999 to 2000-2001) was directed towards: “taking advantage of the additional attention afforded to Australia by the high international profile of the Games” (Australian Commonwealth Government 1998b, p.5). The Australian government’s investment represented the first time any host country had purposefully invested public funds to leverage an Olympic Games for tourism.

Following the Federal Government’s action plan, the Tourism Forecasting Council (1998) released a report projecting the tourism impacts of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, predicting that between 1998 and 2004 an additional 1.6 million visitors would come to Australia for the 2000 Olympic Games. Through the creation of new jobs and tourism earnings, this visitation was expected to generate AU$6.1 million. Prior to, during, and following the staging of the Olympic Games, 132,000 of these international visitors would come to Australia as athletes, officials, judges, journalists, and spectators. It was expected that the majority of this impact would be confined to New South Wales, yet the states and territories throughout Australia were still expected to benefit from Sydney hosting the event.

In January 1999, the ATC launched its Brand Australia campaign. As the Australian Tourist Commission (1999a) stated: “With this campaign the ATC will use the extraordinary interest in Australia surrounding the 2000 Olympic Games to add further depth and dimension to the country’s already highly regarded image overseas” (p. 1). The ATC also promoted the attention Australia was receiving from the rest of the world for its efforts to leverage the Games. Michael Payne, Director of Marketing for the International Olympic Committee (IOC), stated: “We have nothing but praise for how the program is running and appreciation for how people are taking advantage of the Olympic opportunity and the real benefit to the community” (Australian Tourist Commission 1999b, front page). According to the ATC’s (1999b) *Special Tourism Report: Australia 2000*, under the Visiting Journalists Program the ACT expected to bring 1,800 international media delegates into Australia in 1999 and 2000, with 15,000 media delegates attending the Games. In September 1999, this and other Olympic-related information was presented at an Australian Tourist Commission conference to promote tourism opportunities of the 2000 Olympic Games. Akin to the federal government’s response, state and local
governments began to identify opportunities to put policies on the agenda to ensure that their state or localities received a piece of Olympic action.

The Event Organisers

In 1993, an Act of Parliament constituted the Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) as a corporation. SOCOG was a temporary organisation that ceased existence on 31 December 2000. The New South Wales Government underwrote the contract with the IOC to host the 2000 Olympic Games. Accordingly, SOCOG was required to meet the contractual obligations made in both the bid documentation and the Host City Contract. As highlighted by the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (1995), SOCOG was not responsible for the wider economic opportunities associated with the 2000 Olympic Games, but was to stage the 2000 Olympic Games.

Estimating the total gross cost of hosting the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games is problematic given the complexity of the estimate, and often the basis for these estimates is not clear. An estimate published in countdown 2000 (Blackwell 2000), a journal produced in the lead-up to the 2000 Olympic Games, stated:

"The total gross cost to the New South Wales Government of staging the Olympic and Paralympic Games is $2.16 billion ... If the contribution from the Federal Government and the private sector were included, the total cost of staging the Olympics was about $3.5 billion." (p. 4)

In the private sector, stakeholders were predominantly the corporate sponsors, merchandisers, and television broadcasters of the event, both domestically and internationally. In the public sector, stakeholders included the local government (i.e. city councils in Sydney), the New South Wales Government, and the federal government. Each had to legitimise the investment of public money to its voters. Significant private funding meant that the event organisers (i.e. SOCOG) were also answerable to the business community in Australia and internationally. Hence, there was a multi-level public agenda in addition to a private agenda for this event.

As early as the bid stage, it was essential that the Sydney Olympic Games gained community support throughout Australia. The federal government, state and territory governments, cities and towns throughout Australia, the business community, and the voters each had a stake in the event. The Sydney Olympic Games Bid Committee actively sought to build expectations of the benefits of hosting the Olympic Games to Sydney and Australia (McGeogh & Korporaal 1994). Likewise, SOCOG encouraged community support by asking each city and town to 'play its part' in the 2000 Olympic Games. To encourage this support, SOCOG public relations representatives were sent throughout Australia to 'ignite the Olympic spirit' and to prompt regions to think about their role in the Games. Consequently, Olympic interest was heightened in communities throughout Australia; people wanted to get involved and ensure they too got their slice of the Olympic action.

In the early stages, SOCOG, government, and industry stakeholders began to conduct research to investigate the planning needed to successfully host the 2000 Olympic Games in Australia. Of particular interest were the experiences of Barcelona and Atlanta in hosting the 1992 and 1996 Olympic Games respectively. Visits to Atlanta suggested that a key opportunity to generate benefits for regional Australia could be to host pre-Games training camps. As a result, many regions began the process of forming groups and committees, and developing strategies and tactics to promote their region as a pre-Games training camp location. Until the end of 1994, the Sydney Olympic Games Bid Committee actively sought to build expectations of the benefits of hosting the Olympic Games to Sydney and Australia (McGeogh & Korporaal 1994). Likewise, SOCOG encouraged community support by asking each city and town to 'play its part' in the 2000 Olympic Games. To encourage this support, SOCOG public relations representatives were sent throughout Australia to 'ignite the Olympic spirit' and to prompt regions to think about their role in the Games. Consequently, Olympic interest was heightened in communities throughout Australia; people wanted to get involved and ensure they too got their slice of the Olympic action.

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In December 1994, SOCOG employed a full-time staff member to develop and implement SOCOG's Olympic Games training program. The role of this staff member was primarily concerned with managing SOCOG's training facilities (i.e. those to be used by athletes housed in the Athletes Village), but pre-Games training was also included in her duties. Reflecting upon her experience seven months prior to the Games, the SOCOG executive in charge of Games training stated:

"SOCOG really wanted to be able to put together [and provide] some sort of a comprehensive program.

We wanted to look fairly at all of the facilities and promote them ... [although we] didn't want to be seen as favouring anybody, or doing the wrong thing ... SOCOG only wanted to see itself as an information broker."

From SOCOG's perspective, there were four reasons for this stance. Primarily, it expected a culmination of pre-Games training activity two months prior to the Olympic Games. During that period, SOCOG needed its staff and resources focused on managing the actual event. Secondly, it was anticipated that assisting Olympic teams in deciding and planning pre-Games training would render SOCOG responsible for any problems or difficulties that might occur. For example, the Games Training Manager suggested that:

"SOCOG has tried to stay right away from recommending or referring, because politically it is a disaster ... if it goes wrong, they're not happy, they're going to come to us, and the teams will say "but SOCOG told us we should go to Newcastle", then everyone is going to say "well that's not fair"."
Thirdly, several regions approached SOCOG to endorse funding to construct facilities for pre-Games training. These requests were rejected, as SOCOG was not in a political position to move outside of its already crowded agenda. Finally, and most importantly, SOCOG did not see pre-Games training as part of its role. Its role was to look after the Olympic Family (primarily the IOC, Olympic broadcasters, sponsors, National Olympic Committees [NOCs], and International Federations [IFs]) and to organise the 'greatest ever Games'. Pre-Games training was not a condition of the bid or Host City Contract, which sets the contractual obligations of the organising committee. However, SOCOG was publicly obligated to provide a Games for 'all of Australia', and pre-Games training provided a mechanism to demonstrate this reach. Thus, SOCOG encouraged communities to develop pre-Games training initiatives of their own.

In an effort to learn from past experience, SOCOG inspected the program undertaken by Atlanta for the Summer 1996 Olympic Games. Subsequently, SOCOG replicated Atlanta’s facility survey of its regions. However, given Australia’s interest in pre-Games training, SOCOG thought that its program should place a greater emphasis on meeting international facility standards. SOCOG advised regions that were farther away from Sydney, who did not have to comply with the international standard required of official venues, that they had a lesser chance of attracting teams. Throughout this process SOCOG executives maintained that SOCOG did not want to play favourites, but rather manage expectations.

SOCOG distributed a total of 746 facility questionnaires that were sent to local city councils throughout Australia. Since New South Wales also wanted to be involved, 20 questionnaires were sent via the Hillary Commission to New Zealand. The responses were then verified by the state Olympic Task Forces and committees which had already formed. The facility audit was collated into a large folder, and the first edition of the SOCOG facility audit was distributed in November 1996 at the Association of National Olympic Committees Conference in Cancun, Mexico. Since the size and weight of the folder deterred many delegates from taking it home, another copy was sent to them after the conference.

This manual provided a basic listing of potential training locations throughout Australia. It was also reasonably inexpensive and easy to update. The up-dates were undertaken each year and sent to NOCs in mid-1997, mid-1998, and mid-1999. SOCOG did not undertake any evaluation of the effectiveness, reach, or suitability of the information in this document. The SOCOG executive who developed this manual stated: "We wanted it to put the emphasis on the National Olympic Committees speaking to these facilities directly".

Apart from providing a basis for the facilities manual, the survey also acted to stimulate discussion of pre-Games training in regions and provided a platform to begin to match the requirements of teams with the facilities in the local region. Consequently, regions began to recognise previously unconsidered potential for facility development in their local area. For example, some local councils recognised that private school facilities had not been incorporated into the SOCOG audit.

SOCOG’s Relationship to State and Regional Pre-Games Training Strategies

SOCOG acted as an information broker for the states and regions, and occasionally made the state and regional task forces aware of impending visits by NOCs and other decision-makers. Yet, this channel was not used frequently or consistently. The SOCOG executive in charge of coordinating these visits labelled it ‘too difficult' and thought that facilitating pre-Games training contacts could potentially complicate or damage relationships with members of the Olympic Family. In other words, touring Australia to select a pre-Games training location had the potential to distract members of the Olympic Family during their visits to Sydney from their primary task - finalising planning with SOCOG. However, on many occasions NOCs indicated interest in pre-Games training. The political pressure placed on SOCOG by the New South Wales Government meant that the majority of pre-Games enquiries were directed to the New South Wales Department of State and Regional Development based in Sydney. As a result, state and regional pre-Games training strategies developed independently.

SOCOG attempted to track where all the athletes and teams were planning to train, although this proved to be difficult (and at times impossible). The competitive environments surrounding negotiations for training camp locations were often guarded, secretive, and informal, and regions did not accurately communicate with SOCOG or with each other. As a consequence of the scale and difficulty of the task, tracking pre-Game training by SOCOG became unmanageable and inappropriate.

From the standpoint of SOCOG, information on pre-Games training location decisions would have assisted logistics and security planning (e.g. passenger flow through the airports, in particular the athletes arriving at Sydney Airport prior to and during the Olympics). From the standpoint of the state/territory and regional task forces, this information could have helped in assessing competition, and consequently saved resources that might otherwise have been spent pursuing a team that had already chosen a pre-Games training location. In many instances, the NOCs and teams used the lack of coordination to foster rumours that their teams were being bought by other states. Team managers used this as a negotiating ploy to support demands (e.g. for discounted accommodation, free use of facilities), and many were able to negotiate favourable terms for their teams. In
some instances, teams were subsidised to train in a region. However, this practice was not as common, and the level of subsidy was less than many of the state and regional pre-Games planners throughout Australia came to believe.

SOCOG made a final effort to include the states in the event organisation by inviting each of the states and territories to the Chefs de Mission Conference in September 1999. Victoria, Queensland, New South Wales, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory, and South Australia attended the event. Western Australia and the Northern Territory did not attend. Western Australia made contacts through personal networks, and the Northern Territory did not undertake a pre-Games training initiative. During the conference, the states addressed the Chefs de Mission through two networking opportunities. Firstly, they were provided the opportunity to meet with the Chefs de Mission, who typically had influence on their NOC’s training decisions. Secondly, it was the first, and in many cases the only, interaction among the states on matters of pre-Games training. Many states criticised SOCOG for the expense of this exercise, and the states’ lack of status at the event made it difficult to attract decision-makers back to their suites to sell their region. Consequently, there was a general feeling among the states that they were shut out of potential opportunities. A state pre-Games training manager commented, when reflecting on his experience just prior to the Games:

"It could have been a lot better for everyone if SOCOG recognised that the states wanted to help … but at the end of the day, we had to battle with SOCOG to do what we wanted … We all came down to the same conclusion, the rivalry between states had to be there, because our political masters obviously are trying to gain maximum economic return. But, we all said the same thing; it would have been great if SOCOG and the states had all come together…. I think we all recognised that SOCOG had an enormous job to do, no question, but the amount of assistance it gave the states was really limited."

Six months prior to the Games, another state pre-Games training manager commented: “It [SOCOG] hasn’t done anything for us, and I wouldn’t expect them to”. Post-Olympics, yet another pre-Games training manager stated: “I really didn’t talk to SOCOG at all about pre-Games training. It did put together the pre-Games training guide, but I’m not aware of any business coming from that guide”. In response, the SOCOG executive in charge of Games training described SOCOG’s relationship with the states this way:

"The regions have differed in their attitude really. From enthusiastic, entrepreneurial, and strategic to resentful and jealous … the Task Forces promoted [themselves] separately through their own networks to find out when the teams were coming and make the most of those visits. A lot of them did occur, but we didn’t know about the details of the visit. It does become a nightmare and too hard to administer. We never had the staff to manage that."

One of the potential legacies from pre-Games training was construction of a national facilities database through SOCOG’s Australia-wide facilities audit. It is suggested that this facility database could have been used to pursue training camps and events post-Olympics. However, given the temporary nature of the organising committee, the facility audit was relegated to storage after the Games and is no longer available beyond the few outdated print copies sitting on shelves around the world. Since neither the federal government nor the states has undertaken to maintain or update the database, this potential legacy may vanish.

**Concluding Overview**

This chapter has described the impetus for the development of pre-Games training strategies in Australia. The findings demonstrated the role the tourism industry played in capturing policymakers’ attention and highlighting the opportunity to maximise the tourism impact of hosting the Olympic Games. The focal nature of the Olympic Games changed the local, state, and federal governments’ policy agendas and mobilised stakeholders. The tourism industry strategically positioned itself to capitalise on opportunities provided by hosting the Olympic Games. Players within the tourism industry produced indicators that reinforced the notion that this was a ‘good’ policy decision. As a result, tourism became the principal driver of the leveraging activities, and was seen as critical to the success of the event.
Chapter 5

THE GOLD COAST

This case study will show that the success of the Gold Coast in attracting and leveraging pre-Games training camps was not the result of a clear strategic plan. Rather, its success was the result of leveraging personal relationships, complemented by the ability of players on the Gold Coast to provide after-sales service through their flexibility and willingness to accommodate the needs of their customer (particularly the British Olympic Association [BOA]).

An important element of this case study is the reference point of the strategy. In the case of the Gold Coast, pre-Games training strategy was driven by the City Council. It is evident that stakeholders used the Olympic Games to develop sport facilities for their local athletes. Given that tourism was also a key player in the city, efforts were made to leverage the presence of Olympic teams to create international awareness for the host state of Queensland and for the City of Gold Coast. These efforts were conceived ad hoc and without consideration of the ability of the players to capitalise on this potential, and leveraging efforts became an outcome of accommodating the needs of the teams (particularly the British), rather than the result of a carefully considered plan.

This case study also illustrates policy divisions among the various stakeholders -- in particular, the disparate agendas of tourism, sport, and business. The tourism players concentrated their efforts on destination marketing; sport players focused on delivering a sport product; and business players sought to enhance the position and status of Gold Coast business. While some coordination and communication existed among these players, the products represented remained clearly differentiated. Although some effort was made to present an integrated product, in many instances there was asymmetry of desire and action among the group members. Even though the players had segregated strategies and agendas regarding pre-Games training, they were able to act collectively to promote their individual agendas, whilst also achieving overall group benefits.

This chapter begins with a brief profile of the city, followed by an outline of objectives of pre-Games training initiatives in the state of Queensland and the City of Gold Coast. The reference point of each stakeholder group is described, and linkages among key players are presented. The next section depicts responses to pre-Games training, after which outcomes are identified, and issues highlighted.

Profile

The Gold Coast is near the geographic centre of Australia’s east coast, in the southeast corner of the state of Queensland. The City of Gold Coast begins at the border with New South Wales, and extends to the Logan River in the north and Beaudesert Shire in the west. The City of Gold Coast is governed by a single city council. Famous for its beautiful beaches and excellent climate, over the 20 years prior to the Games, the Gold Coast experienced an enormous population growth. By 2000, this coastal strip was home to over 390,000 residents. It is Australia’s fastest growing major city and the second largest local government (in terms of total population and annual expenditure). The City is positioned as Australia's leading tourism destination (Gold Coast City Council 2000a).

Tourism has been the dominant force in the development of the Gold Coast. In 1996, this coastal city attracted an estimated 3.7 million visitors, resulting in a total annual expenditure by tourists of $2.24 billion in the commercial and non-commercial accommodation sectors alone. The number of international visitors to the Gold Coast increased 2% from 855,943 in 1998 to 875,751 in 1999 (Gold Coast City Council 1998). Asian markets remain vital to Gold Coast tourism, and the Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s had a significant impact on the Gold Coast’s international tourism business, which became somewhat stagnant during that time (Faulkner 2000).

The Strategy

When Sydney was awarded the Olympic Games in 1993, both the state of Queensland and the Gold Coast identified potential opportunities from Sydney hosting the Games. Attracting Olympic visitors, Olympic football, the Torch Relay, and teams for pre-Games training camps were all seen as potentially viable options. Because the Gold Coast did not have a facility large enough to host Olympic football, nor was the Torch Relay projected to bring in substantial new revenue, the Gold Coast City Council decided that the most benefit could be derived from attracting Olympic teams and visitors. Southeast Queensland (including the Gold Coast) was an excellent location for pre-Games training camps due to the region’s sub-tropical climate, close proximity to Sydney, and
the international standard sport facilities available. The close proximity of the international airport in Brisbane, capital of Queensland, to the Gold Coast, as well as the Gold Coast's domestic airport, provided easy access to the region for Olympic teams.

The Gold Coast City Council drove pre-Games training planning for the region, and its strategic objective was to attract as many teams as possible to the city to generate the largest economic return. In addition to the actual number of teams training, other leveraging opportunities from pre-Games training activities were identified. The local council’s public relations department proposed that, since the Gold Coast was a key Australian tourist destination, maximising media interest in the Olympic teams training on the Gold Coast would increase awareness of the city and its key markets. A decision was made at both state and local government levels to attract Olympic teams to the region and to leverage the publicity value of the international teams to create awareness in the international market. With the hope that heightened awareness of the city would attract future tourism to the state, the Gold Coast selected pre-Games training as an important basis for leveraging the 2000 Olympic Games, and sought to implement strategies that would capitalise on the opportunity.

The Stakeholders

As shown in Figure 3, the Queensland 2000 governmental Task Force drove the state’s Olympic strategy. An interdepartmental working group was established to coordinate the state government’s pre-Games training activities. Through this group, the Queensland government linked with regional task forces, one of which was the Gold Coast City Council, a chief decision-maker on the pre-Games training response for the Gold Coast.

As illustrated in Figure 3, three state and three local level organisations had stakes in pre-Games training on the Gold Coast. At state level, the stakeholders included: (1) Queensland Government, (2) Sport and Recreation Queensland, and (3) Tourism Queensland. At the regional level, the stakeholders were: (1) Gold Coast City Council, (2) Gold Coast Tourism Bureau, and (3) Couran Cove and Runaway Bay Sports Super Centre. In the following sub-sections the reference point and roles of each stakeholder group are defined, and links among these organisations and individual players are discussed.

Queensland Government

When Sydney won the bid for the 2000 Summer Olympic Games, it became important that the Queensland Government “attain the maximum benefit from the staging of the year 2000 Olympics” (Buchanan 1999, p. 1). However, as Dennis Buchanan, Chair of the Task Force, explains: “When Queensland set out … many thought we were being very optimistic that States other than New South Wales could benefit from the Games” (Queensland 2000 Task Force 1999, foreword). Given this optimism, it was important that the state government respond to opportunities, but avoid competition for similar responses in other states. To address this problem, a central coordinating group was formed within the Queensland government, and on 31 January 1994, the Queensland Olympic Task Force was established in the Department of Tourism, Sport and Racing.

The Task Force’s board members represented various backgrounds, including local councils, the private sector, local businesses, tourism entities, sport bodies, and Olympic-related groups (such as the Olympians and the Queensland Olympic Council). Administrative support consisted of a Secretariat, staff, and project officers employed by the Queensland government. Driven by its board, the Task Force would be the Queensland government’s lead agency for the state's effort to capitalise on the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

The Task Force was seen as the 'one-stop-shop' for all interstate, national and international Olympic organisations, and was expected to develop strong relationships with the Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG), the Sydney Paralympic Organising Committee (SPOC), the Sydney Olympic Broadcasting Organisation (SOBO), the Olympic Roads and Transport Authority (ORTA), and the Olympic Bureau of Roads and Transport (OBRT), as well as coordinate all Queensland government Olympic-related activities in the areas of tourism, sport, business, major events, and arts. The Task Force would synchronise the efforts of five key Queensland government departments: tourism activities (led by Tourism Queensland), major events (led by the Queensland Events Corporation), business activities (led by the Department of Economic Development and Trade), arts activities (led by Arts Queensland), and sport activities (including pre-Games training led by Sport and Recreation Queensland). Other Queensland government departments were utilised, including the Queensland Police Service, Department of Transport, Queensland Health, Department of Emergency Services, Department of Premier and Cabinet, Main Roads, Natural Resources, the Bureau of Ethnic Affairs, Commonwealth Government, and private sector agencies. In 1997, an Interdepartmental Working Group was also established to coordinate these key areas and to provide the Task Force with operational and strategic support. The working group met approximately once every six weeks to share information, strategies, and ideas.
Figure 3: The players in the Gold Coast’s pre-Games training response
From the central coordination of the Queensland 2000 Task Force, ten regional task forces were created. Representatives from each of the regional task forces would meet once every six months to discuss five key areas: pre-Games training, the Torch Relay, tourism, business, and the arts. Each representative was responsible for the disseminating information throughout his or her region. In addition to assisting the transfer of information to regional Queensland, it was hoped that the Task forces would also provide opportunities to coordinate strategies and share ideas.

**Sport and Recreation Queensland**

Pre-Games training was seen as a sport activity, yet there was no unit within the Queensland government experienced in marketing to international sport organisations and hosting elite sport groups. The temporary establishment of a new unit within Sport and Recreation Queensland, called the International Sport Unit, was proposed to undertake this activity. Employees in this unit had sport backgrounds to emphasise the sport component of the response. Reflecting after the Games, an executive from Sport and Recreation Queensland stated: “They knew what the needs of elite sport-people were … [as opposed to the Task Force who were] business-oriented rather than sport-oriented”.

To coordinate the pre-Games training strategy, a tripartite group was established, and included the Queensland 2000 Task Force, the International Sport Unit, and the Queensland Olympic Council. The objective of this group was: “to promote and facilitate pre-Games training and competition in Queensland” (Queensland 2000 Task Force 1999, p. 4). Thus, this three-member group developed the state’s pre-Games training response.

**Tourism Queensland**

Tourism Queensland was established in 1979 as the Queensland Tourist and Travel Corporation, and in September 1999, was renamed Tourism Queensland (Tourism Queensland 1999). As Queensland’s top government tourist organisation, its mission is: “to enhance the development and marketing of Queensland’s tourism destinations in partnership with industry, government and the community” (Tourism Queensland 2001).

Tourism Queensland is funded by three sources: (1) state government grants, (2) Tourism Queensland’s wholesale revenue and retail operations, and (3) co-operative marketing income. The Tourism Queensland Board, which reports to the Minister for Tourism and Racing, delineates the strategic direction of the organisation and ensures that Tourism Queensland meets the statutory obligations of the Queensland government (Tourism Queensland 2001).

Economic and industry forecasts predicted that tourism was expected to be the ‘big winner’ from hosting of the 2000 Olympic Games (Anderson 1999; Australian Commonwealth Government 1995, 1998a; Australian Tourist Commission 1994, 1999b; KPMG Peat Marwick 1993; Tourism Forecasting Council 1998). Tourism Queensland determined that an important strategy was to leverage the media’s interest in Australia’s hosting of the 2000 Olympic Games to generate publicity for the state by means promotional spin-offs and media visits to Queensland, although, as stated by an executive from Tourism Queensland, the organisation did not want to ‘re-invent the wheel’ because the Olympic Games were not seen as its core business. Tourism Queensland’s strategies and tactics, and consequent coordination with other stakeholders, were seen as extensions of its existing routines. The Olympics offered ‘new opportunities’ that Tourism Queensland could channel through its existing framework. In a post-Olympic interview, an executive from the organisation commented on Tourism Queensland’s role in the state’s Olympic response:

“From our point of view, being tourism, it is working the media, and the public relations side of things [coming to Australia for the Olympics]. We’re not so much interested in promoting the event, but promoting the destination in which the event is happening ….The Olympic contacts aren’t our core business. Our core business is the travel writers or feature writers. Whereas, with the events stuff there are more sports writers or arts writers, so it’s a little bit different. So, we separate the two groups.”

Hosting Olympic-related events in Queensland was a major strategy to attract media (particularly travel writers) and create interest in Queensland. The plan included the use of Queensland by international teams as their pre-Games training location, SOCOG International Youth Camp’s excursion to Cairns during the Games, the Pre-Olympic Scientific Congress in Brisbane prior to the Games, the Olympic Torch Relay diving for the first time underwater on the Great Barrier Reef, and the Olympic Football Tournament in Brisbane.

Tourism Queensland created an additional position to coordinate its Olympic Games strategy. It was envisaged that this role would span the organisation. The person in this position would work across the various units or departments, including events, marketing, and public relations, and would link to external organisations, such as the Queensland 2000 Task Force. Tourism Queensland did not alter its marketing campaigns or undertake a re-branding effort for the 2000 Olympic Games.

**Gold Coast City Council**

The Gold Coast City Council (GC City Council) is the lead local government agency for the City of Gold Coast. The corporate structure has seven units responsible for implementing the policies and decisions of Council to deliver services to the local community (Gold Coast City Council 2001).
Lessons from Pre-Olympic Training

The GC City Council’s initial response to pre-Games training was driven by the SOCOG facility audit in 1995. Upon receiving this audit, the GC City Council realised the opportunity to 'get involved' in attracting pre-Games training to the city. Sub-committees were established to investigate key opportunities from pre-Games training and other Olympic-related activities and became the Gold Coast Olympic Task Force.

The new Mayor, elected in March 1996, disbanded the original planning sub-committees. The reasoning for this action will be discussed in the response section of this chapter. At that time, responsibility for pre-Games training has been delegated to staff employed within the Council, and the role of coordinating pre-Games training was held by the Community and Recreation Facilities Branch, a department in charge of all Council-owned sport facilities (particularly maintaining and coordinating the use of these facilities). A staff member from the Community and Recreation Facilities Branch was designated as regional representative to the Queensland 2000 Task Force. The Mayor also served on the board of the Queensland 2000 Task Force.

Gold Coast Tourism Bureau

The Gold Coast Tourism Bureau (GC Tourism Bureau) is the tourism marketing authority for the Gold Coast, and is a membership-based, non-profit organisation. Members represent a cross-section of the Gold Coast’s tourism community, including hotels, resorts, and other accommodation houses (such as bed-and-breakfast providers), tour operators, retailers, professional and commercial service providers, and small business and support industries (Gold Coast Tourism Bureau 2001).

Pre-Games training provided the GC Tourism Bureau with both short- and long-term opportunities. In the short term, pre-Games training camps would increase the number of international visitors to the Gold Coast. It was anticipated that these camps would positively influence the number of international visitors to the Gold Coast statistic. In addition, since most of the training camps were expected to be at least 10 days in length, they were expected to improve the international visitor average length of stay statistic. In the long term, the international training camps could also be leveraged to create awareness of the Gold Coast in international markets.

mja-Matchpoint

mja-Matchpoint is a private events management company, created specifically to host the 2000 British Preparation Camp on the Gold Coast. The Great Britain Olympic Team (referred to as Team GB) consists of athletes from England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man. The founder and director of mja-Matchpoint, formerly Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Queensland Events Corporation, was fundamental in securing and hosting Team GB on the Gold Coast. The company he formed for that purpose, mja-Matchpoint, was appointed Executive Manager of the camp. The reference point of mja-Matchpoint was sport focused, as its agenda was to ensure that Team GB had a successful and well-managed camp. This experience had the potential to create a reputation for the company, build on existing relationships, and generate business for mja-Matchpoint in the future, particularly with the British Olympic Association.

Couran Cove and Runaway Bay Sports Super Centre

The CEO of the Couran Cove Resort and Director of InterPacific Resorts (Australia) was a former Olympian who also had a stake in pre-Games training on the Gold Coast. Recognising the publicity that international Olympics teams could bring to his resort, and capitalising on his long-standing involvement in international athletics and substantial international sport contacts, the resort director planned to attract individual athletes and small teams to stay and train at Couran Cove. The Couran Cove Resort is operated by InterPacific Resorts (Australia) Pty Ltd and was the company’s first Australian venture. In 1998, this 357-room facility opened on the Gold Coast’s South Stradbroke Island. The concept of the resort is to provide its guests luxury accommodation within an ecotourist environment, and offers activities such as rock climbing, water-skiing, and deep-sea fishing. Couran Cove’s sports centre and health spa offer facilities for professional and amateur athletes, including a 100-metre sprint track, two gymnasiums, basketball courts, clubhouse, beach volleyball court, two tennis courts, shuffleboard courts, baseball/softball batting cage, golf driving nets, lawn bowls, trampolines, and a long jump/high jump area (Couran Cove Resort 2001)

This former Olympian’s credits also included conceptualising the Gold Coast’s Runaway Bay Super Sports Centre, a multipurpose sport facility that houses an athletics track, indoor exhibition centre and meeting rooms, fitness centre, 20-metre indoor pool, sports medicine rehabilitation rooms, and athlete accommodations (Runaway Bay Sports Super Centre 2001). At its opening in September, 2000, Runaway Bay’s publicity was promoted by its designation as a pre-Games training facility.
Summary

A summary of the reference points for each stakeholder is shown in Table 4, which includes the organisation, funding source, reference point, objectives, and indicators for their organisation’s pre-Games training response.

Table 4: The Reference Points for each stakeholder involved in the Gold Coast’s pre-Games training response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Reference Point</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Queensland Government (via Qld 2000 Taskforce)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>To maximise the benefits on Queensland’s economy</td>
<td>Economic impact of pre-Games training on the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport and Recreation Queensland</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>To attract the maximise number of teams to Queensland</td>
<td>No. of teams. Economic impact of pre-Games training on the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Queensland</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>To build awareness to maximise the number of visitors to Queensland</td>
<td>No. of visitors to Queensland and the length of stay statistics Media impacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Coast City Council</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>To ensure the Gold Coast’s sport facilities are at capacity</td>
<td>No. of teams Economic impact of pre-Games training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Coast Tourism Bureau</td>
<td>Public and private (Non-profit)</td>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>To build awareness in market and maximise the number of visitors to the Gold Coast</td>
<td>No. of visitors to the Gold Coast and the length of stay statistics Media impacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mja-Matchpoint</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>To ensure that the athletes' experience at the British 2000 Olympic Games preparation camp was optimal</td>
<td>Satisfaction of the British Olympic team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couran Cove and Runaway Bay Sports Super Centre</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>To enhance profile of facilities and attract athletes to use the facilities</td>
<td>No. of athletes Media profile of athletes Training at the facilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linkages

A complex network of stakeholders developed in the pre-Games training response for the Gold Coast (refer to Figure 3). One of the most significant links was that between the Gold Coast regional strategy and the Queensland state strategy, and occurred through the International Sport Department and the regional Task force meetings. The Queensland government envisaged that the meeting with other regions would provide information to the regional Task forces and give the regions an opportunity to network and discuss strategies and to then disseminate information to regional stakeholders. In many regions, including the Gold Coast, distribution of information from state to local levels did not occur. After the final regional Task force forum, the Gold Coast representative stated in an interview:

“You were able to pick up the areas of interest … I only had an interest in one area [being pre-Games training], and I was concerned with those aspects [of the group] … you really couldn’t rely on regional groups to get that information though.”

He suggested that the regional representatives did not have the authority to affect the decision-making process or to 'make things happen'. In the case of the GC City Council, the information from the Queensland 2000 Task Force remained within the Community and Recreation Branch and did not filter through to other internal departments (such as the Torch Relay organisers, events department), or to external stakeholders (such as tourism, local economic development, waterways, and arts).

Furthermore, the early achievements of the Gold Coast pre-Games training initiatives meant that the city’s planners were in many ways ahead of the Task Force and other regions. The Task Force and other regions...
looked to the Gold Coast for guidance on how to capitalise on the Olympics, particularly in terms of the resource requirements of teams (beyond sport facilities) and the after-sales service that would be required. Referring to the Task Force and the Queensland government initiatives, the organiser of the British Preparation Camp on the Gold Coast became: “increasingly totally self-contained … an independent unit … We didn’t need them”. To improve efficiency and avoid bureaucracy, independent networks were developed with suppliers, sports organisations, and volunteers where required. He explained that: “Most of the time, if I wanted anything I had to go out and seek it …. It was a question of identifying what we needed and where the best source of help was for that particular need. If there wasn’t a need to work with a government department, well we didn’t do so.”

Traditionally, there is an historical and financial link between the GC City Council and the GC Tourism Bureau. In fact, the GC Tourism Bureau resulted from a GC City Council proposal. The GC Tourism Bureau is partly funded by the GC City Council and the GC City Council has representatives on the GC Tourism Bureau board. The Project Officer from GC City Council for pre-Games training described his role as: “more hands on. [I focused on] the organisation side of things, in terms of dealing with directors, and team managers”. He also explained that he saw the media as: “separate from our function”, and viewed publicity as the role of the GC City Council’s Public Relations Department. A senior executive of the GC Tourism Bureau described the GC City Council as the ‘asset managers’, distinguishing the GC Tourism Bureau as the ‘destination marketers’. The senior executive of the GC Tourism Bureau stated their role was: “to satisfy the international teams' experiences from a tourism perspective”. In other words, the GC Tourism Bureau sought to provide the teams (including the athletes and coaches, accompanying friends and family, team administration and officials, and media) with opportunities to undertake tourist activities while staying in the city. The GC Tourism Bureau organised day tours, visits to theme parks, trips to major shopping centres and movie theatres, and media familiarisation excursions. The GC City Council and camp organisers were focused on the sport experience of the training camps. In contrast, the GC Tourism Bureau was focused on the tourist experience of the training camps. Each stakeholder had a well-defined role in pre-Games training.

In addition, links among the GC City Council, GC Tourism Bureau, and the independent strategy of a prominent Olympian (representing Couran Cove Resort and the newly constructed Runaway Bay Sports Super Centre) were present, but weak, in that the relationships were primarily information-based. The GC City Council and International Sport Unit were informed of the Olympian’s pre-Games training initiatives, particularly for security and policing efforts, yet his strategy was not part of a collaborative approach.

The Response

The following section describes responses by the state of Queensland and the City of the Gold Coast to pre-Games training. To provide a state context for regional planning, the responses of stakeholders the state level are outlined first, followed by the responses of Gold Coast stakeholders.

The State Of Queensland’s Response

In January 1994, Queensland’s state government established the Queensland 2000 Task Force to coordinate a statewide approach to maximising the benefits of the 2000 Olympic Games. Five objectives were identified to achieve this goal: (1) maximising tourism opportunities for Queensland flowing from the Games, (2) hosting major events capable of promoting Queensland on the world stage, (3) identifying and attaining benefits for Queensland’s arts and cultural communities through the Olympic Arts Festival and events, (4) assisting Queensland businesses to gain contracts and revenue from the Olympic Games, and (5) promoting Queensland as an ideal destination for pre-Olympic and Paralympic Games training (Queensland 2000 Task Force 1999). The Task Force developed a business plan for each of these objectives and negotiated those plans with the agencies responsible for activities implicated by each objective.

Marketing to international sporting organisations (particularly Olympic entities) was a new activity for the Queensland government, so in 1997 the International Sport Unit was established. In April 2001, an executive from the Sport and Recreation Queensland explained that:

"[The new International Sport Unit formed] when it was realised the 2000 Task Force didn’t have the support mechanisms to handle everything that was involved [in pre-Games training]. So, they [i.e., the Task Force] were looking at the business opportunities for Queensland and working with Queensland business.

Then, there was a realisation that there was opportunity with pre-Olympic training."

In consultation with other government departments and the Task Force, the International Sport Unit identified a number of countries that could be targeted for and could afford pre-Games training in Australia such as Japan, Great Britain, France, U.S. and Italy. Countries that did not have the financial flexibility to undertake pre-Games training camps were also identified and withdrawn from future marketing efforts. The next step was to pursue those teams that could best afford to train in Queensland. When reflecting on the experience in April 2001, an executive from Sport and Recreation Queensland stated: “The strategy was identify them, and then pursue them by providing as much information as you possibly could”. National Olympic Committees (NOCs)
throughout the world were sent marketing collateral including 'The choice is simple' and 'In pursuit of gold' documents. Given that the sport-based tripartite group developed these documents, the information about each sport contained in these documents was very specific, and images were predominantly of the sport venues and facilities. Information on the destination was included, but scenic destination images were few. To keep Queensland prominent and disseminate information to the state’s regions, the Task Force produced a 'Queensland 2000' newsletter which was distributed to key NOCs, National Federations (NFs), and National Paralympic Committees (NPCs), as well as regional Task forces and state government departments domestically.

At a Regional Task Force Forum in October 1999, the state government insisted:

"To date, most of you would be aware that the Queensland Task Force has been quite insistent on Regional Task Forces leaving the majority of the marketing to the Olympic and Paralympic Movements and to the State Government. This has provided a uniform, professional and most importantly an effective means of marketing the State." (Moten 1999, p. 3)

**The Gold Coast’s Response**

The Gold Coast strategy began in 1993. A large group of people was assembled to discuss and develop the strategy. This group was known as the Gold Coast Olympic Task Force (GC Olympic Task Force), and focused three policy areas: sport, tourism, and business. Each area was represented by a sub-committee. Although the official objective of the Gold Coast Olympic Task Force was to identify and implement strategies and tactics to maximise the benefits for the Gold Coast from the 2000 Olympic Games, the unofficial objective was different. A member of the GC Olympic Task Force’s sport sub-committee recalled the agenda:

"At my first meeting with the sub-committee chair and other members, we were told that the reason this group was formed was to use the Olympics to get funding for better facilities for Gold Coast athletes. This was particularly the case with the Gold Coast Hockey facility because our sub-committee chair personally wanted a new hockey facility here with a synthetic playing surface. There was little discussion about attracting Olympic teams, only the way we could use the Olympics to get what we wanted for our athletes and sports on the Gold Coast. In fact, I don’t think any of the sport people knew how to go about the task."

As a result of the mixed agendas, this sub-committee had difficulties coordinating and agreeing upon the best way to achieve its official organisational goals and the personal objectives of its members. Over a period of six months, a few meetings were held in each policy area, but little was actually achieved. In the area of pre-Games training (which was the responsibility of the sport sub-committee), no facility audit was undertaken and no marketing material was produced. The three sub-committees did not meet together; and the only occasion during which information was exchanged between the groups was a meeting between the Chair of each sub-committee and the Mayor. However, at these meetings the information presented did not reflect the discussion within each sub-group at the time, making the three sub-committees ineffective.

In March 1997 a new Mayor was elected for the City of Gold Coast. Soon after, the new Mayor redirected pre-Games training by abolishing the GC Olympic Task Force and decided to coordinate pre-Games training internally within the Council. As a member of the GC Olympic Task Force stated:

"It wasn’t that we disbanded or were even told the group no longer existed. Instead the meetings just stopped and so we ceased to exist. At the same time, the staff within the Gold Coast City Council, who knew what they were doing, got on with the job."

Over a short period of time, GC City Council staff members were able to achieve some of the tasks the GC Olympic Task Force could not achieve throughout their existence. In March 1997, staff from within the GC City Council became the central drivers of the Gold Coast’s pre-Games training strategy.

From the beginning, the new Mayor of the amalgamated Council was extremely supportive of Olympic-related activities, as his son was an Olympian and had attended three Olympic Games. A staff member from GC City Council suggested that the Mayor:

"... appreciates the benefits of these things .... He knows the benefits cities can derive from either the Olympic Games or the Olympic glow, which is what we are probably looking at .... It’s just being in the circle, so he knows what it is about."

A staff member from within the GC City Council was appointed to drive the strategy, and to get the initiative back on track. Since pre-Games training was seen as a sport issue, it was delegated to the Facilities and Recreation Branch, and no additional staff members were employed throughout the campaign. Pre-Games training became part of the staff’s existing duties. The central staff member in charge of pre-Games training described pre-Games training as ‘evolving’ into his existing responsibilities. He explained that there were ‘peaks and troughs’ in his time and involvement in pre-Games training given his other responsibilities. These changes gave planning for pre-Games training on the Gold Coast ‘a new lease on life’.

Throughout the Council’s pre-Games training planning, no formal marketing strategy was developed. The strategy simply evolved. In 1997, the GC City Council decided that it needed to provide something tangible for the teams interested in training on the Gold Coast. Marketing the Gold Coast and developing sales collateral were not 'normal' roles of the Community and Recreation Branch. The Public Relations Department within the GC City Council was then asked to assume these responsibilities and developed some marketing collateral. Following its normal procedure of promoting the city with media kits, the Public Relations Department produced
a training camp information kit on what the Gold Coast could offer potential teams. Accompanying the
information kit was a personal letter from the Mayor. This kit was distributed to all the NOCs and IFs around the
world.

Some initial enquiries about pre-Games training in the city were received after the kits had been distributed,
and were thought to have been generated by the information kit. The Public Relations Department used these
responses to propose that the information be put onto a CD-ROM. This technology would allow them to expand
the information provided, and to become interactive, allowing users to take a virtual tour of a facility. Having
electronic information available also facilitated a prompt response to Internet enquiries, allowing the Council to
distribute information anywhere in the world. Hence, a new CD-ROM unit was established in the Public
Relations Department of the GC City Council to produce a pre-Games training CD-ROM. Similar to the initial
marketing collateral, the CD-ROM was distributed to all NOCs. In an interview in November 1998, the
Council’s Public Relations Coordinator explained the benefits of the CD-ROM:

"... in the past, we tended to usually send them a brochure, like every other man and his dog. . . [Now] if we
are talking to the Bulgarian Olympic Committee, instantly we can shoot that [the CD-ROM] across the Net
to them, and they've got the full CD-ROM ... if they are particularly interested, for example, in the
hockey... they'll click on the hockey. It will tell them all about the venue and they will go into the facilities.
They'll click on the clubhouse, and it will take them through a walk in the clubhouse."

Yet, the development of this technology was part of another agenda. In the same interview, it was also stated:

"I mean quite selfishly, the reason why we put the CD-ROM together is, I personally wanted, and our PR
staff here wanted a CD-ROM unit. We knew the technology was available to sell the city, for whatever
purpose, whatever reasons. When we realised that the teams could probably utilise this, we used the
Olympics as an excuse to get funding to put the CD-ROM together for internal funding here and to set up a
little unit over in our community service section, where it’s all done in house. As a catalyst, now the fellow
that operates that little unit can make us CD-ROMs for anything we want."

The CD-ROM had multiple uses. The information about the Gold Coast developed for the pre-Games
training was re-formatted and used as a marketing tool for other marketing activities, and in that sense, became a
legacy of marketing for pre-Games training.

Another strategy discussed in these early stages was to leverage the Sydney Olympic Games to attract and
establish international events on the Gold Coast, such as a Beach Volleyball World Cup. The Council planned
that this tactic would target established local events (such as the Gold Coast Marathon), and also attract and
develop new events in the city. These events would be used as 'pre-Olympic shake downs' as athletes would
compete in lead-up to the Sydney Olympic Games. The expectation was that competitors and event organisers
would enjoy their experience on the Gold Coast, and as a result it would become an annual event with a life
beyond the 2000 Olympic year. However, these events did not occur, as Gold Coast planners became focused on
hosting Team GB. This item was dropped from the agenda.

Nonetheless, the enthusiasm to host Olympic teams on the Gold Coast was used as an impetus to forward a
capital works program. The program included substantial upgrades and re-development of venues and facilities
with a total cost of AU$5.9 million. The Queensland government funded half of the cost and the GC City
Council funded the other half. Some of the significant developments included: the construction of an
international athletics facility at Griffith University including a synthetic track (cost AU$2.4 million), the re-
development of the international rowing facility at Hinze Dam (cost AU$0.5 million), the re-development of
Southport Swimming Complex (cost AU$1.5 million), the re-development of the Nerang Velodrome (cost
AU$0.5 million), and the construction of a synthetic surface hockey facility at the Gold Coast Hockey Centre
(cost AU$1.0 million). Most of these facilities were not due for improvements or major capital works until 2003
or long thereafter. The Hinze Dam rowing course had gone unused since the 1981 Australian Championships. As
a staff member from the Gold Coast City Council stated: “Shamelessly we used the Olympics for these major
capital works to bring the facilities up to speed”. Hence, pre-Games training was used as an impetus to upgrade
and construct sport facilities infrastructures.

**An Autonomous Strategy**

As discussed previously, a former Olympian and CEO of InterPacific Resorts (Australia) was also actively
involved in attracting teams to the Gold Coast. His intent was to target mainly track and field athletes to his new,
privately funded Sports Super Centre at Runaway Bay and Couran Cove Resort, and he planned to reach
individual athletes and smaller teams through personal contacts. In the early days, his aim was to get the athletes
to stay at the resort and commute to his facility. Both the Queensland government and GC City Council were
aware of his independent strategy, although neither was actively involved. Because the former Olympian was a
board member of the Queensland 2000 Task Force, he was able to keep abreast of the Olympic activities in the
state, while pursuing lucrative pre-Games training for his sport facility and resort.
**Negotiations with the British Olympic Association (BOA)**

Team GB’s single preparation camp was hosted on the Gold Coast. British athletes represented almost half of the total number of athletes who trained on the Gold Coast and almost one quarter of those who trained in the state of Queensland. The BOA’s preparation camp for Team GB was also unique as it was the only NOC that trained as a whole team in one location in Australia. Although national teams or individual athletes and teams in other NOCs trained in different locations throughout Australia, BOA management wanted to select one site as the headquarters for their training camp. Given the size and needs of Team GB, the British Olympic Preparation Camp became the focus of the Gold Coast’s planning for pre-Games training.

**Securing the BOA**

Early negotiations with the BOA had a major impact on the pre-Games training strategy of the Gold Coast. The CEO of Queensland Events Corporation was aware that the BOA wanted to establish a training camp in Australia before the 2000 Olympics, similar to the pre-Games training camp it had established for the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta. In April 1996, the CEO went to the United Kingdom on other business for Queensland Events Corporation. When reflecting on the process, he stated: “[During this trip I] made a point of meeting-up with some old friends, particularly one friend who was the Chief Executive of the BOA.” His aim was to prompt their interest in Queensland, specifically the Gold Coast, as an ideal place for pre-Games training in preparation for the 2000 Olympic Games. He proposed to the BOA management that the Australian experience would be different from Atlanta, particularly given the smaller population of Australia compared to the United States, and explained that a successful training camp in Australia would require additional forward planning.

In November 1996, the BOA sent a delegation to inspect a number of training camp locations around Australia. The delegation visited southeast Queensland, including the Gold Coast and Brisbane. Within a few days of this visit, they indicated their interest in the southeast Queensland region as the site for their 2000 Olympic Games training camp.

**The agreement**

The BOA employed an independent, executive manager to act on its behalf to negotiate the terms of the agreement and develop a package with the GC City Council that was acceptable to the BOA. Accordingly, the former CEO of Queensland Events Corporation began a small event management business called mja-Matchpoint. He stated:

“They [the BOA] asked me if I would take on the project of firstly assessing the possibilities and negotiating a draft agreement for them which if that proved successful then a partnership agreement could be set-up. I would manage the project from thereon until the Games. So, that’s when I set-up mja-Matchpoint and it was the first big project for us to get involved in.”

After a brief period of negotiation, an agreement was reached in April 1997, and officials from the BOA returned to the Gold Coast to sign the deal. The agreement formalised the Gold Coast as Team GB’s official Olympic Preparation Camp Headquarters in Australia in the lead-up to the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The principal partner in the agreement was the GC City Council with the Brisbane City Council, and to a limited extent, the Queensland government in supporting roles. The enthusiasm of the Gold Coast to embrace the British was a critical factor in the BOA’s choice. As the British Olympic Preparation Camp’s Executive Manager proposed:

“It is people that were the decider … it was clear that the Coast could provide what was required for the team in terms of the infrastructure. But, it was the people and their ability to handle demands coming thick and fast that was important … if it was to be just a business relationship it would always be much more difficult, because there are always things falling outside of the formal agreement that need to be done. They need to get done in order to move the main bulk of things forward. The BOA read that the people here would be prepared to do that and it wouldn’t be a question of “Is that in the agreement? If it’s not, then I’m sorry we can’t look at it and we can’t do it”. So, the people-side, I cannot stress enough how important that was.”

Signing the BOA also came at a cost. The GC City Council was criticised for allowing Team GB free and exclusive use of specified Gold Coast venues. In addition to the assurance of facility upgrades, the GC City Council also provided the BOA with AUS$100,000 of value-in-kind logistical support. This support could be used for the purpose of transportation, additional venue/facility hire, VIP cars and drivers, and the loan of office equipment. In return, the GC City Council was entitled to advertise, market, and promote the Gold Coast’s association with Team GB in the United Kingdom (only). In November 1998, the camp’s executive manager declared: “I think they [i.e. the GC City Council] would be regarded with some degree of envy in what they’ve been able to do and only because they acted quickly”. In 1999, the BOA adopted the lion logo to further develop the public’s affinity with the Great Britain Olympic Team and the Team GB brand (British Olympic Association 2001). Comparable to a Team GB sponsor, the Gold Coast was permitted use of the Team GB logo in the UK market.
In addition to the logo rights, Team GB would provide exposure to the Gold Coast through the encouragement of UK media to cover the 2000 Training Camp, inclusion in Team GB’s television series 'Insiders Guide to the Olympics', and provision of a flag bearing the Team GB Preparation Camp logo. The BOA also agreed to use its best endeavours to promote the Gold Coast in the UK as Australia’s premier holiday destination. Team GB also agreed to participate in an unspecified number of community programs and professional workshops on the Gold Coast.

The Gold Coast’s substantial investment (including in-kind and capital investment) was seen as a civic booster. Prior to the Olympics, a staff member from the Council stated: “There has been a lot of criticism about that deal, but from the Council’s point of view it was an opportunity to secure a very large team”. The major benefits of this opportunity were said to include the development of first-class facilities which would benefit local sport, the generation of awareness and exposure opportunities surrounding the camps, an impetus to attract other major events, and an opportunity to establish long-term relationships with the UK though the BOA.

The post-BOA response

As a consequence of this early agreement, hosting of Team GB became central to the Gold Coast’s pre-Games training planning. According to the GC City Council’s Project Officer: “We thought dealing with a team that size, we thought even if we don’t get any other teams . . . it has been said that that’s the biggest piece of pre-Olympic Games training anywhere in Australia”. Given the expected saturation of facilities (due to the requirements of Team GB’s athletes), the GC City Council thought it did not need to market and attract other international teams. As such, no additional marketing collateral was developed, and while interested teams were still well received, additional pre-Games training business was not actively pursued.

Recognising that the Gold Coast could only host teams its facilities could accommodate, the Gold Coast City council adopted a filtering approach to the teams attracted to the city for pre-Olympic training. Once prospects from other countries had been secured, facilities would be at capacity, and the city had to reject potential training camps as the facilities reached saturation point long before the accommodation. The GC City Council had to accommodate smaller teams where possible, and in some cases, these teams were directed towards northern New South Wales or other areas of Queensland.

Leveraging Efforts

An internal proposal by the Task Force, presented to the state government in 1998, highlighted the state’s position on potential opportunities that could be derived from Sydney hosting the 2000 Olympic Games. It stated:

"The greatest benefits of hosting teams lie in the promotional spin-offs coming from the media coverage of the team’s preparations appearing in TV, in newsprint and on the radio in the home country …it can be argued that leveraging from other major international events staged interstate can be just as beneficial to Queensland as hosting the event …the only costs associated for Queensland relate to marketing expenses undertaken to leverage from the event. Using the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games as an example, this is a relatively minor outlay for the return."

Tourism Queensland saw pre-Games training as a component of their broader strategy of generating awareness from the Olympics. Their regular business and normal routine was to host visiting international media, which could simply be expanded for the Olympic Games. A marginal adjustment was made to highlight the Olympic association to the visiting media, and international teams training in Queensland were pointed out to visiting journalists, particularly if their country-of-origin had a team training in Queensland. This tactic was employed to emphasise the link between the country-of-origin, Queensland, and the Olympic Games.

At the local level, a senior executive at the Gold Coast Tourism Bureau suggested that it became 'obvious' that a key benefit to the Gold Coast from hosting Team GB and other teams was publicity and exposure of the Gold Coast in the teams’ countries of origin. Of particular interest was the awareness generated in the UK through Team GB. Three central tactics helped achieve this objective: (1) cross-promotion with Team GB Sponsors, (2) hosting of visiting international media, and (3) a taxi advertising campaign in London.

The GC Tourism Bureau formed relationships with Team GB sponsors to develop a cross-promotion campaign. Kellogg’s, a Team GB sponsor, had a breakfast cereal promotion to win an all-expenses-paid trip to the Gold Coast ‘where the British Olympic team will train’, coordinated via Tourism Queensland's London office. In addition, the GC Tourism Bureau launched a direct-mail campaign to one million Lloyds Bank customers advertising a promotional prize of a holiday to the Gold Coast. In a cross-promotion with the BOA and its major corporate partners, a British travel company conducted a major promotion of the Gold Coast to leverage the interest that had been created through previous competitions. This promotion involved a direct-mail campaign to 500,000 households in the UK. In hindsight, a senior executive at the GC Tourism Bureau stated: "The fact that we have seen the results of it and it worked, we would have made more of the corporate linkages that they had. It was just a matter of resources, money, and the unknown".
Leveraging the media interest in the Gold Coast’s training camps was also seen as one of the greatest benefits from hosting the Olympic teams. The reasoning behind this tactic was seen as simple, and in hindsight, a senior executive at the GC Tourism Bureau explained:

“Having strategies aimed at targeting the people who are coming to the Olympics was really short term, so the media were going to be the total focus. We didn’t see it as brain surgery, we just saw that it was the only logical way. There was no question of the media involvement and the expectation of the viewing audiences. There was no question that the media can’t keep running stories about a person being the fastest and the quickest and/or if they are looking for human interest and destination type stories to a degree. I mean the opportunities were there. As I said, it wasn’t rocket science, we just saw that as the real opportunity and that is where we targeted our efforts.”

Working through Tourism Queensland, the GC Tourism Bureau hosted media from the UK in the three-year lead-up period to the training camps (i.e. 1997-2000). Publicity included the filming of a segment for a lifestyle program called ‘Wish You Were Here’, which was broadcast on ‘iTV’ in the UK in early 2000 to stimulate travel to the Gold Coast during the Olympic period. The segment included interviews with Team GB members training on the Gold Coast in 1999 and highlighted their impressions of the Gold Coast. Team GB athletes were seen enjoying the nightlife of the ‘ritzy’ Surfers Paradise (a Gold Coast precinct). In the program, the reporter took a Surf Awareness Course, visited a rainforest in the Gold Coast hinterland, mentioned water activities (such as parasailing and water-skiing), and profiled the costs and accommodation at the Park Royal (host venue for the show).

In the months leading up to the pre-Games training camps, the International Sport Unit employed a media relations person whose role was described from a government perspective by a Sport and Recreation Queensland Executive in a post-Olympic interview:

“She disseminated all the information to all the local media. It was thought that it was about the best way we could handle it. Obviously, at the airport there was a lot of media there and the teams handled it all very differently … sometimes they [i.e., the athletes and officials] didn’t want to talk to them at all…. It was very much a case-by-case basis.”

Publicity surrounding pre-Games training activities took place spontaneously. Information distributed to the media included the number of teams, unspecific information on where the teams were training (due to security), and new commitments of teams in train in Queensland. Sport and Recreation Queensland coordinated opportunities for the media to attend training sessions. When reflecting on the experience, an executive from Sport and Recreation Queensland stated: “We tried to keep it non-specific because of the privacy of the athletes involved”. The media relations person from the International Sport Unit was sport-focused, therefore had minimal interaction with the tourism and event entities within the state, such as Tourism Queensland, the media centre established in Brisbane for Olympic Football, or the GC stakeholders.

During the training camp period, the GC Tourism Bureau and GC City Council’s Public Relations Department established the Gold Coast International Media Centre, which was catalysed by the BOA’s agenda. The former manager of the Public Relations Department at the GC City Council was employed as a media relations consultant for the BOA project. As the Managing Director explained, mj-Matchpoint identified with the media relations consultant’s successor at the GC City Council and approached her with the opportunity to service the British and other media during the pre-Games training periods. From these discussions, the idea of establishing the GC International Media Centre was put on the agenda. In hindsight, the British Preparation Camp Executive Manager stated: “The idea emanated from the people working on the British project, but also the catalyst was the large number of British media that were expected to come”. The early agenda of the media centre was to cater to the needs of the BOA.

The media centre was seen as a win-win proposition. The BOA had a centrally coordinated media centre, while the GC City Council and GC Tourism Bureau could encourage and assist the media to write destination stories or to include destination footage in their reports. During the training camp period, an executive from the GC Tourism Bureau stated:

“It has meant we maximised the potential for any stories, we maximised the contact with the journalists … the guys here have told us they will all come back for holidays, some have already planned to come back to cover the Goodwill Games.”

Both the British Preparation Camp media consultant and the BOA’s Director of Press and Public Affairs supported a balance between the athletes’ preparation and promotion of the training location. In an interview during the training camp, the BOA’s Director of Press and Public Affairs stated: “if it wasn’t for the media they [the athletes] wouldn't have a profile, they wouldn't have sponsorship [although] the bottom-line is the athletes have to prepare for the Games”. Prior to the training, Team GB had received negative publicity about their preparation for the 2000 Olympic Games exacerbated by a disappointing performance in the previous Games (only one gold medal). In 2000, Team GB was publicly funded through the British government’s sports lottery for the first time, and UK residents had a vested interest in Team GB’s success. As a result, there was enormous pressure on Team GB (and indirectly BOA management) to perform. The BOA’s Director of Press and Public Affairs suggested that the BOA also manage the image of athletes’ preparation with the UK audience by not always showing the athletics to be simply enjoying the attractions of the Gold Coast, rather than training
seriously. To manage this balance, some media conferences were held at beachside locations to destination shots, and on other occasions, the media were given access to athletes for interviews and allowed to attend training sessions, tactics that also proved effective in managing athletes’ time. As the media relations consultant for British Preparation Camp commented however, these public activities were not as comprehensive as first anticipated when the agreement with the BOA was signed due to the increasing pressures on BOA management and Team GB athletes to concentrate on training.

The clause in the agreement between the BOA and the Gold Coast giving the GC Tourism Bureau and the GC City Council rights to use Team GB’s logo potentially was a key leveraging element, but, according to persons interviewed, this privilege was not used as effectively as possible. As a local tourism organisation, the GC Tourism Bureau faced a number of barriers in leveraging the use of Team GB’s logo. A senior executive from the GC Tourism Bureau suggested that a key limiting factor was that marketing in the UK was a new experience for his organisation, as the Australia Tourist Commission (ATC) usually undertook Queensland’s (and therefore the Gold Coast’s) international marketing. Because the GC Tourism Bureau’s funding was membership driven, marketing the Gold Coast internationally had the potential to cause conflict with its industry members who sought domestic campaigns. The GC Tourism Bureau had the opportunity, but not the resources, experience, or structure to capitalise on it.

Tourism Queensland was aware of the Gold Coast’s rights to Team GB’s logo, but also had limited capacity to use it as a leveraging strategy. In a post-Olympic interview, an executive from Tourism Queensland explained:

“There wasn’t any specific campaign I guess. It was integrated into our existing channels, so the collateral we provided to our trade partners, including wholesaler and travel agent, we would use it in that collateral for our presentations to them.”

Capitalising on Team GB’s logo was not part of Tourism Queensland’s agenda, as the executive elaborated:

“I guess you need to look at what is the mission of the Australian Tourist Commission and what is the mission of Tourism Queensland. The Australian Tourist Commission’s charter is to market to all the consumers internationally. Tourism Queensland’s charter is trade marketing. Out of that, we look at media opportunities. As opposed to the ATC, who do all the mass advertising to consumers, editors, and all the newspaper stuff. You will never see a campaign like that from Queensland, we don’t have the budget and it’s not our focus. Our focus is to work with the wholesalers, travel agents, and the airlines. I guess given the current economic climate we had to definitely refine what our strategy is. But our mission is definitely trade focused. You won’t see us in international markets.”

In contrast, a representative from the ATC’s London office commented on the role of the ATC in leveraging Team GB’s logo:

“We, as the Australian Tourist Commission, we always focus more on a national spread, I mean that’s our brief. We will work with our states and territories tourist boards that in turn worked with the regional ones. But it’s a very difficult thing for the ATC to try and work with all the regional bodies because it just upsets the other cut in the middle and we can’t get the attention. We are not set up to give that attention and to help with the servicing or whatever. So, any work that we did through that went through Tourism Queensland [which] helped facilitate it. It seemed to be the best way, otherwise it just gets too confusing and you start changing the lines of communication. But, we were delighted that the BOA chose the Gold Coast and promoted it quite well with the media.”

Reflecting on the opportunities and outcome for the Gold Coast, another respondent involved in the negotiation of the BOA’s agreement stated:

“I thought it was important for them to be able to get something in return. The dilemma was - it was used, but only in a fairly limited way. I think the dilemma was that the city itself simply didn’t have the resources to exploit that [the logo] in the UK. It needed the support of the state government in particular…. Also, my view was they did what they could, and what they thought was appropriate in the limits of their budget. But, I think it would be fair to say that there were a number of people that were disappointed that they weren’t able to mount a sustained campaign to utilise that association in the UK. There are still some possibilities, which didn’t happen. It was possible to scratch the surface.”

As a result, the only effort made was a taxi advertising campaign in London, coordinated by Tourism Queensland’s London office, which promoted Queensland as the training ground for Team GB. As an executive from Tourism Queensland noted:

“We got a London cab with the theme 'Queensland', and again, it incorporated the BOA. It was an Olympic promotion using the BOA logo…. Basically it was a taxi running around the area of London as a moving billboard about Queensland – Home to your Olympic team.”

At the community level, Team GB’s training camps offered over 400 people (including students from a local university and other community members) the opportunity to participate in and manage the volunteer program. The Olympic athletes helped to generate community support for the construction and upgrade of facilities. In the lead-up to the Olympic year, some of Team GB came to the Gold Coast for familiarisation training camps. In 1998, the GC City Council proposed that these visits would provide hospitality for the visiting teams, particularly through community events to encourage athletes to form a relationship with the Gold Coast, and to develop a sense of ownership of these Olympic teams in the Gold Coast community and to promote the
Council’s Olympic initiatives. In November 1998, a staff member from GC City Council proposed that the concept behind these events was:

“To give the Gold Coast public a sense of ownership of what’s happening here and let them touch the Olympics. Let them have ownership of the Games themselves. The Games are happening in Sydney, but if they can’t make it down or whatever, they might be able to reach out and touch it a little bit by meeting these athletes.”

During these early visits, the GC City Council opened its new sport facilities by showcasing international athletes coming to train in the facility, thereby reinforcing the message that the training camps were beneficial to the Gold Coast. The Council planned for local newspapers to advertise barbecues and free concerts for the Gold Coast residents to meet the athletes. In the end, these events did not happen given the pressures discussed previously by relating to media activities. Instead, the BOA brought in an Olympian from the Barcelona 1992 Olympic Games during the pre-Games training camp to visit Gold Coast schools (occasionally with 2000 Team GB athletes). Like the planned media activities, this community program was not as extensive as first envisaged.

A reception was organised by the GC City Council to host the officials and British athletes who did not go to Sydney for the Opening Ceremonies. In addition to Team GB’s athletes and officials, civic leaders, politicians, camp organisers, and volunteer leaders were invited to the event. BBC, the British broadcaster, had live feeds from the Gold Coast reception to the UK during the Opening Ceremonies, and also provided the British telecast of the Opening Ceremonies on two large screens at the Gold Coast reception. Speeches were made thanking the Gold Coast and the BOA for their pre-Games training camp experiences. Six months after the Team GB Preparation Camp, the organiser explained:

“What we were hoping to create here was the unique camp tailored to the needs of the British athletes. An important element was to let the British athlete feel almost as if they were at home and that meant watching British coverage of the Olympic Games...BBC saw the opportunities to exploit its connection with the Olympic Games but the idea of the alternative or complementary Opening Ceremony was the idea of the Technical Director of the BOA, for athletes who would not go to the Opening Ceremony to have a feel for it.”

As a result, the Gold Coast training camp became part of the UK broadcast of the Olympic Opening Ceremonies.

Outcome

The Queensland 2000 Task Force’s Final Report (2001) declared that the marketing efforts of the Task Force provided ‘a tremendously positive experience for Queensland’. The state hosted more than 2,500 Olympic and Paralympic athletes from 48 countries. As shown in Figure 4, 80% (or 146) of the 181 teams, that trained in Queensland in Brisbane or the Gold Coast. Sport and Recreation Queensland estimated that these teams brought AUS36 million into Queensland’s economy (including accommodations, meals, transport and facility hires). The final Report (Queensland Government 2001) declared that the legacies from the Task Force included: upgrade and construction of world class sport facilities and accommodations, enhancement of Queensland’s reputation as a sport destination, increased knowledge gained by accommodations and sport managers relates to needs of international sport teams, experience gained by university students involved in the operation of the training camps, improvement of risk management planning which could be exercised at future events (particularly the Goodwill Games in Brisbane 2001), and establishment of a sporting network between Queensland and the international sport community.

An executive from Tourism Queensland suggested that many of the organisation’s successes could not be quantified:

“The difficult thing is putting a dollar figure on why events are good, rather than saying yes they are good for a region. But, what does that mean? It is hard to put in black-and-white the dollar value of an event.”

However, within the organisation, she proposed that the Olympic activities and experience would: “…carry-over a lot of what we did with the Olympics to other events, working with the trade, working with the media…. The whole industry or buzzword has evolved post-Olympics. I think have recognised the value of events”. She suggested that the Olympic experience also gave Tourism Queensland a better understanding of the distribution networks for events, pointing out that the key to the success of Tourism Queensland’s leveraging efforts was: “having someone there to coordinate things, then things happen. As opposed to putting it into someone else’s in-tray when it is not really their priority…. you needed someone there to push it”. She added: “what the Olympics has done is shown us there is opportunity from thinking outside-of-the-box and benefits from working with corporate or non-traditional partners in the tourism industry”. The data suggest that, through the events tourism coordinator, the Olympics provided Tourism Queensland a learning experience that can be carried forward to leverage future events. However, it is questionable whether this learning has been institutionalised into Tourism Queensland or remains with individuals who implemented Tourism Queensland’s Olympic strategy.
The Director of the Queensland 2000 Task Force suggested that leveraging the Olympic Games was a learning process for the state government, and provided a catalyst for new levels of coordination and relationships to develop among departments in the Queensland government. After the Games, however, the Queensland 2000 Task Force and its board disbanded, leaving no formal links. Yet, a senior policy adviser for the Department of Tourism, Sport and Racing and former Director of the Task Force suggested that:

"They have certainly learnt a lot through the sort of work that the Task Force did. In that they will be able to carry-on working through the individual departments and agencies rather than with the overall Task Force …. One of the big lessons was about working in partnership … to try to do any of this stuff on our own is really self-defeating. It's really about picking out the people who can really contribute …. There's all the big picture stuff, but there is all the supporting operation things that came out of it. Community and city promotion, public and private sector, and inter-departmental relations were formed. I think there was an awful lot of goodwill. But, people learnt a lot of strategic things from it. The Queensland Government talks a lot now about integrated service delivery, I think that was it living and breathing and demonstrating how well it can work … it’s a variation on place management… everyone wanted it to be a success …. The organisations have learnt a lot of things that they will keep on using and improving …. We have begun to appreciate the role that other people were playing …. It will keep working because there are continuing events that need it."

As these comments illustrate, the Olympic experience provided the Queensland government with new ways to create links and build partners among both public and private bodies. In particular, the government saw the value of creating a common goal (in this case, the Olympic Games) to stimulate inter-department linkages and cross-department coordination. These departments also sought to protect their own interests (e.g. sport, tourism, business) and promoted activities that propelled their interests onto the agenda. On the surface a collaborative approach was presented, while beneath the surface each department was protecting its own interests on the agenda.

At the local level, the Gold Coast hosted 1,300 athletes and officials from 15 countries with 66 squads. In addition to the entire British team for both the Olympics and Paralympics, other international teams hosted on the Gold Coast included Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Germany, China, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, and the USA. The GC City Council estimated that hosting the teams provided approximately 30,000 – 40,000 bed nights for the Gold Coast, injecting into the local economy an estimated AU$15 million.

During the camps, the Gold Coast International Media Centre accredited seventy-two media agencies. In addition, the GC City Council and GC Tourism Bureau developed a database with personal details of 302 individuals requesting media accreditation. This database includes journalists from Australia, England, Sweden, America, Japan, and Brazil. At a local level, establishment of the Gold Coast International Media Centre was a result of the first cooperative activity between the GC Tourism Bureau and GC City Council. Until this event, the GC Tourism Bureau and GC City Council used a similar event database, but developed independent event calendars each year. Through their collaboration on this project, they develop an integrated Gold Coast events calendar.
Pre-Games training provided the Gold Coast an opportunity to increase the awareness of the region in international markets, particularly in the UK. A senior executive of the GC Tourism Bureau stated: "There is a window of opportunity in terms of the goodwill that’s been created". Because the GC Tourism Bureau obtained only anecdotal evidence of the success of this strategy, the impact of the media exposure is difficult to track. The tracking was undertaken by the international offices of Tourism Queensland and the ATC, organisations from which the GC Tourism Bureau received its tracking information. In hindsight, a senior executive of the GC Tourism Bureau suggested that the tracking gave them better media opportunities than expected, but at the time: "We didn't know, we were hoping, we saw the media from pre-Games training was our best option, but we didn't know how good an option it would be". Elaborating, he stated:

"From the British side, absolutely phenomenal pick-up immediately... We've already had over twenty percent improvement in expressions of interest and pre-bookings in the UK, and to a lesser degree Europe is about fifteen percent. We've had a major convention group of over 1,000 book from the UK, purely on the images and messages they saw coming out of the team being based here. It's early days, but certainly the effort we've made has already paid for the financial investment and the physical investment."

Pre-Games training also provided GC City Council staff members an opportunity to become personally involved in tasks beyond their normal roles, and to step outside of the traditional facilities management perspective. Not normally involved in this capacity, the staff in the Community and Recreation Facility Branch had to collaborate with other government sectors, such as the police, tourism agencies, and privately owned facilities, to develop a database that included both public and private facilities not in existence prior to the 2000 Olympic Games. The GC City Council also hoped to continue building a long-term relationship with the teams to encourage them to return to the Gold Coast for future training camps, particularly prior to other international events held in Australia (such as the 2006 Commonwealth Games) or sport-specific international competitions (such as the World Rugby Cup). During the training camp, a staff member from the Gold Coast City Council suggested that the numerous new and upgraded facilities dedicated to pre-Games training indicated that the Gold Coast had also improved the city’s position as a host of sport events:

"You only have to look back three years, and the only facility that we had was Carrara Stadium. And really, as a direct result of the Olympics there’s now the world class hockey stadium, two world class athletics facilities, our rowing facility, our swimming facility that has been improved. That might have happened over the next ten years, but the Olympics really gave it a spur on."

On 31st October 2000, the GC City Council released a Draft Economic Development Strategy – 2010 for the Gold Coast, stating that the “Gold Coast is at a crossroads” (Gold Coast City Council 2000b, p. 5). In the past, the city’s has reliance on tourism, had resulted in a relatively narrow economic base. The development of the Gold Coast’s tourism industry was an issue identified in the report:

The Gold Coast has a 'State size' tourism sector without an effective industry and government structural framework with which to manage 'tourism related issues' to maximum effect. A 'policy void' currently exists with regard to tourism infrastructure, planning, investment, and product development and service issues in the destination. (Gold Coast City Council 2000b, p. 69)

For these reasons, the report concluded that a strategic approach to economic development is required to create a globally competitive city in 2010. One of the opportunities identified in the report was training in the city as a spin-off of the 2000 Olympic Games and the 2001 Goodwill Games (held in Brisbane). The specific strategies identified for tourism, sport, and entertainment industries included a continued strong emphasis on the city’s existing major events and willingness to investigate new proposals. Further development and promotion of the Gold Coast as a centre for excellence in sport, training, and related activities were also recommended.

In February 2001, a presentation on the future of training camps in the city was made to the Gold Coast City Council. The presentation reported the outcomes of pre-Games training on the Gold Coast and the potential to develop international training camps post-Olympics. As a result of this meeting, in May 2000 a proposal for a long-term training camp agenda was sent to Council for consideration. One of the key aspects of this proposal was the opportunity to extend the link with the British Olympic Association and seek to become the permanent winter training venue for the British team.

Clearly, these are the first steps towards establishing the Gold Coast as an international training location and ultimately developing an integrated sport and place marketing strategy for the city. However, whether the stakeholders can anchor the learning and coordination generated for the 2000 Games is still tentative. Moreover, there is also uncertainty about whether the Gold Coast can capitalise on the momentum created by the Olympic Games and build upon the agenda to develop training camps and other sport events on the Gold Coast in the long term.

Analysis

The city of Gold Coast is tourism focused. The assets and development of the city drive this focus. Governed by the region’s geographical position, these assets include its world-famous beaches and sub-tropical climate. The tourism-driven development of the Gold Coast has meant that, even though its population is smaller than other
Lessons from Pre-Olympic Training

Because the problem of pre-Games training was assigned to sport-orientated stakeholders, it became a sport problem. The objective of the sport-orientated stakeholders was to maximise the number of teams training in the city as opposed to leveraging the tourism value from hosting the teams. Hence, a disconnection existed between the needs of the Gold Coast as a city and the orientation of the stakeholders who were assigned the problem.

As a sport-oriented problem, the pre-Games training response was focused on attracting a maximum number of teams to the city and providing a positive sport experience through the training camps once secured. As Kingdon (1995) suggests, policymakers look for quantifiable indicators that illustrate to the public that government has optimised the opportunities or made good policy decisions. In the pre-Games training context, through attracting and quantifying the number of teams hosted in the city, the staff with government were able to provide the policymakers indicators to demonstrate that the government had maximised the opportunities from the Olympics for the city. Sport-orientated planners focused on the experience of the athletes and the officials, and the organisation and management of the training camps (i.e. the response) concentrated on hosting elite athletes. Leveraging activities, such as hosting the media to create awareness or building business relationships beyond sport, were not familiar mental models to the planners but they made an effort to ensure that the athletes’ and teams’ experiences were well managed. As an example, a media centre was established on the Gold Coast to manage the media for the British Olympic team. In an effort to better manage the teams (and ultimately shelter the athletes, particularly from the media), the sport-focused planners accidentally created a place marketing outcome. By delegating this problem to the tourism stakeholders, the camp planners (i.e. mja-Matchpoint and the Council) were able to leverage the teams to promote the Gold Coast.

As a consequence of the sport stakeholders shifting the leveraging efforts onto the tourism players’ agenda, the sport entities were able to employ existing operational mechanisms and the expertise of the tourism stakeholders to capitalise on this opportunity. The sport stakeholders were then able to concentrate their time and energy on issues central to their own agenda (i.e. the sport aspects of hosting the athletes and teams).

The stakeholder agenda also played an important role in the collective response. At both the state and regional levels, the agendas of the stakeholders were well defined. Moreover, their involvement with the response and their channels of feedback were clearly segregated. As indicated in the findings, sport stakeholders (including the International Sport Unit, the GC City Council, and mja-Matchpoint) focused on sport activities, such as attracting the teams and organising the training camps. Their indicators included the number of teams and the experiences of both athlete and official at the training camp. Tourism stakeholders (including Tourism Queensland and GC Tourism Bureau) focused on tourism activities, such as hosting visiting media and the media centre. Their indicators included the number of media hosted and the visitor statistics for that period. Business stakeholders (principally the Task Force) focused on business activities, such as attracting business to the city and ensuring that Queensland optimised the economic impact from the Games. This case study shows that each stakeholder group was clearly focused on achieving its individual agenda, and this agenda was part of its regular business. In addition, the success of realising this agenda was measured and would be fed back into government through the chosen indicators.

Nonetheless, the Olympic Games provided a superordinate goal and a common language for disparate groups to work together and act collectively. In the early stages of planning, relationships among various groups were weak or non-existent. However, over time some stakeholders discovered they were able work more effectively when acting collectively rather than independently. This trend was evident at the state level, as the policy community came together structurally via the Task Force, and later as the role of the interdepartmental group became increasingly important. A similar trend emerged at the local level in the relationships between Team GB camp organisers (primarily mja-Matchpoint and the GC City Council) and the GC Tourism Bureau who formed an alliance. Coalitions became increasingly important to the policy process and the success of the response, suggesting that these relationships were formed to add value and to assist in promoting independent organisational and personal agendas in the guise of group good.

The importance of personal relationships among stakeholders was also evident in this study. Personal relationships were used to solicit the proposal of the media centre, chiefly to host the British media. These findings concur with Kingdon’s (1995) concepts of coalition building and tipped effect (or a growing realisation) in the policy process to push an item along on the agenda and increase its importance to policy decision-makers. In this case, the players built organisational and personal relationships with other stakeholders to snowball the Olympics agenda, therefore promoting the prominence of their organisational and personal agendas both within their organisations and across government groups. Ultimately, through this process the stakeholders created a widespread perception of the Olympics as a critical problem that needed to be addressed.
To a degree, the Olympics opened a policy window that allowed some players to push for pet policies. Those from sport felt a primary need to develop sport facilities for local athletes. For those in tourism, the obvious need was to create awareness in the market, including increased funding for marketing collateral (e.g. CD-ROMs) and media hosting programs.

As groups capitalised on the opening of this policy window, key problems received attention from policymakers. Some groups received additional funding and human resources for their institutions and departments, such as the extra event tourism position with in Tourism Queensland, the Secretariat for the Task Force in the Queensland government, and the International Sport Unit in Sport and Recreation Queensland. In other organisations, staff roles were adjusted to accommodate pre-Games training, such as part-time involvement of staff members from GC City Council and the GC Tourism Bureau. Others used pre-Games training to create and establish private companies, such as the entrepreneurial activities of the Managing Director of mj.Matchpoint and a prominent local Olympian. Examples of additional funding included the re-development and construction of sport facilities throughout the Gold Coast, and the establishment of a CD-ROM unit in the GC City Council. As these examples illustrate, players leveraged the policy process to push organisational, departmental, and personal objectives onto the agenda.

The Gold Coast case study also revealed problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation in the policy process (Cohen et al. 1972). The Gold Coast’s response to pre-Games training was seen to evolve from a loose collection of ideas rather than from a coherent, strategic plan. Furthermore, this response was implemented on a trial-and-error basis. Marketing initiatives were formulated and implemented with little understanding of the needs of the target market, the process of pre-Games training decision-making and selection, or the potential to leverage pre-Games training. Time and involvement of the members also varied. At both state and regional levels, pre-Games training was only one issue in a portfolio of organisational tasks. While the membership of planning groups remained relatively stable, the time and involvement the players devoted to pre-Games training fluctuated, creating fluid participation in the pre-Games training agenda. The response to pre-Games training fluctuated in an unknown environment, as the stakeholders were uncertain of what to expect or how to react. These findings are consistent with the concept proposed by Cohen and colleagues (1972) that issues in the policy process are in a constant state of flux, operating in an uncertain or unknown environment with changing decision-makers.

Senge (1990) argues that, when there is uncertainty causing a challenge to the status quo, an organisational climate is created in which learning can occur. As this case study illustrates, the attention-grabbing, focusing nature of the Olympic Games disrupted the status quo and challenged organisations, groups, and individual players to surpass their standard ways of thinking and acting.

At the state level, coordination between key stakeholders was undertaken in the inter-departmental working group, which provided a forum where ideas and challenges across organisations and departments could be exchanged. In this environment, group members began the process of thinking ‘outside the box’. Through this experience, these stakeholders gained a new appreciation of the roles of other organisations and departments and learned ways to use organisational structures to leverage the policy process. Still, group learning was individual and personalised to group members. Because there has been no investment in anchoring the team learning concept into other learning teams or organisations, this potential legacy of the Olympics may be lost.

At the local level, planning was undertaken by a small group of like-minded stakeholders. Two key individuals were involved in the majority of the planning: the project officer from the GC City Council and the Managing Director of mj.Matchpoint. In the later stages, the Public Relations department of GC City Council, GC Tourism Bureau, and other groups (such as police, university, and sport facilities managers) became involved, although these later groups had defined roles and were usually only involved in one aspect of the total project (i.e. operating the Gold Coast International Media Centre, policing the training camp, organising the volunteer program). Planning at the local level was centralised, and the two key individuals who managed the process came to learn about attracting, negotiating, and managing the training camps, as well as building alliances with other organisations to assist in the provision of the camps. The learning remains vested in these individuals, and is not anchored into other departments in GC City Council or the city as a whole. Consequently, there is potential to lose this knowledge and experience.

In conclusion, the Gold Coast case study has highlighted the influence of problem attribution and the orientation of the stakeholders on the response to pre-Games training. While the region’s assets were important in attracting teams and media to the city, initiatives implemented to leverage these assets were unintentional. Consequently, the leveraging of these camps was not a carefully considered strategic decision, but rather a haphazard chain of events that fortunately generated some positive tourism outcomes.
Chapter 6

THE HUNTER

The Hunter case study focuses on the stakeholder responses when pre-Games training is considered from the perspective of local economic development. This chapter will discuss the use of pre-Games training camps to build relationships beyond sport for business and trade opportunities. Seen as an economic development activity, sport has a clear relationship to leveraging business and tourism opportunities. In the early planning stages, the Hunter’s pre-Games training initiative was positioned within local government, but a dramatic change to the players who drove the strategy had a profound influence on the objectives and outcomes of this project. This case study demonstrates the influence of problem attribution and orientation to planning group to the outcomes from pre-Games training. Legacy planning and agendas are discussed, and strategic objectives of pre-Games training and stakeholders’ reference points are also defined. The impacts of these reference points and agendas are reviewed in relation to the response of the region to the pre-Games training opportunity, and leveraging efforts and outcomes are described. At the conclusion of this chapter, issues and lessons from the Hunter case study are discussed.

Profile

The Hunter is a region located north of Sydney in the Olympic host-state of New South Wales. Its distance from Sydney is approximately two hours by road via a major highway link, and 30 minutes by air. The region was named after the Hunter River, which flows through the region. Within the Hunter are 13 local governing areas. The region extends from Lake Macquarie in the south to the Great Lakes in the north, Merriwa in the west, and to the Pacific Ocean in the east. The Hunter is home to over 540,000 people, and its major city is Newcastle (Hunter Region Organisation of Councils 2001).

The coastal city of Newcastle is the light metals capital of Australia, one of the country’s leading trade centres, and the largest export port in New South Wales. Each year the Hunter produces almost three-quarters of a million tonnes of light metal, and is the only region in the state where aluminium is smelted. The region produces 40% of Australia’s aluminium, and provides 80% of the electricity for New South Wales. The coal industry brings in AU$5 billion a year to the local economy. In the post-industry era, the region recognised the need to diversify its economic base, and in 1999 Australia’s largest steel manufacturer, BHP, ceased steel production in Newcastle (Hunter Economic Development Corporation 1999a).

Given these economic changes, the Hunter sought other industries to strengthen the region’s economic base beyond its established industries such as agribusiness and agriculture (Hunter Economic Development Corporation 1999b, 1999c, 1999d, 1999e). At the time of the Games, emerging industries in the Hunter included tourism, wine, defence, aeronautics, marine engineering, sustainable development, and medical and thoroughbred horse research.

Tourism is an important emerging industry in the Hunter. In 1997, the service sector employed 80% of the region’s workforce, predominantly in tourism, education, health, and retail services (Hunter Economic Development Corporation 2001). In the fiscal year 2000, 2.5 million domestic tourists and 100,000 international tourists visited the Hunter region. Fifteen percent of the total domestic tourism business for the region is generated within New South Wales, and represents 10 per cent of the state’s total domestic tourism, making the Hunter the most popular regional tourist destination in New South Wales. The Hunter region’s wine country boasts 60 wineries and 80 independent grape growers (Bureau of Tourism Research 2000).

The Strategy

As the host state and principal investor in the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, New South Wales had a unique advantage in the pre-Games training market. Although the New South Wales government (NSW government) had high stakes in successfully generating and retaining economic impact from hosting the Games, distribution of some of the Olympic impact out of Sydney and into regional New South Wales was also vital. Pre-Games training provided a means to achieve that goal. The NSW government maximised opportunities for the state by ensuring that a NSW government agency was the first point of contact for the visiting delegations, particularly NOCs and NSFs. In addition, pre-Games training would build relationships with the Olympic family and leverage long-term economic benefits for the state of New South Wales.

Local stakeholders in the Hunter anticipated that their location within the host state of the 2000 Olympic Games and their close proximity to Sydney would enable the region to capitalise on Sydney’s hosting of the Games. Attracting Olympic tenders, pre-Games training camps, tourists, and media were identified as major
opportunities for the region. In the beginning, the objective of the Hunter’s pre-Games training strategy was to attract a maximum number of teams to the region, which was believed by the stakeholders to significantly impact the local economy. The Hunter was seen as a prime location for pre-Games training based on its: (1) proximity to Sydney (two hours by road); (2) climate (similar to Sydney’s); (3) international standard facilities; and (4) reduced traffic and ease of moving to and from training facilities. In 1998, with a new planning team, the Hunter switched its focus to deriving commercial and economic opportunities for the region for both short- and long-term benefits. The new strategy was not limited to attracting teams, but also sought to leverage pre-Games training for sport, tourism, and business opportunities.

The Stakeholders

As displayed in Figure 5, the Hunter’s pre-Games training strategy involved five key players. As the state level, the NSW government established the NSW government pre-Games training unit, consisting of three primary departments: New South Wales Sport and Recreation, New South Wales Department of State and Regional Development, and Tourism New South Wales. The central local player in the early stages of planning was the Dash for 2000 Committee, coordinated part-time by a staff member of the Lake Macquarie City Council, although this role was later assumed by the Hunter Olympic Business Task Force, which was based within the Hunter Economic Development Corporation. In the following sub-sections, these stakeholders are described, and reference points and roles in the pre-Games response will be identified.

New South Wales Sport and Recreation

New South Wales Sport and Recreation (NSW Sport and Recreation) was the lead agency in the NSW government pre-Games training unit. As stated in the NSW Sport and Recreation Corporate Plan 1999-2003 (1999), its focus is to: “assist the people of New South Wales to participate in sport and recreation” (p. 1). In preparation for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, NSW Sport and Recreation aimed to: “… take advantage of the opportunities provided by the Olympic and Paralympic Games to provide a lasting benefit for sport in New South Wales” (p. 2). Its role was to coordinate pre-Games training activities across the state and to ensure that New South Wales received a majority of the training camp business from the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The agency also provided technical advice to the Olympic Coordination Authority regarding management of facilities.
and infrastructure to create a lasting legacy for sport in New South Wales. NSW Sport and Recreation was provided additional funding in the amount of AU$800,000 to develop Olympic-related facilities. (New South Wales Sport and Recreation 2000).

New South Wales Department of State and Regional Development

The second agency involved in pre-Games training in the state was the New South Wales Department of State and Regional Development (NSW DSRD), which is the first point of contact within the government for companies seeking to locate in Sydney and New South Wales. Central to the department’s objectives is development of its local economy and businesses to create quality sustainable jobs throughout the state. This objective consists of four components: (1) securing and sustaining investment; (2) increasing the participation of New South Wales business in international economy; (3) delivering enterprise improvement programs enhance international competitiveness; and (4) driving policy change to improve the business climate in New South Wales.

In response to the pre-Games training opportunity, an additional position was created in the NSW DSRD. The central responsibility of this role was to demonstrate the attractiveness of the state for pre-Games training camps, particularly in regional New South Wales. This indicator would assist the NSW government to legitimate to regional New South Wales its investment in the 2000 Olympic Games. A representative from NSW DSRD met with international delegations, assessed their sport needs, organised tours of appropriate sport facilities available in regions throughout the state, and continued to liaise with delegates after they departed to secure pre-Games training camps in the state. An executive from NSW DSRD suggested that their success was due in part to development of a close relationship with Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG): “SOCOG would advise me on any visit which was taking place... when any visitor came out, I got the opportunity to speak to them briefly about the pre-Games training opportunities”.

Tourism New South Wales

The third agency involved in the state’s pre-Games training initiative was Tourism New South Wales (TNSW), the state government’s tourism marketing arm. The organisation’s mission is to: "Advance New South Wales as Australia’s premier tourism destination” (Tourism New South Wales 1999, p. i). TNSW defines its stakeholders as local, state, and federal government, industry cooperative partners, staff, state tourism operators, and consumers. As the host state for the Olympic Games, a key TNSW objective was to leverage the awareness created by hosting the event, particularly through a media servicing program.

Dash for 2000 Committee

Early in 1994, the Hunter region identified pre-Games training as an opportunity worth pursuing. A regional committee of planners, called The Dash for 2000 Committee was formed to develop an initial pre-Games training strategy for the Hunter. Coordination of the group was the responsibility of a public relations officer from the City Council of Lake Macquarie, one of thirteen local governments in the Hunter. The Dash for 2000 committee represented a collection of stakeholder interests throughout the Hunter, including local sport, political, and community identities, such as managers of local sport organisations and facilities, Olympians, mayors, and a representative from the Chamber of Commerce. This temporary organisation did not exist prior to the Games and was not meant to continue after the Olympics.

Originally a small committee of 8-10 members, the Dash for 2000 initiative soon grew in size. Although records on the growth in membership were not available, a committee member described the group as: "a very loose and too large body". The Dash for 2000 Committee received no direct funding, but the City of Lake Macquarie donated a the service of a public relations officer to host National Olympic Committee (NOC) and National Federation (NF) representatives when they visited and attended meetings in the Hunter and Sydney. The Lake Macquarie City Council also provided Council resources to coordinate the initiative and to develop marketing collateral to promote the Hunter as a pre-Games training destination.

Hunter Olympic Business Task Force

In 1998, the Hunter’s pre-Games training strategy shifted to a local economic development focus. Coordination of the strategy was now based in the Hunter Economic Development Corporation. The reasons for this shift are described in the subsequent section (i.e. the regional response). The thirteen government councils in the Hunter region form an organisation called the Hunter Regional Organisation of Councils (HROC). Together, the Hunter Economic Development Corporation and HROC formed a group consisting of business people and regional mayors to discuss regional issues and identify economic development opportunities for the Hunter. The group also linked to other agencies, such as the NSW DSRD and NSW Sport and Recreation.

The Hunter Olympic Business Task Force (HOBTF) was established in 1998. The HOBTF was not simply the reinstatement or reformation of the Dash for 2000 Committee, but had a completely new membership from the previous planners. NSW Sport and Recreation, Hunter Economic Development Corporation, and HROC jointly sponsored this group, the key objective of which was to pursue local economic development opportunities.
arising from the Olympics. Originally, the state and local governments made six appointments to the Task Force. A local political figure, the Mayor of the City of Lake Macquarie, was selected to chair this group. Reflecting on the selection of committee members, he stated: "I've been on enough committees to know that the last thing you want is a politically correct committee". HOBT members were strategically chosen from various sectors of the community, including sport, tourism, local government, and business, to provide their expertise to the HOBT. Later the board was expanded to 10, then to 13, because the original members believed the group should be more representative of the community. As a member of the group stated: "... We didn't want to be seen as an elitist group... I could see the benefits for the Hunter at large, not just Newcastle".

After its expansion, the HOBT included representatives from the local television network and local event management. From this central group, committees were formed to generate strategies and tactics in each of four key areas: (1) business, (2) tourism, (3) sport, and (4) the Paralympics. The role of the four committees was to identify appropriate projects, provide direction on priorities to HOBT employees, generate ideas, and provide assistance to project leaders. A HOBT member described this group as a 'pot-pourri' of expertise. It was emphasised in the interviews of prospective committee members that the blend of expertise was essential to the group's success. A HOBT member described it in this way:

"What I’ve found in the past, if you are doing surf life saving, everyone is involved in surf life saving. If you are doing a rock opera, their background is music. Or if you are doing a sporting event, they are involved in that sport. At times their focus is limited and they don’t look over the fence for other opportunities... Now, I could be the world’s best at what I am doing in a sport, but that doesn’t make me a good sport administrator; it doesn’t make me a good coach; it doesn’t make me an expert in the marketing of that product. I may not have the knowledge to leverage off my own ability. I leave that to a management team to do. That is supposed to be their expertise... We were able to have an 'A' grade team, doing what we were briefed to do. In contrast, we could have had twelve sporting identities sitting around the table all scratching their backsides, trying to workout how to do it."

In addition to a strategically selected group driving the strategy, the HOBT employed two staff members to manage, facilitate, develop, and implement the strategy. In July 1998, the Hunter Economic Development Corporation employed an Olympic Business Coordinator to manage the strategy. This employee worked two days per week on tourism and business opportunities. In September 1998, another person was employed as the Olympic Sport Coordinator for three days per week to be responsible for the strategy’s sport component and for attracting athletes and teams to pre-Games training camps in the Hunter. In September 1999, the Olympic Sport Coordinator left the Task Force to join the Newcastle and Hunter Events Corporation to prepare for the 2001 Australian Master Games (to be held in Newcastle). As a result, the remaining Business Coordinator’s role expanded from a part-time focus on tourism and business to a full-time position that also included the sport portfolio as well as administrative assistance. Energy Australia sponsored the position. A member of the HOBT described the Olympic Business Coordinator as: "... an excellent marketing and management person .... She made things happen. If they didn’t, she found out how to get them happening".

After the Olympic Business Coordinator’s role was expanded, her ability to network and realise opportunities improved. When reflecting on her role as the Olympic Business Coordinator, she stated: “The contacts that I had made in the sporting fraternities also had other careers as well ... by getting to know them and helping them with the sport, I could also integrate the business opportunities as well".

The HOBT’s mission was: “To ensure that the Hunter region obtains the maximum possible economic and commercial benefits from the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games” (Hunter Olympic Business Task Force 2000a, p. 3). As shown in Table 5, the HOBT set several objectives to achieve this mission. It was by these objectives that the success of the HOBT’s initiatives would be measured. These objectives differentiated the HOBT from other Olympic planners in Australia, as noted by one HOBT member: "There are other task forces but I think the majority that I’ve spoken to are actually targeting teams basically more so than the business opportunities and tourism”. Because the HOBT’s Olympic strategy was enmeshed with the local economic development strategy rather than directed to one particular sector, such as sport or tourism, its role was one of fostering ideas and then catalysing their realisation through relevant organisations.
The overall key objectives of the Hunter strategy:

1. Identify realistic business opportunities arising from the Games that will benefit the Hunter region;
2. Increase awareness in the region of the economic benefits that can flow from the Olympic and Paralympic Games, both in the lead up to and in the longer-term [sic.] post event;
3. Promote the region’s capabilities to strategic Olympic bodies and targeted business partners and customers;
4. Facilitate successful business outcomes for Hunter enterprises by providing coordination and assistance to capitalise on opportunities, including building regional capabilities where necessary;
5. Identify, communicate and promote Olympic sporting opportunities to the Hunter’s sport fraternity and implement a range of strategies to encourage international and national Olympic teams to undertake pre-Games training and competition in the Hunter;
6. Identify, communicate and promote Paralympic information and opportunities to the residents of the Hunter and implement a range of strategies to encourage international and national Paralympic teams to undertake pre-Paralympic Games training and competition in the Hunter.

In addition, the Final Report (November, 2000, p.4) states a seventh objective:

7. Promote the region’s capabilities to Consuls General, international visitors, national and international media and Olympic tour companies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: The Hunter Olympic Business Taskforce Objectives</th>
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<tr>
<td>The overall key objectives of the Hunter strategy:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) Identify realistic business opportunities arising from the Games that will benefit the Hunter region;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Increase awareness in the region of the economic benefits that can flow from the Olympic and Paralympic Games, both in the lead up to and in the longer-term [sic.] post event;</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) Promote the region’s capabilities to strategic Olympic bodies and targeted business partners and customers;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Facilitate successful business outcomes for Hunter enterprises by providing coordination and assistance to capitalise on opportunities, including building regional capabilities where necessary;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Identify, communicate and promote Olympic sporting opportunities to the Hunter’s sport fraternity and implement a range of strategies to encourage international and national Olympic teams to undertake pre-Games training and competition in the Hunter;</td>
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<tr>
<td>(6) Identify, communicate and promote Paralympic information and opportunities to the residents of the Hunter and implement a range of strategies to encourage international and national Paralympic teams to undertake pre-Paralympic Games training and competition in the Hunter.</td>
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7. Promote the region’s capabilities to Consuls General, international visitors, national and international media and Olympic tour companies.

Source: Hunter Olympic Business Taskforce 2000a, p.3

Summary

A summary of the reference points for each stakeholder is shown in Table 6. These points include the funding source, reference point, objectives, and indicators for each organisation’s pre-Games training response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6: The Reference Points for each stakeholder in the Hunter’s pre-Games training response</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales Sport and Recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and Regional Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSW Dept of</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tourism New South Wales</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dash for 2000 Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hunter Olympic Business Taskforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number of teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Economic impact of pre-Games training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Linkages

Prior to the HOBT, the Dash for 2000 Committee was active in forming relationships with key players in the NSW government, SOCOG, and other regions in the state. After the group disbanded, these relationships were passed to the HOBT through personal introductions.

The HOBT identified one particular relationship as pivotal for attracting teams to the Hunter. That relationship was with the pre-Games training coordinator for the state, located in the NSW DSRD. In order to develop this relationship and promote the Hunter region as a pre-Games training site, HOBT members met with the key NSW DSRD contact and shared information. As one HOBT board member noted, the Hunter’s stakeholders wanted to demonstrate: “Hey, we are alive and well up here, and we’ve got facilities. We are keen to get involved”. To reinforce this message, the HOBT regularly communicated with the NSW DSRD contact to provide updates on the progress of efforts being made in the Hunter to attract athletes and teams. Likewise, the NSW DSRD contact sent visiting NOC and IF delegations to the Hunter to inspect its sporting facilities for pre-Games training camps.

Through creating a personal relationship with the NSW DSRD, the Hunter formed an indirect relationship with SOCOG’s pre-Games training area. Furthermore, NSW DSRD was also part of the coordination group formed in the NSW government, and the Hunter was able to indirectly receive information through this channel as well. This within-state network was important, as other states were aggressively marketing to SOCOG. As one HOBT board member explained, it was important to ‘remain top-of-mind’ when international teams were looking for facilities. As a result, the Hunter received numerous visits from visiting NOC and NF representatives via the NSW DSRD and SOCOG. As the Olympic Business Coordinator recalls:

“As long as I have been in the pre-games training position, I haven’t seen anything come from SOCOG. But, I think that the department of Sport and Rec. worked very closely with SOCOG, therefore we didn’t have to.”

The HOBT also formed a relationship with its neighbouring region, the Central Coast. This relationship was predominantly to link businesses to bid for Olympic tenders, yet it was also used to develop a cooperative approach, on occasions, with the neighbouring Central Coast pre-Games training strategy. The HOBT anticipated that this relationship would be important in managing the expected overflow of teams from the Hunter region, and in organising day tours from the Central Coast to the Hunter wine country. Likewise, the Hunter would take visitors on day tours to attractions in the Central Coast. Although this relationship was important for tendering opportunities, it was not used much for pre-Games training. As the Hunter discovered, it was able to host all the teams that the region secured.

The Response

This section outlines stakeholder response at the state and regional levels, and demonstrates the influence of the New South Wales government on the regional response, and on the state’s policy environment. The response of the regional stakeholders is also described.

The State of New South Wales’ Response

After Sydney was awarded the venue of the 2000 Olympic Games, the NSW government began to establish units to coordinate, capitalise upon, and ensure that the impacts of the Olympics remained within its own state. Identification of pre-Games training as an Olympic-generated opportunity resulted in the establishment of a pre-Games training unit within the NSW government. This pre-Games training unit was driven by the NSW DSRD and NSW Sport and Recreation, with marginal assistance from TNSW to develop marketing collateral. At the regional level, task forces and committees were set-up throughout the state. The NSW government pre-Games training unit concentrated its efforts in regions with existing international-standard sporting facilities that were keen to host Olympic teams for pre-Games training. As an executive from the NSW government pre-Games training unit explained, the NSW government emphasised to the regions that it should appoint a full-time person in the region to coordinate all the Olympic activities. In the same interview, it was suggested that: “The Olympics really hasten the building [of sport facilities], particularly in Newcastle …. Definitely as a result on the Games taking place, they [new facilities] were built, and the government funded them. They are a legacy for the Games”. In years leading up to the Games, the NSW government conducted regional Olympic seminars. Although these meetings mainly concentrated on organisation for the Torch Relay, pre-Games training also was discussed.

The first response of the NSW government pre-Games training unit was to write to all local councils in the state to explain the potential for pre-Games training and request a listing of international standard facilities in their region. Many regions already had this information as a result of a recent facility audit conducted by SOCOG.

From the state-based facility audit, the NSW government pre-Games training unit developed a tactic that targeted particular countries and matched them with facilities in various locations throughout the state. As the
Lessons from Pre-Olympic Training

primary role of the NSW government pre-Games training unit was to act as a coordinating body, it directed visiting delegations of NOC and IF representatives to the appropriate regional task forces and facilitated the development of a relationship once the representatives returned home. TNSW produced the pre-Games training brochure for the state of New South Wales using the slogan 'Get the home town advantage'. The brochure concentrated on the state’s point of difference, its position as the home of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, including photographs of athletes training in a picturesque environment, but offered minimal information about the sport facilities. In addition to this statewide approach, many regions throughout New South Wales produced their own independent marketing material. The state sent its marketing collateral to all NOCs and IFs using a list provided by SOCOG.

The NSW government pre-Games training unit soon recognised that other states were also competing for pre-Games training camps, and to address this problem, stakeholders in the NSW government reminded SOCOG policymakers that the New South Wales taxpayers were funding the Games. As one executive within the NSW government recalls:

"Certain people at a very high level made it quite plain to people at SOCOG don’t overlook New South Wales. Initially, there was a problem. I was annoyed that New South Wales was being treated similarly to the other states. I made it be known that I didn’t think that was appropriate. Certain people in SOCOG thought it was an agreement that everybody should be treated the same. Whereas, I am literally walking distance from their offices, and you have people in Brisbane or Victoria who have to hop on a plane all the time. So, I wasn’t very happy. During the lead-up it was made extremely clear to the people at SOCOG that I, as a New South Wales representative, was to be given as much access as possible."

Given the expense of hosting the Olympic Games, the pre-Games training strategy in New South Wales had fewer resources (particularly financial ones) than comparable units in other states. As one executive from the NSW government training unit commented: “Our problem was our government wasn’t interested in sending people overseas, whereas [the] Queensland, South Australian and Victorian [governments] did”. New South Wales did however use its position as the host state to be a first point of contact for pre-Games training in Australia.

The importance of personal relationships soon became obvious. As an executive from the NSW government pre-Games training unit recalls:

"For example, an American guy that came out here, he was told the best place to do rowing [training] is in Canberra. I met him and he was not interested in doing anything in NSW. But, after spending a couple of days with him, he cancelled visiting anywhere else. Brisbane and Canberra were ringing him on the phone and he said, “No, I have decided where I am going”. We ended up with 90 US rowers going to a small place called Maclean."

Because the state stakeholders had positioned themselves as the first point of contact in Australia, from SOCOG’s initial introduction they were able to develop personal relationships with NOC and IF representatives.

The Hunter’s Response

The first group to undertake a pre-Games training initiative in the Hunter was the Dash for 2000 Committee. A member of this committee described the group as being:

“….galvanised into action … [because stakeholders in the Hunter felt that] SOCOG was busy working away at doing their own thing. We felt that the regions were in danger of being missed out …. We definitely got the impression that everything was for Sydney and to hell with the regions.”

The SOCOG facility audit provided a base from which to begin considering pre-Games training, in particular the facility assets in the region. As a consequence of this audit, the Dash for 2000 Committee constructed a facility database. In the Hunter region, two international standard facilities were being constructed: a multipurpose facility at Newcastle University and the North Power Hunter Sports Centre (including an athletics track and gymnastic centre). The Newcastle University Sport Union financed a AUS$20 million sports and aquatic centre called the Forum (Hunter Economic Development Corporation 2001). On the other hand, the AUS$10.4 million North Power Hunter Sports Centre (including an athletics track and gymnastic centre) was principally funded publicly by the Lake Macquarie City Council, with some assistance from pooling the NSW Sport and Recreation annual grants. An executive from the City of Lake Macquarie stated: "The Olympics pushed them along the pipeline. The thing helped us get it [the facilities] quicker than we would normally have".

In 1996, the Dash for 2000 Committee produced a marketing kit, distributed to NOCs throughout the world to promote the Hunter as a training destination to the international sport community. A delegation of three members from Dash for 2000 travelled to observe pre-Games training efforts for the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, and took with them their marketing kit to promote pre-Games training in the Hunter for the 2000 Games. However, in 1996 two of the major facilities that would be attractive to international teams were still being constructed (i.e. the Forum and the North Power Stadium). A member of the Dash for 2000 delegation explained that they felt armed with promises of superb facilities, but had little to show the international delegations when they arrived in the Hunter to inspect facilities. The member of the delegation suggested that the lack of completed sport facilities put the Hunter at a disadvantage. The uncertainty and unfamiliarity of this new activity meant it was difficult to convince businesses (particularly accommodation providers) to become involved in the
pre-Games training initiative. A Dash for 2000 Committee member suggested that private businesses were unsure of what pre-Games training could mean for them. As a result, it was important that the Dash for 2000 initiative scored an early victory when it secured a training camp for five Lithuanian athletes (to be held in 1998).

In 1996, following the Atlanta visit, the Dash for 2000 Committee members began to form an informal network with other regions in New South Wales experiencing the same Olympic-related challenges as the Hunter. These regions met in Sydney in a series of meetings. The SOCOG and the NSW government became aware that the regions were active and interested in pursuing Olympic-related opportunities. As a consequence, the NSW government pre-Games training unit was created and took over the organisation of these meetings to ensure that momentum was maintained throughout the planning period.

Following their assignment in Atlanta, the Dash for 2000 Committee produced a report on its experience that included a recommendation that the Hunter's Olympic activities, including pre-Games training, be supported by a full-time employee. This proposal was reinforced by SOCOG, as noted by a member of the Dash for 2000 Committee: "...if you are going to make a job of this, you've really got to put someone on full-time". The Dash for 2000 Committee proposed that this employee should be a woman they had met in Atlanta who had prepared an Olympic business plan for the Hunter. This proposal was presented to HROC. Upon consideration, it was rejected. As one of the authors of the proposal stated:

"[When] they knocked her back, we thought, "Well, how dinkum are they". We're giving our time and our energy and we're not getting anywhere... It just got to the stage where we thought it was not going to happen unless we did something drastic."

In 1997, the Dash for 2000 committee strategically and intentionally disbanded, after members decided that dissolution might prompt local stakeholders to take strong action. In hindsight, a Dash for 2000 Committee member stated: "... it would have happened had we been willing just to continue". He went on to say: "Local government is not the area really. It would have been better if it was a private enterprise, or even a Chamber of Commerce". As a result of this sacrifice, the Hunter Olympic Business Task Force (HOBT) was formed.

Using some of the information and knowledge collected by the Dash for 2000 campaign, the HOBT began to plan marketing strategies and tactics to attract the NOCs and IFs to the Hunter. Initially, the newly formed HOBT board believed it would be judged by the number of international teams it attracted to inspect the region and proposed that tactics be enacted that would show results. The HOBT board member who offered the proposal characterised it as 'getting some runs on the board', and explained that these results would create some credibility and support within the Hunter community. Demonstrating the benefits of the Olympic initiatives to maintain support of local governments in the region and stimulating interest from local businesses were of particular importance. As a HOBT board member commented:

"I must admit, some of the businesses did not see the benefits initially you know, because it's the old story of life, until somebody goes and does the work, you don't enjoy the benefits. But if you don't go and do the work up-front, you don't enjoy the benefits."

During the planning stages, the value of sponsoring teams (i.e. offering incentives for teams to train in the Hunter) was discussed. The board concurred that sponsorship should be limited to teams who could generate interest in the host region, such as the USA basketball teams or the Australian swimming team. As a member of the HOBT board explained: “We were pretty keen to get teams at one stage, but were not into buying teams”. Another board member commented:

"The government was of the opinion that because it was funding the Olympics there shouldn't be inducements to get the teams here, whereas that may not have necessarily been the case in other parts of Australia …. Why bastardise your product and give it away. At the end of the day we wanted people to come here, but we didn't want our operators or suppliers to be out of pocket."

As a consequence of this stance, a HOBT board member suggested that the Hunter lost teams to other regions that were offering attractive subsidies.

Attracting Teams

The first step in the plan was to identify existing facilities in the region that had the potential to host international teams. The SOCOG facility audit had already been collected by the Dash for 2000 Committee, but this information needed to be updated. The audit was used as a starting point, and sport organisations and facility managers were contacted again to update the information.

Through negotiations with local sport facilities and organisations, the HOBT developed a database of facilities in the Hunter. From this database, the HOBT developed a matrix of the Olympic sports, that the region’s sport facilities could accommodate, as well as countries that would compete at the 2000 Games in these sports. Subsequently, marketing material was developed to target specific sports.

The HOBT produced a new information kit and video about the region. The imagery and branding that had been undertaken by Dash for 2000 was replaced with a new marketing campaign. Internally, it was felt that the Dash for 2000 was a failure, so the new group wanted to start afresh. A member of the HOBT, who owned a
marketing company in Newcastle, designed new marketing collateral in the form of an information kit. Given that the Mayor of the Council of Lake Macquarie was the Chairman of the HOBT, the printing of the information kit was sponsored by the local city council. A Task Force member from NBN Television arranged for the television station to produce a pre-Games training promotional video, and folders for the information kit were donated by the Hunter Regional Tourism Organisation, whose Executive Director was also a member of the HOBT board.

The information kit and a letter of introduction were again sent to all NOCs worldwide. Subsequent contact was solicited via the video and through the Internet. The HOBT also developed a relationship with the local university’s (Newcastle University) language department, which provided interpretation services. This relationship enabled text translation and telephone conversations with countries throughout the world.

Personal contacts were also developed between local sport organisations and the IF of their specific sports. Liaison officers were obtained from each of the 29 targeted sport disciplines within the region. The liaison officers were thought to be experts in their sport, and these direct contacts provided the HOBT with knowledge of the needs of the international teams in each sport. The contacts also assisted in targeted relationship marketing to the teams via the Internet. For many years, one of the HOBT board members had been involved in international swimming and had contacts in this community. Through the board member’s personal contacts, the HOBT targeted Olympic swimming teams to achieve some early successes, or as the board member described, ‘to kick some goals early’. Accordingly, HOBT sent twenty e-mails to the world’s best swimming nations. Some replies from New Zealand and Holland were not received, although the Dutch team eventually decided to train in the Hunter. From these early successes, momentum began to build. According to the HOBT’s Final Report, over the 1998-99 period, 124 NOCs and 181 NFs were targeted for pre-Games training in the Hunter. From this campaign, 56 NOC, NF, and Olympic team representatives inspected the Hunter for pre-Games training between August 1998 and October 2000.

Leveraging Efforts

From the beginning, the HOBT decided to focus not only on what teams it could win, but more importantly, on what relationships and awareness it could generate with the teams and their home countries on an on-going basis. As a HOBT member board stated: "Those relationships are built on knowledge, delivering on what you say, and on trust", and HOBT implemented tactics aimed at promoting the Hunter and building relationships to leverage the pre-Games training camps.

During the pre-Games training camps, the focus of the NSW government was in Sydney and on hosting the Olympic Games in the state. At the state level there was no media strategy for hosting visiting media travelling with the teams. Although it began without a media strategy, the Hunter region learnt early in the planning process the importance of hosting the media. The visit by the Dutch swimming team one year prior to the Games (in September 1999) alerted the Hunter of the need to manage the media. When reflecting on the first training camp in the Hunter, the coordinator of the HOBT said:

"The fact is we wanted to be so courteous to the team and not upset them, that we left the press releases until a couple of days after they arrived. [We thought this would] make them comfortable within their facility.... The media picked it up straightaway. On the first day, they arrived at the facilities. It wasn’t a controlled joint effort from a tourism point of view and a facility point of view. It was purely a facility point of view. [The media reported] this is the facility, rather than showing the whole region. So, from that [experience] we learnt to manage them from right at the minute they arrive, [which meant] taking them around [the Hunter], and being with them."

As a consequence of this experience, the HOBT learnt the importance of hosting the media covering the pre-Games training to avoid missing opportunities provided by hosting sports people, and began to develop a database of its media contacts. It undertook research to locate appropriate media, including contacting SOCOG, the Australian Sports Commission, and other Olympic Organising Committees such as Salt Lake City (host of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games). HOBT members also attended media functions and other events to network informally. From this database, HOBT would send out media releases highlighting the Olympic and international teams that were training in the region. At the local level, the HOBT distributed a monthly 'Hunter Olympic Business Task Force Update' to local television, radio and newspapers.

Hosting the visiting media also became part of the broader Olympic strategy. To the HOBT it became 'obvious' that it should focus on assisting both accredited and non-accredited media to focus on the 'bigger picture images' of the Hunter -- to showcase its business and tourism sectors (particularly the wine industry), and to build relationships with the business community for trade purposes. While the teams were training in the region, the HOBT coordinator offered to manage the media by organising interviews and scheduling media access to the athletes.

The Hunter’s media strategy was supported by personal contacts the HOBT coordinator had developed with NSW government agencies, in particular TNSW and NSW DSRD. Competition to attract media during the lead-
up to the Olympics prompted the HOBT to actively pursue their personal contacts as well. The HOBT anticipated that journalists would be looking for stories, and if the HOBT could assist a journalist to find a story, the article could also be used to promote the Hunter. On reflection, the HOBT coordinator stated: “I developed a lot of links with a lot of the media …. I suppose it was a matter of you help me, and I’ll help you … it was also knowing what media to contact”.

As a result of this proactive strategy, the HOBT hosted international media, including Guatemalan Press, Argentinean media, Polish media, Dutch media, SM: TV in the United Kingdom, Reuters, Lithuanian media, Kyoto News, Australian media (including SBS TV, Sportsworld, Sydney Morning Herald, Financial Review, News Limited, 2WS, ABC TV, Channel 7, Daily Telegraph), and local media. The HOBT also coordinated interviews with teams from United Emirate Empires, Ireland, The Netherlands, Germany, Cyprus, Guatemala, and China (Hunter Olympic Business Task Force 2000b).

One of the early plans was a journalist exchange. The HOBT proposed that a journalist from one of the countries training in the Hunter (such as Ireland) be exchanged with a Hunter-based journalist for a two-month period. It was thought that this exchange would publicise the Hunter in the journalist’s home country (e.g. in Irish newspapers). However, due to time and resource difficulties, the journalist exchange did not take place.

Other media opportunities were pursued. During the Irish team’s visit, an Irish television station, RTE, produced a 10-minute documentary on Irish athletes training in the Hunter. This television program provided an opportunity to showcase the Hunter, including images of Irish Olympic boxers training on the beach in Newcastle and Irish cyclists training around Lake Macquarie. The documentary, described by the HOBT coordinator as being: "virtually like a tourism sporting video", and was broadcast in Ireland to an audience of over 4 million viewers directly following the telecast of the Opening Ceremonies of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. By coordinating this visit, the HOBT was able to include scenic footage of the Hunter region.

With the assistance of the Irish team, the Hunter region organised a pre-Olympic athletics meet. Track and field athletes from the countries already training on the Hunter were invited. To boost the numbers and gain additional publicity, HOBT also invited athletes housed in the Athletes Village in Sydney. Essentially, this event was organised to generate media attention. Media releases were distributed to everyone on the media database. As the HOBT coordinator stated: “It was apparently known as one of the largest athletics meets outside of the Sydney Olympic Stadium”. The Hunter attracted five international television broadcasters to cover the event, which also provided local residents an opportunity to see the Olympic athletes compete prior to the Games.

At a community level, the plan was to develop a relationship connecting the international teams to the local Hunter community. The HOBT would achieve this objective by encouraging and facilitating community support and hospitality for the teams. Several initiatives were to facilitate this community involvement. Firstly, volunteers from the ethnic community were recruited as team hosts. Secondly, the Hunter Business Task Force worked with a local school to promote an ‘Adopt a culture’ program, and many Olympic athletes visited local schools during their stay in the Hunter. Finally, a civic reception for the teams was held.

One of the aims of the Hunter’s strategy was to encourage teams to return to the region to train. The HOBT also wanted to highlight activities beyond training that athletes and officials could undertake in the Hunter, another strategy to encourage repeat visitation. In addition to the athletes, numerous people would be travelling with the teams, including officials, administrators, friends, and family, and to accommodate this market, tour packages were developed to showcase the Hunter region and to provide hospitality to Olympic visitors. An information kit was developed containing general tourism facts about the Hunter region and was presented to athletes upon arrival, who could then pass the kit on to their friends and family. The kits were not as useful as anticipated, as many athletes were not interested in day touring, and officials did not encourage friends and relatives to visit the athletes during this intensive training period.

In addition to the information kits, the Hunter produced a booklet highlighting medical services in the Hunter region. Developed through liaison with the Hunter Region Division of General Practitioners, the booklet identified doctors, hospitals, and sports medicine facilities in the region. Relationships with practitioners were also facilitated through networking lunches, such as a luncheon held for the Hunter Medical Society and medical doctors of the visiting international teams. These lunches were also replicated with Olympic team coaches and the Hunter sport community to build alliances and create a knowledge exchange between each country and the Hunter region.

On 6 September 2000, a civic reception was held for visiting teams. The Lord Mayor of Newcastle City Council and the Mayor of Lake Macquarie jointly hosted this function. All athletes, officials, attaches, and other delegation members from each of the visiting teams were invited. From the local community, the Task Force members, civic leaders, and local business people were invited. Newcastle City Council, Lake Macquarie City Council, McGuigans (a local wine producer), Coca-Cola, and Carlton Breweries sponsored the food and beverages at the event. The outcomes of this reception were twofold. First, it provided hospitality to the teams. It was anticipated that, if athletes and officials came away with a positive overall impression of the Hunter, they would return to the region and encourage others to visit as well. The reception would also demonstrate the friendliness of the people in the Hunter region. More importantly, the reception provided an opportunity for informal business networking among the international visiting delegations and the local business people. As one Task Force member put it:
"When they found a National Olympic Committee going to the Olympic Games, some regions would say, “We will put these benefits on the table”. The business benefits may not have come into it, because they are sporting people not business people…. But we thought that if we could firstly start through their delegates to build relationships from a business point-of-view, and then let's see where that goes. It was very much a wish list situation; it wasn't as if the strategy had been developed tightly. But what I'm saying is that we were not going to let the opportunity go through to the keeper when we sat across the table and started to talk about opportunities."

In this passage, the respondent uses the sporting analogy: "we were not going to let the opportunity go through to the keeper". The keeper refers to the wicket keeper in cricket, and the object refers to a cricket ball. The analogy of a cricket ball missed by the bats person without being hit (hence being caught by the keeper) is parallel to overlooking a business opportunity through pre-Games training. Throughout this interview, this respondent used sport metaphors as parallels to business and pre-Games training opportunities. For example, he said: “We were trying to kick some goals early”, analogous to trying to kick a goal in Australian Rules Football to describe the need for early successes to build support for the HOBT and its response. When describing the need to gain Council and business support of pre-Games training, he used a rugby analogy: “When you are down behind the goal line and you are being pelted [beaten], as a captain you know you’ve got to get your team up. It’s funny, if you score a try the momentum builds”. These examples show that this board member of HOBT used sport analogies to link sport activities (in this case pre-Games training) to business opportunities.

Leveraging pre-Games training for business opportunities was particularly pertinent in the case of the Irish team. After securing the Irish, the HOBT realised the need to leverage its investment by creating relationships with the Irish community beyond the pre-Games training experience. HOBT discovered that the team itself would bring to the Hunter civic leaders such as Mayors and Chief Executive Officers from five different councils across Ireland. To build relationships, the HOBT organised a civic reception and visits to local businesses and industries in the region. In many instances, business opportunities were realised through informal conversations. As an example, the opportunity to export Hunter technology to Ireland was not realised until a member of the HOBT joined the Irish delegation for coffee. They began discussing the growth of the Irish economy and, in particular, the level of waste produced by the manufacturing sector that was burdening landfills in the country. It became apparent that a potential market existed in Ireland for Hunter waste disposal technology (which had been developed for Singapore).

Pre-Games training also provided an entry point for other international contacts. The HOBT established links with Germany and the Caribbean. Through their contact with the German team, the Hunter was able to secure a position in the World Trade Expo in March 2001 to exhibit its wines. A contact made through the Irish Olympic teams led to the HOBT initiating and organising a Northern Ireland Trade Mission. Subsequently, a business mission of 20 delegates (including ten companies and ten civic leaders and government officials) from Northern Ireland visited the Hunter in the lead-up (July 2000) and post-Olympic (November 2000) periods. The aim of this mission was to match Irish businesses to Hunter businesses, and to develop links for future export and trade business. As a result, an agreement was forged between Northern Ireland and the Newcastle City Council to export the Hunter’s local economic development initiatives into Northern Ireland.

Through the teams, the HOBT coordinator was able to secure invitations to the sponsor hospitality parties during the Olympic Games. These invitations were an invaluable networking opportunity, as the HOBT coordinator was able to make contact with business and media people. From initial introductions, HOBT pursued formal relationships with them at a later date. These are but a few examples that illustrate how the Hunter business people were able to build business relationships with executives and public officials from countries with teams training in the Hunter. A HOBT board member characterised this as: “leap-frogging opportunities”, or using one opportunity to get to another.

Outcomes

Over the 1998-99 period, the HOBT targeted 124 NOCs and 181 teams for pre-Games training and pre-Paralympic training. As a result, 56 inspections were undertaken from August 1998 to October 2000, and in the end, the Hunter had attracted a total of 960 Olympic and Paralympic athletes and officials (35 teams) from 21 countries in the years prior to the Olympics.

Based on a model developed by the NSW DSRD, the HOBT projected that pre-Games training activities injected AUS$8.2 million into the local economy. Furthermore, the HOBT assisted successful Olympic tenderers to secure over AUS$145.3 million worth of Olympic business (Hunter Olympic Business Task Force 2000b). Post-Olympic outcomes were always important to the HOBT, and the challenge was to project these gains into the post-Olympic period. As the HOBT coordinator noted:

"[At] the time we established this Task Force, we said not only do we want to make a difference prior to the Olympics, but post-Olympics as well. We thought that to leave something behind, as a legacy would be fantastic."

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An initial legacy of the pre-Games training experience is the instrumental role HOBT played in establishing the Hunter Events Corporation. This organisation used the pre-Games database of training facilities and accommodation to bid successfully for the 2001 Australian Masters Games. By using the knowledge about the facilities captured in the SOCOG facility audit, as well as the expertise and contacts the sport coordinator had developed from marketing the Hunter for pre-Games training, the bid team had an early start in preparing the bid and organising the event.

The HOBT databases established for pre-Games training can also be used by the Hunter Events Corporation for future events, and include databases for media, accommodation, and sport facilities. The Hunter Events Corporation intends to use these databases to develop a calendar to attract and coordinate events on an on-going basis, such as the State Age Netball Tournament for Australians under 15. The pre-Games facility audit also made the stakeholders in the Hunter aware of sport facilities in the region, such as the Hunter’s world-class shooting facility. A HOBT member described the learning process of the Olympic experience:

“If we have learnt anything, it is [hosting a training camp] can be very, very financial for a region… If the business community, the Councils, and the New South Wales Department of Sport and Rec all get together, there is no reason why we can't have ongoing sporting events at all age groups, from your juniors through to your masters, almost every week, of every month, of every year, infinitely.”

The Olympic experience demonstrated to local businesses their involvement with sport training camps could be profitable. Once the issues of how to attract visitors and encourage them to spend were addressed, some Hunter businesses provided incentives (such as meal promotions and vouchers) to attract and encourage visitor spending. A HOBT board member suggested that this experience resulted in a change in attitude as businesses can now see the benefit of getting involved and commercially leveraging sport activities in the region.

Another legacy of the HOBT proved to be the ongoing relationships built through the teams, particularly with the British, Irish, and European consuls. As stated in the final report on the HOBT activities 1998-2000:

“Through these visits stronger relationships have been developed with the British Consul General, who has attended Hunter Export Meeting to address members on European missions. He has taken an interest in the Hunter and passed along a number of property developer contacts to Honeysuckle [a local property developer]” (Hunter Olympic Business Task Force 2000b, p. 9)

Post-Olympic visits were planned for Consuls from the United States, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Mexico, as well as the Irish Ambassador. The HOBT coordinator suggested that these visits would create the impression that Newcastle is the next port of call after Sydney, thereby bringing more business to the Hunter. Through the Greek Consul, Hunter business people also identified the potential to form a partnership with Greek businesses in the lead-up to the 2004 Athens Olympic Games.

Although legacies were seen as vital goals of the HOBT, the Hunter Economic Development Corporation had no formal plans to secure its institutional memory from the Olympic Games. At the end of November 2000, the HOBT ceased, and its full-time staff person’s contract was ended. In the closing stages, the Olympic Business Coordinator transferred her files and documents collected during the process which she described:

"I've passed on my leads hoping that other government departments will pick-up on it at this time… We spoke a lot about keeping the board together, because it’s such a good board. The final decision is that if the project takes off, the way we are looking at it, it’s just keeping another entity there that doesn’t need to be there. I think there is a great advantage having a board and looking at it strategically, because they drew on so many areas."

Six months after the Olympics, the NSW government had no comprehensive strategy to leverage its investment in the upgraded and newly constructed facilities throughout New South Wales. Yet, the NSW government has been keen to continue to monitor benefits that have accrued throughout New South Wales as a result of the Olympics, and consequently began a log of opportunities, including sport export opportunities. Staff from the pre-Games training unit have learnt a great deal about the training camp market. Post-Olympics, an executive from the unit stated: “There is a big market out there for teams wanting to train. If there is an international event, like World Cup Soccer in Sydney, there is an area for training”. Although the unit’s Executive saw potential for repeat business from the teams who conducted their pre-Games training camps in New South Wales, he also acknowledged the uncertainties.

In November 2000, a proposal for the HOBT’s post-Olympic strategy was released that reported on the achievements of the HOBT and proposed future directions for the Hunter to build on the foundation the Olympics established. The proposal, which was distributed to the Newcastle and Hunter Chambers of Commerce, Hunter Economic Development Corporation, and NSW DSRD, was recommended the creation of a 12-month position to capitalise on relationships created through the Olympics. The position required 50% funding from the government and 50% funding from the private sector, with the Newcastle and Hunter Chambers of Commerce expected to fund the private component. As of March 2001, no decision had been made on the future of the Hunter’s post-Olympic strategy. Meanwhile, the relationships built through pre-Games training had begun to dissipate, and the knowledge gain had no institutional home. Thus, leveraging pre-Games training in the long-term and hosting training camps beyond the Games remain uncertain.
Analysis

As the profile of the region indicates, the Hunter’s local economy is focused on primary industry. Trade and export are central to the region’s agenda. In accordance with this agenda, strategies and tactics were pursued to develop business relationships, particularly to exploit international trade and export opportunities. Furthermore, as this case study shows, the region began looking to other industries to strengthen their economic base, in particular the tourism industry. Regional initiatives focused particularly on developing an events portfolio and growing wine tourism. The 2000 Olympic Games provided the impetus to establish an events corporation and to build domestic and international awareness of the Hunter as a tourism destination.

The Hunter case also highlights the importance of problem attribution, and the reference points of the stakeholders. Originally, the Hunter’s Olympic strategy was the responsibility of a group of local sport identities, political figures, and local business people who had an interest in pre-Games training (i.e. the Dash for 2000 stakeholders. Originally, the Hunter’s Olympic strategy was the responsibility of a group of local sport identities, political figures, and local business people who had an interest in pre-Games training (i.e. the Dash for 2000 Committee). Although the stakeholders in this group had good intentions, two primary factors contributed to this group’s dysfunction. Firstly, the size of the group made it difficult to reach a group consensus, particularly in relation to group vision and the direction of the strategy. Secondly, the lack of resources crippled the group’s ability to operate, in particular limiting the staffing resources required to host the visiting NOC and NF representatives, and coordinate pre-Games training with other Olympic-related activities. As a result, the Dash for 2000 Committee was unable to provide a comprehensive pre-Games training response for the Hunter, and its response became disordered and reactive rather than coherent and strategic.

Gradually, key players within the group became frustrated at their perceived lack of achievement in contrast to the amount of personal time and energy each had donated to the group. At the same time, they were becoming increasingly aware that a more comprehensive, personalised approach was required to secure pre-Games training camps and capitalise on other Olympic-related opportunities. The central Dash for 2000 Committee members recognised that relationships needed to be built, not only with the visiting NOC and NF representatives, but also with the players within the NSW government and SOCOG, which would facilitate these opportunities for the Hunter. The delegation’s visit to the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games reinforced this realisation.

Prior to the Atlanta Games, the presence of an Olympic response in the Hunter was stable and predictable. Dash for 2000 committee members knew they had to make a change if stakeholders in the Hunter were to realise their potential to leverage the Sydney Olympic Games. They also knew they had to attract greater attention to pre-Games training to promote it on the agenda of the policymakers. In an effort to force policymakers to address pre-Games training, the Dash for 2000 Committee disbanded, a strategic decision designed to force a radical response -- one that would dramatically shift the personnel and resourcing of the strategy.

The action of the policymakers had a significant impact on the Hunter’s response and ultimately the outcomes of their pre-Games training strategy. The state government was under strong political pressure to demonstrate to the taxpayers of regional New South Wales the benefit they could reap from Sydney hosting the 2000 Olympic Games. To avoid political backlash, the state government strategically chose a group of board members to rebuild the Hunter’s response.

The composition of this newly formed group, the HOBT, was vital to its success, and included stakeholders from a cross-section of the community, including the Chamber of Commerce, the media, events, tourism, sport, local government, and private business. Members were strategically chosen for their expertise and networks they brought to the group. The mayor of a local city council was intentionally recruited board chairman to endorse the business-like nature of the group and provide political weight to their initiatives.

With a new group driving the response, the Hunter’s Olympic planning took on a new direction, becoming oriented to local economic development. In contrast to the previous planning group, the HOBT board shared a common vision focused on maximising economic and commercial benefits from the Sydney Olympic and Paralympic Games. Accordingly, all HOBT’s strategies and tactics were focused on achieving those outcomes.

The new shared vision had a significant impact on the response, leverage efforts, and ultimately the outcomes for the Hunter. Given the local economic development reference point, the HOBT formulated and implemented relationship building and networking initiatives that would stimulate the local economy both in the short- and long-term. In the short-term, pre-Games training would stimulate the economy by hosting Olympic teams in the region, and promotional tactics were implemented to encourage spending, such as incentives to purchase goods and services. In the long-term, the HOBT sought to leverage pre-Games training camps to stimulate future growth in the sport, tourism, and business sectors. To facilitate this growth, the leveraging activities concentrated on generating publicity and building relationships for business. Examples included hosting international journalists and organising media events (e.g. the pre-Games Track and Field meet) to encourage destination stories on the Hunter, organising visits from international business delegations and foreign consulates, and forming local business networks to target international export opportunities.

Even though some information was available to the HOBT from the Dash for 2000 committee and other sources (such as state and federal governments), there was substantial uncertainty when formulating the response, which required the HOBT to operate on a trial-and-error basis. To ‘learn on the fly’, the HOBT established feedback mechanisms to monitor and respond promptly to information, as feedback was important to the incremental development of strategies and tactics. If an idea was a success (attracted international
delegations), it was pursued further. Alternatively, if an idea was not as successful as anticipated, it was re-assessed and re-developed. Along the way, players began to learn new skills and new ways of acting. For example, in the early stages, the Hunter organisers were not aware of the value of the media, but after missing an opportunity, they realised the importance of hosting visiting journalists during the training camps.

The Hunter case study also provides an interesting illustration of problematic preferences (Cohen et al. 1972). The HOBT had clearly defined objectives for its Olympic strategy (i.e. to maximise both short-term and long-term economic benefits for the Hunter region). Given the local economic development reference point, the HOBT envisioned desired outcomes from leveraging pre-Games training, and developed ideas on how to achieve its objectives. In the normal business environment, standard practice is often to undertake relationship-building initiatives, such as hosting international business delegations. The HOBT knew it would need Olympic-specific ideas to capitalise on pre-Games training, but until the strategies and tactics were implemented (or tested through trial-and-error), there was substantial uncertainty about the best way to identify and realise Olympic opportunities. Similar uncertainty existed about how to leverage those opportunities that were realised. An incremental approach was essential, but incrementalism requires an effective base from which to build and learn. In the early days, the strategies were ineffective, largely due to lack of involvement by key business people as well as inadequate resourcing, which increased the decision to employ a coordinator to monitor and facilitate a response to the feedback.

The advantage of having a single coordinator was that one individual was able to work across the various sectors and see the ‘bigger picture’. A coordinator with a local economic development focus allowed the HOBT to respond to the needs of the various sectors (e.g. sport, tourism, and other businesses), and link organisations across sectors. The coordinator was therefore able to synergise the various components of the Hunter’s Olympic strategy to generate an integrated response focused on developing the local economy as a whole. This finding concurs with Blakely (1994), who also highlights the benefits of a network coordinator to align and converge the goals of various stakeholders and sectors to ensure a coordinated approach to local economic development.

The HOBT’s point of reference also influenced its approach to media. Had its focus merely been on short-term business opportunities, creating awareness and interest in the Hunter for tourism would not have been incorporated into the strategy. A long-term local economic development orientation, however, focused on tourism business as a vital component. Because tourism, like other sectors of the economy, plays a role in local economic development, the HOBT included rather than excluded it from its leveraging activities. In other words, the HOBT did not see sport and tourism as functions separate from business; rather, they were considered part of local economic development.

The Hunter case also emphasises the importance of informal networking and building long-term relationships through sport. The HOBT was able to leverage pre-Games training to enhance and develop new relationships within the state and region, and with international organisations and governments. The HOBT used pre-Games training as an icebreaker. Hosting training camps and related activities provided informal ways to begin conversations that could potentially lead to local economic development opportunities. The players in the HOBT actively sought to create business relationships, not through overly indicating their intentions, but rather by informally socialising and networking. Deals were never closed at social gatherings. Relationships were first created and business opportunities were pursued later. These friendships often led to formal business relationships, which central to outcomes achieved in the Hunter.

The Hunter case highlights five significant aspects of leveraging pre-Games training: (1) the impact of problem framing, (2) the vital role of relationship building, (3) the value of a coordinated strategic response, (4) the necessity of an effective strategic base, and (5) the difference made by adequate resourcing. By framing the problem as one of economic development, stakeholders from sport, tourism, and other businesses came together with a shared vision. By building relationships with VIPs from countries whose teams trained in the Hunter, new business opportunities were obtained. By hiring a staff member to coordinate the response, information was used more effectively and opportunities were reported more quickly. Closing down the Dash for 2000 Committee opened the door for the establishment of a new and more effective task force. The new group’s funding made possible the employment of a staff position and an effective response to opportunities.
Chapter 7

CANBERRA AND THE ACT

Canberra is the capital city of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the national capital of Australia. As a young city, Canberra’s community and governing bodies were keen to establish the city and promote Canberra’s importance in Australia. As the home of the Australian Federal Government, Canberra’s economy is built upon the government sector, and the city’s response to the 2000 Games was to leverage the Olympics to develop the capabilities of the region’s young government and promote Canberra’s position as the national capital.

In Canberra, pre-Games training was considered a sport problem, and the reference point of the planners was sport orientation. Canberra’s pre-Games training initiative was the responsibility of the public sector, as the government felt obligated to respond to Olympic-generated opportunities. As the ACT government’s Olympics agenda became crowded, time and energy limitations compelled planners to focus their attention on projects considered critical to maximising Olympic-related opportunities, and pre-Games training was not as valuable to the agenda as were other Olympic-related issues, such as Olympic football. Management of pre-Games training was consequently contracted out to a private company. The Canberra case provides an example of a response to pre-Games training falling from the agenda of policymakers, as planning efforts did not progress past the embryonic stage, and pre-Games training was not leveraged.

The Canberra case also illustrates how stakeholders in Canberra used the focusing effect of the Olympic Games to mobilise interested groups and attract the attention of policymakers to promote their projects on the agenda. In addition to the ACT government, other groups, such as tourism, sport, and local business communities, had a stake in Canberra’s pre-Games training response. Canberra stakeholders used the Olympic Games to justify establishing a tourism and event organisation to attract and manage events in the city, and to deliver a tourism marketing strategy to reposition the city’s tourist brand. The response of the ACT government to the 2000 Olympic Games also provided a tool for government stakeholders to demonstrate to themselves that the government had reached a level of maturity and confidence to promote Canberra on the national and international stage alongside other Australian capital cities. The Canberra case also illustrates how community stakeholders can influence the direction of government policy, but subsequently be isolated from the policy process by bureaucratic webs of government and politics.

This chapter profiles Canberra as the national capital and its influence on the response to the Olympic opportunity. Stakeholder reference points and agendas, and the influence of these factors on their response to the Olympic Games, are explained. Relationships between politics and policy processes and outcomes derived from this opportunity are also described and interpreted.

Profile

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Australian Commonwealth Government selected Canberra as the national capital and home of the federal government. Canberra is a purpose-built city, located between the two major population centres in Australia, the capital cities of Sydney and Melbourne. It is 30 minutes by air and 306 kilometres by road to Sydney. On 1 January 1911, the Federal Capital of Australia was established, and in 1938, was re-named the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), its present-day name. The city itself was named Canberra, after the Aboriginal word for ‘meeting place’ (Australian Capital Territory Government 2000a). In June 1999, the ACT was home to over 310,200 residents. Throughout the 1990s, the ACT’s population growth declined due to the federal government’s funding and employment policies. However, in 1999, population growth in the ACT reached 0.7% or 2,100 over the previous year (Australian Capital Territory Government 2001a).

The governing structure of the ACT is unique in Australia. Until the 1980s, the Australian Commonwealth Government governed the ACT. In 1988, the ACT Self-Government Act and related legislation were passed, and the first ACT Legislative Assembly was formed. This unique structure established the ACT as a single-tier government, with policymakers formulating and implementing policies at the state/territory, regional, and local levels, which resulted in the ACT becoming known as a ‘city state’ (Australian Capital Territory Government 2000a).

Canberra is the home of Australia’s Federal Parliament, and other national organisations such as: the Australian Sports Commission, the Australian Royal Military College, the National Museum of Australia, the Royal Australian Mint, and the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS). Government administration and defence are central to Canberra’s economy. According to the economic report, Snapshot of Canberra (Australian Capital Territory Government 2001b), in the 1998-1999 fiscal year government administration and defence were valued at AUS3,357 million. The property and business services sector (AUS1,274 million) and construction industry (AUS680 million) are the next most significant source of income in Canberra’s economy. The accommodation and hospitality industry contributed AUS246 million to the economy in 1998-1999.
Tourism plays an important role in Canberra’s economy. In 1998, approximately 82% of visitors to Canberra were domestic, with the remaining 18% being international travellers (Canberra Tourism and Events Corporation 1998). A brand audit undertaken in 1998 suggested that most domestic visitors to Canberra come from Sydney, with 59% of Sydney residents (aged above 15) visiting Canberra occasionally or regularly (Taylor Nelson Sofres 1998). Canberra’s main competitors for the Sydney short-break market are other destinations in regional New South Wales, such as the Blue Mountains, Central Coast, and the Illawarra.

Canberra’s Strategy

Canberra’s stakeholders saw the 2000 Olympic Games as a ‘golden opportunity’ (ACT 2000 Committee 1994, p. 10). Local stakeholder ideas were gathered and a proposal put forward that identified opportunities and ways Canberra could capitalise on the 2000 Olympic Games in the neighbouring city of Sydney. Given its close proximity to Sydney and being the home city of the AIS, Canberra was well positioned to attract pre-Games training camps to the city. Compared to other states in Australia, Canberra was a relatively small territory with a recently formed governmental system, fewer residents, and a smaller government budget. Given these factors, the ACT government did not have the flexibility of other regions, and chose to emphasise Olympic-related opportunities likely to generate the greatest economic and community benefits for the residents and businesses of Canberra.

Although tourism is a growth sector in Canberra’s economy, the city was hindered by an image problem and its brand needed to be repositioned in the customer’s eyes. *The Brand Health of Canberra* (Taylor Nelson Sofres 1998), a report prepared for the Canberra Tourism and Event Corporation, indicated that the most admired aspects of the city were its beautiful, unspoiled natural attractions. The city was seen as a desirable destination for family holiday car touring. In contrast, another study, *Opening the Doors* (Frank Small & Associates 1999), noted that the city’s brand suffered from its association with Australian politics.

In 1997, along with other capital cities in Australia (including Brisbane, Melbourne and Adelaide), Canberra was awarded the rights to host some preliminary Olympic football matches. In addition, 2001 was the Centennial of Federation in Australia. Canberra’s destination marketing organisation, Canberra Tourism and Events Corporation (CTEC), decided that these events would be used to re-brand Canberra from its stuffy, political image to a dynamic, welcoming, exciting, and varied city. From an awareness and visitation perspective, CTEC determined that Olympic football would be central to achieving this objective. Because CTEC was responsible for organising and managing the event, the ACT government (via CTEC) focused on Olympic football to reposition Canberra’s brand.

The ACT government could not simply limit its strategy to tourism, but also had to demonstrate to the community and local businesses that its strategies and tactics capitalised on a broader range of Olympic opportunities. The government wished to avoid a perception by the community that it had missed opportunities, such as hosting pre-Games training camps. Through an initiative called Project 2000, the ACT Government developed a strategy to attract pre-Games training to the region, and took the stance that pre-Games training was a commercial venture beneficial to local businesses. Reflecting on this strategy, a local business person involved in the pre-Games training camp stated:

"The ATC government has stressed the point that it wanted it to be a commercial operation for Canberra’s businesses to reap the financial benefits. I know a lot of other local councils within New South Wales have offered free accommodation and training just to get the teams into town. Whereas the ATC government took a different view on it, and thought this is a chance for our business community to reap the benefits of this, without going to the extreme of ripping the teams off of course that’s not what it was about, but to make it commercially viable for local businesses."

Because Canberra was the home city of the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS), pre-Games training was also used to market its image as the sport capital of Australia and to showcase Canberra's reputation as a premier centre for elite sport competition and training.

As shown in the following sections, stakeholders from tourism, sport, and local businesses within Canberra responded to the pre-Games training opportunity. Coordination between the stakeholders and each of their reference points also played important roles in responding to opportunities and are discussed in the subsequent sections.

The Stakeholders

As shown in Figure 6, Canberra’s response to pre-Games training took place within the ACT government, through two temporary groups formed specifically to capitalise on the Games: the ACT 2000 Committee and Project 2000. These groups, which did not exist prior to the Olympics and were not designed to continue after the Games, represented a collection of stakeholder interests from the sport, tourism, business, and arts communities in Canberra, and their goals and actions were a compromise of these interests. A key player in Project 2000, the Canberra Tourism and Events Corporation (CTEC) was established within the ACT
government during the lead-up to the Games. As an ongoing organisation, the CTEC had a tourism stake in pre-Games training, with the DPM and the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS) also playing important roles in the strategy. In the following sub-sections, the reference points of these four stakeholders (i.e. ACT government, CTEC, DPM, and the AIS) are explained.

![Figure 6: The players in Canberra's pre-Games training response](image)

**ACT Government**

Established in 1988, the ACT government is a relatively new system of government in comparison to other states in Australia. The Chief Minister’s Department is at the apex of this organisation, with four offices in the tier beneath: the Office of Financial Management, the Office of Business Development and Tourism, the Office of Strategy and Public Administration, and the Office of Asset Management. Canberra’s response to the Olympic Games was delegated to the Office of Business Development and Tourism. According to the Chief Minister’s Department Annual Report 1998-99 (Australian Capital Territory Government 1999) objective of this tier is: “Stimulate sustainable economic growth and the creation of new jobs through the purchase or direct delivery of a range of targeted programs and strategic projects (p. 38)”. Accordingly, Canberra’s Olympic strategy was orientated towards job creation and community involvement in the Olympic Games.

**ACT 2000 Committee**

When Sydney won the rights to host the 2000 Olympic Games, the ACT government announced the formation of the ACT 2000 Committee. The aim of this group was to assess and formulate a proposal on Canberra’s opportunities from the 2000 Games and suggest ways Canberra could capitalise on Sydney’s hosting of the Olympic Games (Australian Capital Territory Government 2000b). The terms of reference of the ACT 2000 Committee (1994) were defined as follows:

“The purpose of the Committee is to advise the Government on the economic, sport, tourism, and cultural opportunities to Canberra and the region from the 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games and the necessary action which is required to ensure that Canberra is positioned to maximise the benefits of the 2000 Games in Sydney.” (p. 15)

To demonstrate that the policy formulation process was inclusive, the ACT 2000 Committee was comprised of representatives from various sectors of the community, including sport, local business, tourism, arts, and cultural sectors. From this central group, four subcommittees were formed: (1) culture (9 members), (2) sport (13 members), (3) economy and tourism (12 members), and (4) infrastructure (12 members). The Chair of each subcommittee was also a member of the central committee (20 members), which attempted to integrate the ideas
from the various sub-committees. From this review process, a report was produced which highlighted the opportunities identified by each of the sub-committees and made recommendations to the ACT government on possible future directions of Canberra’s Olympic response. Among the recommendations, one of the key proposals was:

"... that the ACT Government: continue to support ACT 2000 Committee, in a revised form, to support and oversee the implementation of Olympic initiatives and recommendations in this report." (ACT 2000 Committee 1994, p. 10)

In October 1994, the report was presented to the ACT government’s Minister for Sport. In response to this proposal, the ACT government established Project 2000.

**Project 2000**

Because the ACT government defined pre-Games training as a sport issue, the Project 2000 initiative was initially located within the ACT Bureau of Sport and Recreation. In August 1997 Canberra was confirmed as a host venue for some preliminary Olympic football matches, and Project 2000 released a new plan, which saw it shifted to the Chief Minister's Department. Indifferent to the shift, the primary indicators that would be used to assess Project 2000 included its ability to achieve the objectives defined by the community consultation process (i.e. the ACT 2000 Committee), although the focus of the Chief Minister’s Department was job creation and business development. The number of pre-Games training camps in Canberra and the associated economic impact on the region of hosting these camps became important measures of the project’s success.

As the manager of Project 2000 explained, Project 2000 saw itself as ‘a cattle prod’ rather than a ‘doing’ organisation. In other words, its role was to prompt other organisations to act on Olympic opportunities. Pre-Games training was the exception, however, as Project 2000 was obligated to remain involved throughout the planning process. According to Project 2000’s Internet site, its official mission was: “to maximise the benefits to Canberra and the surrounding region emanating from the 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games” (Project 2000 2000).

Similar to the ACT 2000 Committee, Project 2000 was governed by a board of representatives from various sectors of the community, including sport, tourism, business, and arts. One member described the group as: “Predominantly business people throughout Canberra who would either be affected positively or negatively or could derive benefit from the Olympics”. The Chairman of Project 2000 was quoted in *The Canberra Times* as saying:

"We are the interface between Government on the one hand and business, sporting and community interests on the other, on the way that Canberra can be advantaged and position itself in the lead-up to 2000 … there was a tremendous opportunity for the ACT community to get involved in the Games … we will be trying to develop community awareness on the importance of the Olympic Games to Canberra over the next four years.” (“ACT focus of Olympic marketing push” 1996, p. 20)

To achieve this objective, the ACT 2000 Committee’s report highlighted the importance of building relationships both within the local community and with external bodies. Project 2000 would be Canberra’s official link to the Sydney Olympic Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) and the Sydney Paralympic Organising Committee (SPOC) to assist Canberra’s stakeholders to identify and capitalise on Games-related opportunities. Opportunities identified included the Torch Relay and other community participation and cultural activities, pre-Games training camps, tourism opportunities (particular to marketing Canberra), and business opportunities (particularly Olympic-related tendering contracts). The aim of Project 2000 was to develop strategies to gain from these opportunities and ensure that Canberra maximised the impact of the Games to its benefit.

**Canberra Tourism and Events Corporation**

In addition to recommending the establishment of Project 2000, the ACT 2000 Committee lobbyed for the creation of an events body within the ACT. This entity would provide expertise and assistance in bidding for and staging sport and other events (such as festivals) in the city. At the time of this proposal, three organisations undertook tourism initiatives in Canberra: the Canberra Tourism Commission, the Canberra Visitor and Convention Bureau, and the Canberra Visitor and Information Services. On 1 July 1997, the ACT government responded to this lobbying effort and established the Canberra Tourism and Events Corporation (CTEC). As a statutory corporation, the CTEC was the first tourism entity of its kind in Australia and operated not as a company, but as a body corporate.

CTEC reports to the Office of Business Development and Tourism, which is overseen by the Chief Minister’s Department. Its mission is: “to maximise the social, cultural, economic and employment benefits of tourist visitation to Canberra’s community through the provision of quality tourism events, marketing and services” (Canberra Tourism and Events Corporation 2000, p. 7). The overriding agenda of CTEC is to market Canberra as a tourism destination.

To capitalise on the 2000 Olympics and the 2001 Centennial of Federation, the ACT government committed an additional AUS4.5 million to the CTEC over the 1999-2001 period. This funding was directed into a
marketing strategy, termed ‘Another face of our national capital’, which was to reposition Canberra’s brand from cold, stuffy and reserved to open, welcoming, and approachable. The success of this marketing effort would be measured over a ten year period (1995-2004). Tourist statistics (or indicators) would be used to monitor changes in Canberra’s domestic and international tourist markets. According to its Marketing Strategy 1999-2001 (Canberra Tourism and Events Corporation 1999), CTEC’s Olympic objectives were:

"... to maximise the interest in the Olympic Games Football in Canberra, maximise the Olympic experience for residents of the Canberra region, attract visitation as a consequence of the Olympic Games activity in the Canberra, leverage the prestige that comes with Canberra being an Olympic city [and] use Olympic football to present Canberra to the world." (p. 6)

As these objectives illustrate, while hosting Olympic teams for training was seen as a potential opportunity, the focus of the CTEC’s Olympic strategy was hosting and leveraging the Olympic football preliminary matches. When asked prior to the Games what was being done in regards to pre-Games training, a marketing executive from CTEC stated: “We are not doing anything in relation to marketing or leveraging off that.”

External Relationships

The ACT 2000 Committee’s report (1994) noted: “To maximise the opportunities for Canberra, the region must work with other NSW [New South Wales] and Commonwealth organisations” (p. 10). Accordingly, CTEC actively pursued relationships with organisations external to Canberra at both the state and national levels. These relationships informed CTEC’s strategy and had the potential to assist planners from other sectors (such as sport, tourism and local business).

As CTEC was a tourism and events entity, relationships were fostered with tourism and event stakeholders such as the Australian Tourist Commission (ATC), Tourism New South Wales (TNSW), SOCOG, tourism organisations in other states and territories, and Traveland (the official travel provider and Sydney Olympic Games sponsor). CTEC’s Chief Executive actively participated in the Tourism Olympic Forum organised by TNSW. This forum provided information and direction to businesses (particularly tourism businesses) that would be affected by the 2000 Olympic Games. Owing to this involvement, on three occasions (in 1995, 1996 and 1997) CTEC’s Chief Executive visited the state of Georgia to investigate its planning strategy for hosting the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta. As coordinator of the regional dispersion sub-committee, CTEC’s Chief Executive was to share Atlanta’s strategies planners in regional New South Wales and Canberra in preparation for the 2000 Olympic Games. Although this information was included in CTEC’s plan to leverage the Olympic Games, it may not have been passed on to other planners in the sport, business, and arts communities.

Outsourcing the Pre-Games Training

As focus on the Olympic teams increased, Project 2000 staff became aware that hosting international delegations interested in pre-Games training required a great deal of their time. The manager of Project 2000 recalls the group’s position:

"[It was] decided that what it really needed was somebody who could pay all of their attention that [the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) including the visiting representatives to select the training camp site, and ultimately the athletes during the training camp] were going to demand when they arrived, without pulling us away from other activities, which is exactly what would have happened."

Project 2000 was caught in a dilemma, as the Project Manager went on to explain:

"We couldn’t afford not to have the teams here… [but] we were running around for them… we wanted the teams to have a good experience here. We did not want them to leave and go home saying: “They didn’t know what they were doing, and I’ll never go back there”. Instead, we wanted them to say: “It is a great place. I want to go back.”

To solve this problem, Project 2000 decided to outsource their pre-Games training program. In 1997, Project 2000 put out to tender the hosting of international Olympic delegations as well as and the management, planning, and delivery of the pre-Games training camps. A local event management company, DPM, won the contract.

DPM

DPM is a private company that provides event management services, and is a partnership which formed in 1991 (DPM 2001). One of partners was a former Senior Protocol Officer with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, who was experienced in hosting international delegations. Hosting international sport teams for pre-Games training was a new, but logical, progression for the company. DPM’s orientation to pre-Games training was that of a private business. The company envisioned the opportunity to gain experience in event management and to build relationships for future business partnerships, particularly with the ACT government and the AIS.
Australia Institute of Sport
The Australian Institute of Sport (AIS) has been Australia’s national sport training organisation since 1981. The AIS provides one location where Australian athletes can train with the sport infrastructure and services necessary to improve their performance. The Institute has world-class, purpose-built elite sport training facilities, exercise science testing laboratories, sport medicine services, and athlete residents on-site. At the time of the Games, the Institute’s facilities were valued at over AU$100 million (Australian Institute of Sport 2001). The AIS delivers the elite sport program of the Australian Sports Commission, which is responsible for implementing the federal government's national sports policy (Australian Sports Commission 2001).

In addition to providing services for Australian athletes, AIS also targets National Sporting Organisations (NSOs) to attract elite athletes from other countries to conduct training camps at AIS facilities, offering training packages that can also include sport medicine, coaching, exercise testing, and recovery services and expertise. The AIS viewed pre-Games training as a part of their regular business, but on a grander scale, and welcomed the opportunity to expand their elite training camp business.

Summary
Table 7 provides a summary of the organisations, funding source, reference point, objectives, and indicators used to assess the performance of their pre-Games training response.

Table 7: The reference points for each organisation involved in Canberra’s pre-Games training strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Reference Point</th>
<th>Objective(s)</th>
<th>Indicator(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACT government (via Project 2000)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>To maximise the benefits to Canberra’s economy</td>
<td>• Report against the recommendations of the ACT 2000 Committee&lt;br&gt;• Number of teams training in Canberra&lt;br&gt;• Economic impact on the local business community of hosting the teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canberra Tourism &amp; Events Corporation</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>To create awareness and re-brand the destination to maximise the number of visitors to Canberra</td>
<td>• Estimated value of media coverage from the Visiting Journalists Program&lt;br&gt;• Visitor numbers and visitor nights statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPM</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>To establish and expand the business, and build relationships for future business opportunities</td>
<td>• Human resource and business development&lt;br&gt;• Profitability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Institute of Sport</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>To attract Olympic teams to train at the AIS</td>
<td>• Number of teams hosted at the AIS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canberra’s Response
In September 1993, Sydney won the rights to host the 2000 Olympic Games, and in response the ACT government established the ACT 2000 Committee. At that time, the impact of this event on Australia was relatively unknown, although sketchy information from past Olympics indicated that regions surrounding Sydney could also derive benefits from the Games. The ACT Committee proposed that Canberra: “grasp the golden opportunity created by the 2000 Games… to invest in the future of Canberra and the region” (ACT 2000 Committee, 1994, p. 10). Because the ACT government would be accountable to the public for its planning strategy and the impact it derived, in 1994 the ACT government undertook a year-long development process with the community’s stakeholders to sanction the strategic direction of Canberra’s Olympic response. Project 2000 described the process as one of ‘exhaustive consultation’ (Australian Capital Territory Government 2000b, p. 5).
Lessons from Pre-Olympic Training

From this process, the ACT 2000 Committee developed a report that recommended means to maximise Games-related opportunities for Canberra and provided a strategic direction to: "help Canberra ride the crest of the wave into the year 2000" (Australian Capital Territory Government 2000b, p. 5). The report was titled The 2000 Games – A Reason for Action. On 21 October 1994, the ACT 2000 Committee presented this report to the ACT government’s Minister for Sport.

The 130 recommendations in the report identified a number of choices for the ACT government regarding development of the city’s Olympic strategies and tactics. As shown in Table 8, these recommendations addressed many of the problems faced by the stakeholders in these groups (i.e. ACT 2000 Committee and sub-committees) in terms of sport, tourism, and cultural and local business development in general. These regional problems were coupled with the ACT 2000 Committee’s Olympic initiatives and put forward in their proposal to the government. The 2000 Games was seen as: “…an opportunity to invest in the future of Canberra and the region” (ACT 2000 Committee 1994, p. 11). Strategically, this group sought to use the focus on the Olympic Games to attract the attention of government to these long-standing issues and evoke the enactment of related policy.

Table 8: The problems in Canberra and the issues identified by the ACT 2000 Committee in The 2000 Games - A Reason for Action (1994)

| Need to improve communication among stakeholder groups within Canberra |
| Proposed solution: “Canberra and the region must make greater attempts to coordinate and plan activities and abandon regional rivalries in the interest of working for the common good” (p. 13). |

| Establishing an event body in Canberra |
| Proposed solution: “The key to realising these golden opportunities is the establishment of a events body” (p. 10). |

| A poor city image and lack of identity as the nation’s capital |
| Proposed solutions: “The Olympics provided a marketing tool for the 2001 celebrations … This national celebration of Federation is a time for Canberra to position itself as the nation’s capital” (p. 25); “Positioning Canberra and the region, as the home of the national capital, centre of Australian elite sport and a tourism destination with natural attractions, the mountains, the coast and rural lifestyle experience” (p. 40); “To encourage the development of Canberra’s cultural identity as the national capital” (p. 22). |

| Promoting the association between Canberra and the home of elite sport in Australia |
| Proposed solution: “To develop Canberra’s domestic and international reputation as the premier centre for elite sports competition and training” (p. 27). |

| Developing and coordinating sporting facilities and infrastructure |
| Proposed solutions: “Partnerships between the ACT Government and the Australian Institute of Sport regarding access to both AIS and Canberra facilities and future developments are important” (p. 36); “A longer term facilities development plan, which also develops closer integration with the Australian Institute of Sport is essential. The plan will need to identify community needs, national opportunities and the potential to maximise use of facilities” (p. 37). |

Attracting the Teams

To attract teams to Canberra, Project 2000 implemented several tactics. The first was to create international awareness, particularly with the National Olympic Committees (NOCs), that Canberra had a pre-Games training product. The sport components of this product had been identified through SOCOG’s facility audit in 1994, which showed Canberra to be well positioned to capitalise on this opportunity by means of its sport facility infrastructure and close proximity to Sydney. In reference to pre-Games training, the ACT 2000 Committee’s (1994) report stated: “It is difficult to quantify international demand in the lead up to the 2000 Games. However taking advantage of this demand through marketing strategies and promotional material will be essential” (p. 29).

Due to Project 2000’s difficulty in gauging the level of aggressiveness required for this marketing strategy, an initial introductory letter was to be sent to test the market. In 1994, this letter was sent to NOCs asking them to consider Canberra as a pre-Games training destination. After generating some initial interest by the letter, Project 2000 pursued these marketing activities further, and formed an alliance with the Australian Sports Commission and AIS. This alliance gave the pre-Games training campaign the expertise of Canberra’s sport community, and collectively, this group would undertake commercialisation and sport export efforts to promote Canberra’s elite sport training facilities. In 1996, Project 2000 developed a marketing kit with the assistance of...
these partners. This marketing kit was distributed to all NOCs with an accompanying invitation to meet with Project 2000 representatives at the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta.

Project 2000 and CTEC staff were still uncertain about how to derive Olympic opportunities for Canberra, particularly in relation to tourism, pre-Games training, and Olympic football initiatives. They proposed that the Atlanta Olympic Games would provide an opportunity to gather information and learn from stakeholders in Georgia (the host state of the Olympics). In 1996, Project 2000 and CTEC sent a delegation to the Atlanta Olympic Games on an information-gathering exercise. As a result of the Atlanta mission, Project 2000 and CTEC representatives established relationships with groups preparing for the Atlanta Olympics, in particular the University of Georgia, which would host the Olympic football and some pre-Games training camps. Project 2000 and CTEC also used the visit to promote Canberra as a pre-Games training and tourist destination.

Following the Atlanta mission, a newsletter entitled The Edge was produced to keep Canberra top-of-mind in target markets, provide information on current activities and planning, and increase awareness of Canberra Olympic strategies (including pre-Games training). The newsletter was distributed every quarter to NOCs and National Paralympic Committees (NPCs) and locally to sport, tourism, and business contacts in the region. In 1997, Project 2000 launched an Internet site at www.project2000.act.gov.au. Following the introduction of CTEC’s ‘Another face of our national capital’ campaign, the Internet site was re-developed. On 13 September 1999, it was re-launched at www.2000canberra.com.

In March 1999, a Project 2000 Event Fund was established. CTEC was allocated AU$250,000 over two years to identify events that could be staged in Canberra. As Project 2000 described, the aim of hosting events prior to the Games was to: “promote Canberra as an Olympic city with an expanding sports event staging capability to local, national and international audiences” (Australian Capital Territory Government 2000b, p. 19).

The report, The 2000 Games – A Reason for Action (ACT 2000 Committee 1994), also recommended that the ACT government should work with Canberra’s sport organisations to prepare bids for Olympic competition. Members of the Project 2000 Task Force proposed a targeted lobbying campaign in which sport stakeholders (with the assistance of government) could lobby personal contacts, such as the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), to indirectly apply pressure on the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) to include Futsal as a demonstration sport in the 2000 Olympic Games. The proposal gained momentum through 1994-1995, and in January 1996, a delegation travelled to Brazil to lobby FIFA. During this visit, informal relationships with the President of the Brazilian NOC were nurtured, and as a consequence, the Brazilian NOC agreed to consider Canberra as the site of its pre-Games training camp. Later that year, the Brazilian NOC sent representatives to Australia to inspect potential sites for its pre-Games training camp in 2000, including Canberra. After a period of negotiation, the Brazilian Olympic training camp was secured in September 1997. Canberra was announced as the home of Brazilian Olympic training camp for the 2000 Olympic Games and would host the majority (approximately 140 athletes) of the Brazilian team.

Project 2000 Task Force members and staff became increasingly aware of the importance of relationships to success in attracting Olympic teams. In hindsight, one Task Force member involved in the Brazilian team negotiations stated:

“We were able to identify the strengths and market those to them [i.e. the Brazilian NOC]. The only way you can do it successfully is to get into the personalities; to work out who is friends with whom; who has the influence over those people. We got Brazil because of personal contacts and we were trusted.”

In addition, players within the government recognised a network ignored in the past. Canberra was home to many Ambassadors and High Commissioners from other countries that would require a pre-Games training site for their Olympic teams. Accordingly, Project 2000 began to leverage its location in the nation’s capital to meet with Ambassadors and High Commissioners to promote Canberra as a pre-Games training site.

Although the ACT government wanted to attract teams to Canberra for pre-Games training, it also took the stance that no subsidies would be provided, and no facilities upgrades undertaken or new facilities constructed to host these camps. This public position was politically important given the negative media attention the government of the day was receiving on the expense of re-developing Bruce Stadium to host Olympic football. It became increasingly imperative that the government demonstrate the success of hosting Olympic football and justify public investment in the event. Thus, the policymakers’ sense of the mood in Canberra (owing mainly to the media) played a role in directing the focus of the Olympic-strategy towards Olympic football and away from such opportunities as pre-Games training.

From 1994 –1998, Project 2000 staff had adequate time and resources to respond to pre-Games training enquires and inspections. With the formation of the CTEC in 1997 and its focus on repositioning Canberra’s tourist brand, the overall government response became increasingly oriented towards marketing Canberra. As the Olympics approached, pressures on government time and resources increased, and Project 2000 had to concentrate on activities considered to have greatest impact on local business (i.e. Olympic football) and facilitate the community’s involvement in the Olympic Games (i.e. the Torch Relay and community celebrations). Consequently, pre-Games training slid from the agenda and was considered a burden rather than a dividend.
Given Project 2000’s position, it welcomed a relationship with the Brazilian NOC to attract the team was welcomed, but a continuing relationship (i.e. to organise and manage their training camp within government) was not part of Project 2000’s plan, and management of pre-Games training camps was out-sourced to a private consultancy company, DPM. From that point, Project 2000 anticipated having minimal direct involvement in training camps, and its staff assumed they had removed one more responsibility from their workload. However, the Brazilian NOC insisted on contracting and liaising directly with the ACT government, and to secure the Brazilian Olympic team, Project 2000 resumed its former role in pre-Games training, becoming the international liaison between the Brazilian NOC and the privately contracted organisation, DPM. A respondent involved in the process suggested that the Brazilian NOC: “felt much safer dealing with a government body rather than a private company when you know big dollars are concerned”.

In spite of the fact that the arrangement with DPM was seen as the safer option, it also generated difficulties in communicating information in a timely and accurate manner. Due to the agreement, DPM was unable to liaise directly with the Brazilian team before it arrived in Canberra. As the camp was being planned, DPM had to communicate through a third party, Project 2000, who would then communicate with the Brazilian NOC. The length of this communication channel resulted in problems, of incorrect, distorted, or lost messages. As the manager of Project 2000 noted: “Putting another party in the middle made it easier for us to lose information and communication”.

After Project 2000 secured the Brazilian team in 1997 and other small teams between 1997 and 1999 (such as two Finnish Olympic preparation camps in October 1998 and December 1999, French wrestling and weightlifting pre-Games training, and the Israeli Olympic swimming pre-Games training camp), Canberra’s marketing to international teams faded. While visiting delegations were hosted by DPM, Project 2000 neglected marketing efforts for additional pre-Games training camp business. In 1999, representatives from Project 2000 attended a three day Olympic Chefs de Mission Conference in Sydney, but this was the only pre-Games training related activity reported by the ACT government in the 1999-2000 period. To some extent, this activity was undertaken because it was easy, expected, and ensured that the secured teams were not ‘hijacked’ by other regions in Australia. In the lead-up to the Games, ACT government resources (particularly Project 2000 and CTEC) became increasingly focused on planning for the Torch Relay and Olympic football.

Leveraging Efforts

The principal objectives of Canberra's stakeholder response were focused on tourism activities such as leveraging the Games to create awareness, attracting Olympic visitors, and repositioning the city’s brand. Leveraging the potential exposure of international teams training in Canberra was not seen to have the same value as Olympic football, and all pre-Games training activities were delegated to the private provider, DPM. As a private company, DPM had no stake in creating awareness in Canberra and promoting the Canberra brand. Furthermore, the stakeholders in Canberra did not consider building relationships and networks for ongoing business and trade opportunities.

Initially, the potential to generate media interest in Canberra through hosting the Brazilian team was recognised by CTEC. Its Annual Report for 1997-98 (Canberra Tourism and Events Corporation 1998) it was proposed that: “CTEC lobbied the ATC’s Americas representatives to secure VJP [Visiting Journalists Program] visits from Brazil in order to exploit the fact that Canberra will host the Brazilian Olympic team for pre-Olympic training” (p. 22). The success of this initiative is difficult to assess, although CTEC records indicate that its Visiting Journalists Program in the 1999-2000 fiscal year hosted only one Brazilian journalist who was covering the Olympic Football Tournament (Canberra Tourism and Events Corporation 2000). Apart from an initial attempt to lobby the ATC, CTEC did not implement a targeted program to host the media travelling with these teams or encourage Brazilian media to come to Canberra to exploit the city’s link with the Brazilian Olympic team. Instead, visiting journalists were incorporated into existing tourism media relations programs. Prior to the Olympics, a marketing executive from CTEC explained: “Most of them [the athletes] want to concentrate on training. We are not going to annoy them with media…. You have got to say the media is very focused on sport”.

The total media impact during the Olympic period represented an unknown quantity for CTEC. In hindsight, a marketing executive from CTEC commented: “It was like working in the dark with the media…. The difficulty was not knowing how big a call on our resources it was going to be”. In relation to the pre-Games training camp media, he stated:

“We found most of them were very savvy. Most of the crew that came had been to other Olympics, so were quite self-sufficient as long as they were provided with information. In the information, we made them aware of some of the quirky opportunities they could have in Canberra, like going and filming from a hot air balloon, and that we could organise that for them.”

In 1994, the ACT 2000 Committee anticipated that there would be two journalists for every athlete hosted in Canberra. AIS staff expected that about 30 independent journalists would arrive with the Brazilian team, although 60-70 actually came to Canberra during the pre-Games training period. The actual number of total
journals was only one-fourth of the number expected by the ACT 2000 Committee (i.e. approximately one journalist to every two athletes hosted in Canberra).

Throughout the training camp, the Brazilian media centre was located at the AIS. A conversation with one of the media delegations during the final days of pre-Games training indicated that the Brazilian media had acted autonomously and sourced information for the stories themselves (personal communication, 9 September 2000). The media had not been in contact with CTEC or Project 2000. The Brazilian media delegate suggested that they had reported one story each day on the training camp in Canberra. Their reports included two stories on the AIS facilities, and a story on the city of Canberra. They had not reported on athletes participating in sightseeing or other activities in the region to showcase Canberra. In hindsight, the manager of Project 2000 commented:

"The only team that brought its own media outfit was Brazil. They pretty much said, “This is what we need and this is how many people are coming”. They were looked after as part of the teams, which wasn’t too hard. They had all sorts of technical requirements, like they wanted to have live time back to Brazil with their teams and we were stuffing around fixing that up for them, but that was OK. The AIS actually worked it out. They had other teams training that had contacted them. They had a system in place where a media person was going to come in and watch training and they would be accompanied by a media person that was authorised to make sure that the media weren’t harassing the athletes while they were training. That was their main concern; that is why they were there, so those athletes could train in preparation [for the Olympic Games] and not be harassed."

Hosting the media was undertaken by DPM, with assistance from the AIS. DPM recognised the opportunity to create awareness of Canberra in Brazil, yet were surprised at the lack of government interest in capitalising on the publicity platform provided by pre-Games training. A consultant from DPM explains the company’s perspective:

"Marketing Canberra as a tourism destination – that was left up to the government body … a lot of them [journalists] contacted us, but none of them used our services because of the strictness of our contracts, and having fixed schedules and payments, which lost flexibility."

Hosting the media to generate interest in Canberra was not DPM’s primary interest as a private company, but in its camp management role DPM assisted the Brazilian media where necessary, thus building good will with the Brazilian NOC. On occasion, DPM excluded its official role and offered to host visiting media, which provided an opportunity for DPM’s staff to showcase their home city, an activity often driven more by community pride than by business necessity. For example, DPM hosted a Brazilian reporter from the Coagio Brasiliense, who was writing a story on the Brazilian Olympic team’s training location. DPM also hosted Global TV, a Brazilian television broadcaster, for a day.

The Brazilian and other pre-Games training media acted relatively independently. While there was some basic media hosting, neither CTEC nor Project 2000 actively lobbied the media to encourage coverage of pre-Games training in Canberra, or destination stories, and any potential leveraging of the pre-Games training media became a missed opportunity.

In contrast, Project 2000 did have an interest in ensuring that Olympic athletes and officials enjoyed their in Canberra, particularly to avoid negative publicity by local media and to encourage future training camp opportunities in the city. Delegates from visiting Olympic teams were presented with gift packs and civic receptions were held in their honour, activities planned to ensure that these visitors would feel welcomed in Canberra, leave with pleasant memories, and subsequently act as ambassadors to the city.

Project 2000 produced a small informational booklet and map of Canberra to encourage the athletes and officials to explore the region. However, this activity conflicted with the agendas of other stakeholders, in particular the AIS, which saw leveraging of training camps as not generating optimal impact for their organisation. An executive from the AIS stated:

"We also have to look at it as what we want out of it [referring to the pre-Games training camp], and what our business is. Our business is getting people to stay in our residences, eat in our dining hall, and use our facilities. If this [the leveraging activities such as day-tours] compliments it [our business], we can organise something …. I mean it doesn’t hurt to show them a good time while they’re here either, I mean if they have a good time they will come back."

Overall, from a sport perspective, all interviewees agreed that the relationship with the Brazilian NOC and its Olympic team members was successfully established. An official from the Brazilian NOC stated: “I think a relationship has been established, and I think it will be fruitful”. When commenting on the team’s intent to return to Canberra for future training camps, she stated: “We have established a relationship. Things become easier. You become acquainted”. Through providing excellent customer service and hospitality, DPM was able to build a close relationship with the Brazilian NOC. However, the distant role of the ACT government meant that the primary relationship remained with the private service provider rather than the local governing body. As a result, the ACT government’s opportunities to leverage the relationship and develop future initiatives with Brazil may be limited.
Outcomes

Between 1996 and September 2000, 56 international sport delegations inspected Canberra as a prospective pre-Games training site. The Finish team held two Olympic preparation camps, the first in December 1998 with 24 coaches and officials, and the second in November 1999 with 33 athletes and officials. In the pre-Games period, Canberra hosted three Olympic teams: the Brazilian Olympic Team (139 athletes and 91 officials), French wrestling and weightlifting teams, and the Israeli swimming team. According to Project 2000’s Final Report (Australian Capital Territory 2000b) the estimated impact from hosting these teams was 4,500 bed nights and business that generated AU$1 million for local companies. This figure does not include the additional discretionary spending by visiting athletes, coaches, and officials.

CTEC saw its Olympic Games strategy as a success. An estimated AU$34 million worth of exposure was generated for Canberra, principally from hosting visiting journalists covering the Canberra Olympic football games. Yet, a CTEC executive suggested the corporation benefited only 'marginally' from the pre-Games training media exposure, although CTEC concentrated its pre-Games training public relations efforts on the local community. Through publicising pre-Games training in the city, CTEC and Project 2000 were able to encourage attendance at Olympic football games, stimulate interest in the Torch Relay, and develop in the community a sense of involvement in the Olympic Games.

From DPM’s perspective, the experience was invaluable, although the large amount of labour invested in such a high-profile project was somewhat of a risk to the company. However, DPM maintained that it benefited from the experience because it provided the company opportunity to expand and establish the organisation, in particular adding a staff member to coordinate the pre-Games training camp project. DPM was also able to showcase its expertise in the event management industry, and since then, has successfully tendered for other ACT government projects. As a staff development exercise, the experience of managing an international training camp developed the communication and negotiation expertise of DPM’s staff, especially through third parties and across cultures. Looking back on the experience, a DPM employee stated: “Basically it was a huge learning curve for me and for DPM”.

Based on the experience of hosting the pre-Games training camps at the AIS, DPM plans to cultivate their relationship with the AIS to attract and host future international training camps again using AIS facilities and extending its network. The company hopes to be involved in future events, such as the 2003 Australian Masters Games in Canberra, and the 2006 Commonwealth Games in Melbourne, and has recognised the opportunity to export its services and experience to host cities for pre-Games training camps in the lead-up to the 2004 Athens Olympic Games.

Pre-Games training, particularly the marketing of Canberra as an elite sport destination, has been beneficial to AIS’s sport camp business, as international groups have come to train at the AIS as a result of Project 2000’s international promotion of Canberra as an elite centre for pre-Games training.

Clearly, these training camps represented a potential market for AIS, and the opportunity allowed AIS to extend its networks with international teams. An AIS executive suggested that the experience provided them with ‘bragging rights’ and demonstrated the Institute’s ability to host international training camps for elite athletes.

In December 2000, Project 2000 was disbanded. Feelings of discontent and frustration were expressed by some members of the Project 2000 Task Force due to lack of action and inability to use the Olympics to stimulate community initiatives in the future. They perceived these problems as stemming from the bureaucratic nature of Project 2000 initiatives. One Task Force member saw the group as a ‘token effort’, believing that the government solicited their input but then omitted them from the process. Another Task Force member stated: “I had to physically get involved. I had to be pro-active”. The same member described the outcome of Project 2000’s work:

"In the end the government produced a very good outcome. The football event was first class, and the way the Brazilians were looked after … there wasn’t any problems and it was done very well. But, they left a lot of damage around the place in terms of personalities and people. I dare say if they called another event here in another three years they would be lucky to get a lot of people involved. I think a lot of people got burned. When the event was over everyone sat back and said, “Thank god that is over”, instead of, “Wow! Let’s keep going”. I don’t think too many long-term relationships were forged or continued after the Olympics. If anything I think everyone walked from it and walked away from each other.”

Project 2000 produced a concluding report which outlined the outcomes and achievements of Canberra’s Olympic initiatives. DPM also submitted a final report to Project 2000. However, no debriefing among the stakeholders took place. As one stakeholder involved in pre-Games training said:

"It’s been good to talk to you. It’s made me think about what we were doing. Sometimes you get so caught-up in what you’re doing and when it’s all over your glad to put it behind you, and you don’t look back on it enough. We certainly have taken a lot of those lessons into different projects that we are doing now, and how we handle them.”

The ACT government also had the opportunity to create business networks in Brazil. Following the Olympics, the city of Cairns in far north Queensland hosted a Brazilian education delegation with the aim of
exporting to Brazil English language courses through business colleges in Cairns. This opportunity could have been pursued also by stakeholders in Canberra, but, unfortunately, Canberra planners failed to consider other potential opportunities beyond sport and did not exploit the relationships developed through pre-Games training, particularly with Brazil. Reflecting on missed opportunities, a Project 2000 Task Force member commented on the lack of long-term gains for Canberra from the 2000 Olympic Games: “[It’s] not because of the massive network. Not because the networks didn’t work. It’s because the government can’t provide the follow up and lost contact”.

Project 2000’s final report included eight key recommendations for capitalising on the momentum from the Sydney Olympic Games. The goal of the report’s author was to make the information available to people who would take up the challenge for the long-term. In summary, the Final Report proposed that Canberra build on the Olympic experience, particularly the efforts of Project 2000, and that government and community stakeholders adopt a strategic approach to developing Canberra’s events portfolio. Project 2000 and the AIS have recommended that the ACT government continue to promote Canberra as the home of elite sport through international training camps. At present, there is no indication of future implantation of these recommendations.

A concern expressed by individuals who worked on the pre-Games training initiative was retention of the knowledge gained from their involvement in project. As an executive from Project 2000 suggested, the possibility exists that another big event will come along and the people who planned Canberra’s Olympic response will not be involved. A new group would have to start over, or, in the Executive’s words, ‘re-invent the wheel’. She suggested that mechanisms to retain the knowledge and lessons derived from pre-Games training are pivotal to ensuring that mistakes do not recur and that planners learn from the experiences of others. In hindsight, the decision to outsource pre-Games training was problematic, and as a consequence, Canberra failed to leverage this event. Capturing and incorporating these lessons of the past are critical to future planning to ensure stakeholders identify and leverage the potential benefits from hosting sport events in the city.

Analysis

Canberra’s position as the national capital and its young system of government were central to Canberra’s Olympic response. Given these factors, the region’s agenda for its Olympic strategy, motivated by civic boosterism, was to strengthen the city’s position in Australia. The government focused its resources on community events that would attract attention to the city, in particular Olympic football. In the short-term, the publicity value, economic impact, and spectator numbers provided immediately available, quantifiable measures of the government’s performance. Other more subjective indicators (such as the mood and atmosphere in the city) were also used to demonstrate to the community that the government had maximised its opportunity to involve Canberra’s residents. In the longer term, government stakeholders anticipated that its strategy termed ‘Another face of our national capital’ would reposition Canberra’s tourist brand, and ultimately provide benefits to local businesses from increased tourism. Of political importance was the government’s ability to show evidence that Canberra derived benefits from the 2000 Olympic Games, and it used these indicators to legitimate public investment in its Olympic policies.

Government stakeholders also wanted Canberra’s response to be comparable to that of other regions in Australia and strove to demonstrate that all potential opportunities had been addressed. A pre-Games training initiative was still pursued, but was limited to activities which could be qualified in evaluation (i.e. number of teams training in Canberra). Although marketing activities were undertaken to attract pre-Games training camps to Canberra, no strategies were implemented to leverage Olympic teams once they were secured.

A ‘disconnect’ also existed between the definition of pre-Games training as a sport problem and the agenda of ACT government planners. The planners included commerce and tourism on their agenda, but they could not see the relevance of pre-Games training pursuant to these objectives. As a result, the pre-Games training initiative was neglected and opportunities were missed, in contrast to Olympic football, which was defined as a tourism activity and therefore accommodated on the agenda. ACT government planners understood and were familiar with working with Olympic football and pursued initiatives surrounding this hallmark event. Pre-Games training would have provided outcomes the planners desired (e.g. generating publicity to reposition the city, local economic development), but because it was not identified as an opportunity, government stakeholders did not consider strategies to leverage pre-Games training. Seen as a sport problem, the response to pre-Games training had a purely sport orientation, and planners were primarily concerned with the sport experience.

Pre-Games training in Canberra also faced another hurdle, which was the government’s increasingly crowded agenda. Given other priorities of the Office of Tourism and Business Development in the ACT Government, pre-Games training began to slide down on the list of Olympic-related priorities. To reduce the load, the government contracted out the organisation and management of the pre-Games training camps. This decision was justified on the grounds that it provided Canberra’s local businesses an opportunity to capitalise on pre-Games training (i.e. through provision of goods and services), in alignment with the local business development agenda of the Office of Business and Tourism Development.
The outsourcing (or removal) of pre-Games training from the government to the private sector had a significant impact on Canberra’s leveraging efforts and outcomes derived from pre-Games training. The private consultancy company that was contracted, DPM, was a for-profit enterprise that was focused on making decisions to generate revenue and expand the company. DPM’s involvement in pre-Games training was limited to the requirements of its contract with the ACT government and a strict budget, and the company’s orientation as a private enterprise was not consistent with implementing and leveraging opportunities to benefit the public.

Two key implications resulted from this conflict. First, the formality and strictness of the agreement and budget limitations of the private providers limited the flexibility and depth of the response. The ability to steer the response to take advantage of opportunities and extend the impact into other sectors of the local economy was problematic. These problems were exacerbated by the structure of the agreement, which prohibited direct contact between the service provider and the Brazilian NOC prior to the training camp. As a result of this structure, the potential to capitalise on emerging opportunities and create relationships beyond the camp training was not realised.

Second, the private providers were contracted to supply event management services, but they had neither the interest nor expertise to host visiting journalists to encourage destination stories on the city, nor the capacity or inclination to create business relationships through the sports teams. While basic media services were provided, these activities were focused on hosting the sport teams and showcasing the AIS facilities, rather than on promoting the city as a whole. DPM, as a for-profit enterprise, and the AIS had no stake in leveraging the training camps, and as a result, city marketers and local economic development agencies did not capitalise on the media interest and business opportunities provided by pre-Games training.

Politics also played an important role in Canberra’s response to the Olympic Games. The awarding of the 2000 Olympic Games to Sydney attracted the attention of Canberra policymakers in Canberra, who responded immediately and began assembling a group of individuals representing the sport, tourism, business, and arts communities. These individuals were interested to aligning their own organisational issues and pet proposals with policy actions developed for the Olympics. Groups from various sectors of the community banded together within the ACT 2000 Committee and Project 2000 Task Force, sharing the common belief that the Sydney Olympic Games would provide many opportunities for the city. Interest in the Olympics began to snowball and resulted in a growing realisation that the Olympics could provide opportunities and benefits for Canberra’s planners.

Members of the ACT 2000 Committee saw the Olympic Games as an opportunity to satisfy their organisational and personal agendas. In its proposal developed for the ACT government, The 2000 Games – A Reason for Action, the ACT 2000 committee coupled unrelated problems and solutions under the umbrella of Olympic-related initiatives (see Table 8). The Olympic Games were seen as a choice opportunity to solve a number of long-standing problems.

The ACT 2000 Committee’s proposal also played another role in the policy process. Government used the recommendations from this group of community representatives as a tool to legitimate its decisions. Criticisms of the government’s response could be referred to the community consultation undertaken in these early stages. To demonstrate that the government was continuing to seek advice from the industry throughout the process, the government formed a Project 2000 Task Force. This group was a revised version of the ACT 2000 Committee, with similar membership. However, on this occasion there was belief within the group that its effects were merely a token. On the surface the group represented the consultation process between the government and the local community, but members saw their influence on governmental decisions as minimal. Through reinstating the ACT 2000 Committee and forming the Project 2000 Task Force, the government could claim it was acting on the community’s ideas despite the lack of public appeal.

The Canberra case also provides an interesting example of asymmetries in collective action (Hardin 1982). The community groups assembled to formulate Canberra’s Olympic response contrived proposals that would influence the direction of the strategies and tactics implemented by the government. Given the group members’ orientation (i.e. towards sport, tourism, business, and arts), the responses proposed sought to benefit the members’ organisational and pet interests. Ultimately the proposals from the various sectors (or sub-committees) had to compete with each other for the policymakers’ attention. Through this process, some proposals were promoted on the agenda and others were demoted. Although all group members contributed to the collective good, some sectors benefited more than others in the outcomes they obtained. For example, the stakeholders catalysed the development of a tourism and events corporation which implemented a tourism marketing strategy. Nonetheless, by concentrating the government’s efforts on this strategy, the stakeholders in Canberra had sacrificed other opportunities, such as pre-Games training.
In conclusion, the Canberra case illustrates the effect of problem attribution and orientation of the stakeholders on the outcomes derived. Several related factors influenced the stakeholder response in Canberra: (1) the focus of the region and its government on defining and establishing itself as a city, resulting in an emphasis on repositioning the city’s tourist brand; (2) the definition of pre-Games training as a sport problem, therefore not considered part of tourism’s repositioning strategy, (3) the out-sourcing of pre-Games training to private providers, reducing the government’s involvement in the process, and (4) the business-orientated sport focus of the private providers which limited the city’s response to hosting the training camps. These factors contributed to the absence of a leveraging response to pre-Games training in Canberra.
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Chapter 8

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The objective of this study was to explore the planning, marketing, and implementation of strategies and tactics to leverage pre-Games training in the lead-up to the Sydney Olympic Games. Factors that account for effective and ineffective leveraging of this activity were also investigated. Findings from this study can be used to inform the utilisation of sport as part of the product and service mix in place marketing.

The three preceding chapters have described the strategies adopted, the stakeholders involved in the strategies, the leveraging efforts undertaken, and the outcomes in each case study. In this chapter, findings from the three case studies are compared to provide an integrated discussion and highlight cross-case implications. Similarities and differences in the leveraging efforts and outcomes, as well as the structure and coordination of responses across cases, are considered and implications derived. In addition, sport and place marketing policy analysis and the sport policy process are discussed, and implications and recommendations given. In conclusion, the generalisability of the study and future research directions are examined.

Leveraging Efforts and Outcomes Across the Cases

Various opportunities to leverage and derive outcomes from the pre-Games training camps were revealed in each of the cases. In this section, the cross-case opportunities are identified and responses to these opportunities are given.

The Opportunities

An inspection of the cases reveals that there were three central clusters of opportunities to leverage or obtain beneficial outcomes from hosting training camps in a city. As shown in Figure 7, the clusters include economic outcomes, awareness created from hosting the athletes and teams, and relationships that can be built or enhanced through hosting sport teams. Across the cases, strategies and tactics were implemented in each cluster to promote short- and long-term outcomes for the local economy.

In the short-term, sport can stimulate the local economy through expenditures by sport spectators, athletes, and officials while in the region. This economic influx is generated from consumption of products, such as use of sport facilities, equipment rentals, and clothing purchases. The money spent in the region by visitors who seek sport services and expertise (such as exercise testing, sport medicine services, and training camp management) also impacts the economy. In addition to the athletes, hosting training camps can attract other visitors, including team officials and administrators (coaches, support staff, and managers), as well as spectators and supporters (friends and family). During their stay in the region, these tourists consume accommodation, transport, and food and beverages.

Other auxiliary activities such as sightseeing, touring, shopping, and dining at restaurants can result in additional visitor spending. Encouraging and providing access to these activities can increase the expenditure of each visitor, and thereby boost the local economy. In each case study, these activities were encouraged to varying extents.

In the Hunter and Canberra, booklets and/or maps were produced and disseminated to the athletes and officials. Stakeholders from local businesses in the Hunter also encouraged athletes and officials to visit a local restaurant precinct by offering incentives, such as discount meal vouchers. In the Gold Coast, tourism stakeholders provided a visitor information desk at the British Olympic team’s training camp headquarters and accommodation venue. Information and a booking service for day tours and other activities in the region (e.g. visits to the movies, shopping centres, theme parks) were made available to training camp visitors at this desk. In the Hunter and the Gold Coast (where greater emphasis was placed on implementing these tactics), tourism stakeholders and government policymakers saw these efforts as worthwhile, both to stimulate visitor spending and to establish a precedent for future collective efforts to leverage sport events and training camps.
Figure 7: The opportunities identified from pre-Games training

In addition to short-term benefits, longer-term economic outcomes can also be realised when sport products and services are exported. These export initiatives can be delivered within Australia. For example, a region could implement an ongoing program to develop products and services for the training camp market (i.e. hosting future pre-event and off-season training camps in the city), a tactic that is being considered by each of the cities studied. Sport products and services can also be exported offshore. The private company that managed the Brazilian training camp is considering developing training camps for athletes preparing for the 2004 Athens Olympic Games. In the Hunter, the local economic development agency and a local government formed a partnership agreement with Northern Ireland to export the Hunter’s expertise in leveraging training camps and its innovations in local economic development planning to the Irish for the 2002 Manchester Commonwealth Games. However, no comparable effort has been made to export Gold Coast expertise. As shown in the Hunter and Canberra cases, private companies and local economic development agencies are considering the export of sport. These planners view this activity as an entrepreneurial, commercial venture. As the previous examples demonstrate, hosting training camps and the export of sport represent economic opportunities for these cities.

The Opportunity to Create Awareness

The second cluster of opportunity is leveraging the profile of sport events, athletes, and teams to create publicity and promote the city. One of the most significant opportunities within this cluster is the ability to attract and host media in the region through sport. In the lead-up to the event (in this case, the Olympic Games), the destination markets in both the Gold Coast and the Hunter sought to boost their media hosting programs and work to create associations between the visiting sport identities and the region. In the Gold Coast, during the pre-Games training camp, the tourism entity and local council established a media centre to host journalists travelling with teams that were training in the city. This activity generated destination stories by tying in with reports on the sport teams. Likewise, the Hunter hosted a media delegation that produced a television report on the Irish Olympic team’s preparation in the Hunter. These activities maximised opportunities to create links between the training camps and the cities involved. In both cases, stories and images of the athletes’ training were tied into the destination by using the location (e.g. the Hunter’s beaches and lakes) as the backdrop for the report. The Hunter also organised a pre-Olympic athletics event to generate publicity for the region. In contrast, in Canberra, tourism stakeholders did not capitalise on the media opportunity Canberra viewed the sporting media travelling with the teams as not relevant to its tourism objectives and concentrated on other media activities, particularly...
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Olympic football. Although the effort to generate awareness differed across cases, each confirmed that the media played an important role in capitalising on hosting pre-Games training in the city.

The Gold Coast case also illustrates that training camps can provide an opportunity to create awareness through cross-promotion with team sponsors (e.g. the Gold Coast’s cross-promotion with Team Great Britain’s sponsors), and direct advertising (e.g. the Queensland taxi promotion in London). All the cities studied used pre-Olympic conferences and forums to promote the region as pre-Games training locations (e.g. the Chefs de Mission Conference held in Sydney prior to the Games). These promotions also provided opportunities to market the cities, beyond the Olympics, as training camp destinations.

Strategies and tactics were also implemented to create positive publicity about the city. Tourism and sporting stakeholders anticipated that positive word-of-mouth would produce two outcomes. First, it would encourage repeat training camp business in the region. Second, the positive experiences of athletes who trained in the region would be shared with friends and families, who might be inclined to visit the region in the future.

Another strategy developed for the Olympics (and not specifically for pre-Games training) was the tactical marketing campaign in Canberra. Tourism and government stakeholders in Canberra leveraged the Olympics to reposition the city’s tourist brand. Destination marketers did not concentrate exclusively on one event (i.e. the Olympic Games) but used the Olympics in conjunction with other events (e.g. the Centenary of Federation) to create an integrated two-year repositioning strategy. The Canberra case illustrates how destination marketers can incorporate events into an integrated marketing communications campaign. Tourism and government stakeholders in Canberra anticipated that this strategy would create the greatest impact on repositioning the city’s tourist brand.

As these examples demonstrate, hosting a training camp can produce opportunities to create awareness. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the influence of these activities (particularly on the destination’s brand) could have long-term implications for the region. Leveraging activities can be more than short-term tactical responses and result in long-term place marketing plans. Hence, the types of events and the creation of awareness should be intimately tied to the long-term agenda of the region.

The Opportunity to Create New and Build on Existing Relationships

The third cluster identified in this study was the opportunity to create new and build on existing relationships through the training camps. This cluster includes relationships among tourism organisations, sports organisations, local businesses, and prospective trading partners identified through pre-Games training efforts.

Some of the most important relationships generated were among stakeholders within the city. As shown in the Hunter case study, by creating relationships and alliances among local restaurants and cafes in a food precinct, the city was able to offer visitors incentives that would stimulate spending and encourage them to explore the local region. The study of pre-Games training also demonstrates the importance of alliances with external bodies, such as the government players in the state. As an example, the Hunter formed a relationship with the New South Wales Department of State and Regional Development to encourage them to send prospective teams to the Hunter. Another example was the interdepartmental group formed at the state level within the Queensland government. Relationships with internal and external organisations were an important part of the leveraging effort.

An additional factor in the success of the effort was the relationships developed with sport bodies and business prospects, which were facilitated through the training camps. It was imperative that the stakeholders responsible for developing the local economy identify and form relationships with the decision-makers in the sport, tourism, and business communities. Across the case studies, the findings have shown that personal relationships were the most effective method to attract sport teams to the region. A personal relationship between an entrepreneur on the Gold Coast and the British Olympic Association led to the BOA’s selection of the Gold Coast as Team GB’s training camp headquarters. In the Hunter, planners formed personal relationships with the teams through a targeted database marketing campaign. In Canberra, the personal relationship between a Task Force member and the Brazilian National Olympic Committee resulted in the selection of Canberra as the Brazilian team’s training site.

This study also highlights the potential to leverage Olympic associations into extended relationships for export and trade opportunities. In the Hunter, stakeholders from the local economic development agency and local businesses used the relationship with the country’s Olympic team to solicit visits and referrals from its Consulates for business matching, export opportunities, and to secure trade and export missions, creating an opening to network informally. These stakeholders used sport contacts, developed as a result of hosting the Olympic team, to provide introductions to and build relationships with business people through activities such as hosting a civic reception and networking at Olympic-related functions.
The Structure and Coordination of Sport Policy

Findings of this study indicate that the underlying structure and coordination of policy are imperative to the stakeholder response and, ultimately, influence the outcomes obtained. Groups of stakeholders that formed to address pre-Game training opportunities were often political in their interaction, and the outcomes obtained asymmetrical (winners versus losers). Stakeholders became disenfranchised and their responses were fragmented. In the following section, these structural and coordination issues are discussed and recommendations presented.

The Politics in Policy Making

Politics played an important role in the pre-Games training response. In each case, the origins of Olympic policy were haphazard, yet the selection of those policies was not (Kingdon 1995). The stakeholders (players) did not strategically select the source of policy ideas, but managed the evolution of ideas through policy processes. For example, the tourism and sport stakeholders in Canberra wanted an event management entity to attract events to the city. These stakeholders (players) managed the evolution of the Olympic policy agenda by ensuring they were well positioned to influence policy response and promote their own proposals to policymakers. Through this structure, the stakeholders (players) demonstrated the importance of leveraging the Olympics in the region and using the Games to catalyse the establishment of the city’s events corporation.

In each of the cases, the initial policy reaction to the Games was to advocate groups in specialised policy areas to address Olympic issues. The sub-committees typically formed in tourism, sport, business development, and the arts. In the context of pre-Games training (or the sport sub-committee), these groups not only represented stakeholders from sport, but also tourism bodies and local businesses that had an interest in pre-Games training.

Within each sub-committee, members carried out intimate, small-group interactions and advocated ideas according to favoured issues (tourism, sport, the arts, or business initiatives). The group thus became advocates for solutions to problems and produced proposals to solicit responses from policymakers and promote issues that concerned the group members’ organisational and personal vested interests in the policy agenda. Politics played an important role in the structure and coordination of the response, and the ability of stakeholders (players) to advocate policy solutions was imperative to the outcomes obtained from this opportune event (i.e. the Olympic Games).

Group Asymmetry

In each case, groups formed which represented stakeholders (players) with diverse backgrounds and interests. Each invested its resources, time, and energy in pre-Games training to seek a personal return in the future. Some examples of these returns included additional funding for programs, organisations, or departments, additional resources (such as staff and facilities), career advancement, ‘bragging rights’ and personal values (in sport and/or involvement in the Olympic Games).

In accordance with Kingdon’s (1995) discussion of group dynamics in the policy process, this study illustrated that players often become involved in the policy process for their own personal benefits. When acting collectively, some individuals ‘free ride and social loaf’ on the group’s efforts (Hardin 1982; Schermerhorn et al. 1994). This study found that some group members ‘rode the Olympics agenda’ to achieve their personal objectives, while, others loitered and did not contribute to the group as much as possible. Inequalities in the distribution of collective benefit were also present. Some members benefited more from their involvement in the group than others, a phenomenon described in collective action literature as group asymmetry (Hardin 1982). The implications of these findings suggest that group members should be aware of the problems of acting collectively and consider both the positive and negative aspects of their involvement.

Network Coordinator

The study highlights the importance of a network coordinator to work across organisations and align the needs of the various sectors that have a stake in a policy issue (such as place marketing). Sarason and Lorentz’s (1998) findings support this proposition. They suggest that a facilitator or network coordinator is important to local economic development as that individual can work with local agencies to create a sense of community and shared commitment. Furthermore, a network coordinator can reduce the transaction costs between individual stakeholders (Hardin 1992). Without a coordinator, each individual engaged in a collective activity (such as pre-Games training or place marketing) has to incur the cost (e.g. time and energy) of forming and benefitting from their individual effort to derive a collective good. A network coordinator can eliminate some of the cost to the individuals involved in a collective response, as the coordinator can create necessary relationships and form a network of stakeholders to optimise the collective response to a problem. For example, the network coordinator can link provider A, a sport medicine provider, with provider B, a sport facility, to result in sport medicine for a training camp. This study suggests that a network coordinator can assist in creating links among sport organisations, tourism bodies, and local businesses to develop an integrated local economic development strategy.
Summary

In a sport and place marketing strategy, stakeholders (players) from tourism organisations, sport bodies, local businesses, the media, the local community, and economic development agencies play a role or influence policy decisions. The diversity of interests, the level of involvement, and competition among stakeholders (players) suggest that players can promote pet proposals by managing the politics of the policy structure to ensure the evolution of an idea on the policy agenda. Stakeholders in a group should be aware of asymmetries inherent in acting collectively. This study proposes that a network coordinator can help to eliminate transaction costs among stakeholders and align the varied interests of the stakeholders. In the following section, implications for policy analysis in a sport and place marketing context are revealed and discussed.

Implications for Understanding Sport and Place Marketing Policy Analysis

The literature suggests that many stakeholders can benefit from hosting sport activities and events in a region (Ashworth & Voogd 1990; Cashman & Hughes 1999; Getz 1997a; Hall 2000). In the study of pre-Games training, multiple stakeholders could have been or were affected by hosting sport training camps in a city. These stakeholders represented an assortment of interests and a diverse array of organisational backgrounds ranging from public and non-profit to the private sector. The explicit or agreed upon values of the multiple stakeholders also played a significant role in the planning process, and, when analysing the policy process, it is also important to consider the organisational and personal interests of the stakeholders. In the literature, Considine (1994) states that: “values express their preference and explain their purpose in undertaking or refusing different forms of behaviour” (p. 49). Pre-existing agendas of the players involved and the organisations they represent, as well as the economic and social focus of the city, are important considerations when analysing sport and place marketing policy. This study proposes that these factors influenced the direction of the policy response, and ultimately, the outcomes derived from the policies.

Pre-existing Agendas

Findings of this study show the influence of pre-existing agendas on the response to the pre-Games training. Across cases, each city, its stakeholders, and other players involved in developing policy had deeply held beliefs about how they defined themselves, their organisations, and the economic strengths of the region. These reference points framed the responses to pre-Games training.

Each city’s pre-existing economic strengths and differences dictated the aspects focused on by the city as a whole in its pre-Games training policy. The Gold Coast was seen as a tourism-based economy, the Hunter as a primary industry-based economy, and Canberra a government-based economy. In reaction to the Games, the Gold Coast leveraged the media to promote itself as a tourist destination; the Hunter created relationships to promote, export, and trade opportunities; and Canberra leveraged the Olympics to promote its position as the national capital of Australia. These assets were reinforced in the way the policymakers reacted to Olympic-related opportunities.

In addition to the city’s agenda, the players involved in the response and the organisations they represented play a role in shaping the policy. At an organisational level, the stakeholders formulated strategies and tactics that reflected the overall objectives of their organisation. For example, tourism stakeholders implemented strategies and tactics to attract tourists to the city; sporting stakeholders implemented strategies and tactics to compensate sport; and stakeholders from local businesses implemented strategies and tactics to stimulate commercial benefits. At the personal level, the individual players pursued actions that satisfied their personal and political interests (e.g., players with an interest in sport promoted initiatives to develop local athletes).

However, the findings also show that multiple focus points can be problematic when there is a disconnection between the agenda of the city, the agenda of the various stakeholders, and the personal agendas of those involved in the policy process. In both the Gold Coast and Canberra, the agenda of stakeholders and the players involved in managing the training camps was sport, although the city’s agenda was to promote the place as a tourist destination. This inconsistency created a disconnection between the tourism agenda of the city as a whole and the agenda of the sport-oriented stakeholders and players driving the pre-Games training response. The response focused on the particular needs of the sport-oriented stakeholders rather than the needs of the city, and consequently, the response to pre-Games training became fragmented.

In contrast, the Hunter’s stakeholders and players had a local economic development focus, which aligned with the aspirations of the city. As a result, the Hunter’s response integrated the agenda of the city with agendas of the stakeholders and players. Thus, it is evident from these findings that pre-existing agendas influence the policy response to an issue.

Levels of Analysis

Given that pre-existing agendas underlie the response, it is important to consider the policy process from multiple viewpoints or lenses. In the literature, Allison (1971) challenged the unitary level of analysis, suggesting that analysis through three contextual lenses (rational actor, organisational, and political) is important
in viewing the complexity of the policy process. Allison’s multiple lenses of analysis are used to inform the findings from this study. It is proposed that there are three viewpoints on sport and place marketing problems: (1) the agenda of the city, (2) the agenda of the stakeholders, and (3) the agenda of players (or personal agendas).

In Figure 8, the framework for policy analysis in place marketing is presented.

![Figure 8: A framework for policy analysis in place marketing](image)

Allison suggests that each viewpoint does not operate in isolation, but rather has a relationship with the other levels. The decisions of the one level of analysis have a direct impact on the other levels of analysis and vice-versa. In the context of sport and place marketing, the agenda of the city can influence decisions of stakeholders in the city (or individual players) and vice-versa. While policy analysts should consider each level of analysis, they must not consider each process as operating in isolation from the others (or as three separate processes), but simultaneously, to gain a better understanding of the policy process in its entirety. The core agenda of the city, as well as the orientation of the stakeholders and players should be considered when deciding how to address a policy issue.

**Problem Attribution**

Defining the problem and assigning ownership of pre-Games training were primary considerations in the effectiveness of strategies surveyed in this study. The pre-existing agenda of the organisation and the personal interest of the players driving the making of policy defined the type of response and ultimately the outcomes derived. Therefore, an important decision in the policy process was assigning ownership of the problem (viz. Gusfield 1981).

The findings show that when the problem is assigned to sport, the policy will reflect a sport agenda and derive sporting outcomes. For example, in the case of the Gold Coast, the problem of pre-Games training was assigned to sport-orientated stakeholders. The agenda of these sport-oriented stakeholders (and players) was to improve the sport facilities and equipment in the city to support local athletes. As a result of the stakeholders’ influence on the policy decisions, massive upgrades of sport infrastructure were undertaken, resulting in significant sport outcomes for the city. Because other stakeholders in the city failed to capitalise on or were not involved in pre-Games training, most outcomes for the Gold Coast from pre-Games training were limited to sport.

Similarly, if the problem of pre-Games training was assigned to tourism, the outcomes reflected a tourism agenda. Tourism stakeholders (players) were focused on implementing policies that developed the tourism industry, as seen in the example of the pre-Games training brochure developed for the state of New South Wales. Because this project was assigned to tourism, the tourism stakeholders produced a brochure aimed at marketing the destination to attract tourists, rather than addressing the needs of its target market (i.e. elite sports people).
As shown in these examples, if a problem is assigned to a single sector (such as sport or tourism), the agenda of the planners can produce a single sector response, and, as a consequence, other elements of the city’s product and service mix can be neglected. The findings from this study suggest that when local economic development becomes the shared goal of stakeholders, the interests of sport, tourism, and local businesses are optimally synergised. This proposition is particularly evident in the Hunter case, in which the response was driven initially by a multi-sector stakeholder group (i.e. the Dash for 2000 Committee) with diverse agendas and different visions. After this group disbanded, the new task force defined their mission and created a shared vision for the group. Conversely, planners in the Gold Coast and Canberra neglected this stage of the planning process, and as a result, the groups and individuals involved in the Gold Coast and Canberra’s responses had segregated visions for hosting pre-Games training camps in the city. These stakeholders were focused on personal interests and what could be achieved for their organisations. Independent strategies and tactics emerged from their deliberation that did not reflect the overall goals of the group or the city, but rather mirrored the organisational and personal objectives of those involved.

These findings suggest that the shared vision of the group can have a significant effect on the planning process. Groups should take the time to align individual visions of the members to create a shared vision of the common good they seek to derive (Senge 1990). Furthermore, sport and tourism planners and managers should expect to play a greater role in local economic development planning, and link their own activities and those of other sectors of the local economy to create a shared vision for the city. From a policy analyst perspective, it is important to consider the importance of stakeholder agendas and problem attribution in shaping the stakeholders’ response to a problem and defining its ownership.

**Implications for Understanding Sport Policy**

One of the most important contributions of this study is its implications for understanding policy processes, particularly in relation to sport and events. The environment in which the policies were developed and the policy processes that were brought to bear played important roles in the stakeholders’ response to pre-Games training. On the surface, policymakers appeared to have set defined objectives and carefully considered strategic plans to capitalise on pre-Games training. In reality, policy decisions were random and often haphazard. Policymakers characterised the policy environment as uncertain and driven by politics (Kingdon 1995). In this section, the policy processes revealed in this study are considered and implications are derived.

**An Informed Response**

Superficially, the policy environment appeared rational and logical. Policymakers appeared to be informed on potential opportunities to leverage the Games, and accordingly formulated and implemented initiatives to capitalise on those opportunities. In the case of Canberra, the consultation process was undertaken such that options and alternatives were identified and evaluated, the best options were chosen, policies were formulated, and a policy response to the Games was implemented. Described in this way, it would appear that policymakers utilised a rational process of planning, deciding, and acting. Elements of the classical rational model of policy-making (Hall 2000; Newmann 1998) were evident in each of the cases, although the actual environment for policy formulation and implementation was neither straightforward nor fully rational in the classical sense.

**Uncertainty in the Policy Process**

A key difficulty faced in each case by policymakers responding to the problem of pre-Games training was the uncertainty of the planning environment. Policymakers often lacked the information necessary to make informed decisions and speculation took place regarding the potential opportunities presented by pre-Games training. The policy environment was constantly changing as new information became known (e.g. forecasts of tourism impact of the Games), and new opportunities became available (e.g. the opportunity to host preliminary matches of Olympic football). In this uncertain and changing policy environment, actions wavered and decisions fluctuated as policymakers deliberated on the best opportunities to leverage the Olympics. Strategies were often based on a loose collection of ideas rather than a coherent strategic plan. For example, the Gold Coast appeared to have a well-planned media strategy, but a detailed examination revealed a haphazard chain of events that led to efforts to leverage pre-Games training by establishment of a media centre. Decisions were characterised as evolving and fluid, rather than articulated and resolute, and pre-Games training policy-making often operated on a trial-and-error basis. Policymakers reacted to new information and opportunities as they became available, and in some instances, gambled on choices that might have been in their best interest.

In addition to operating in an environment of uncertainty, policymakers wavered between pre-Games training and other items that demanded attention. Apart from the everyday distractions of the ongoing policy process, other Olympic-related activities occurring concurrently competed with pre-Games training for the attention of the policymakers. In some cases, pre-Games training held a higher priority on the agenda than other Olympic activities (e.g. the Gold Coast’s focus on pre-Games training), and in others its priority was lower (e.g. Canberra’s neglect of pre-Games in preference for Olympic football). The findings of this study show that the
priority of pre-Games training on policymakers’ agendas and the effect of other items demanding their attention influenced the richness of pre-Games training responses.

These findings are consistent with Cohen et al.’s (1972) discussion of organised anarchies, which characterises the policy environment as operating with problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. Thus, the position of an item on the agenda is influenced by a complex combination of factors (Kingdon 1995). The current study has demonstrated that, for an issue to attract optimum attention of policymakers, its advocates must ensure that the issue retains a high priority on the policymakers’ agenda.

Random Coupling
Another central concept apparent in the pre-Games training policy process was the garbage can analogy described by Cohen et al. (1972). As illustrated in each of the cases, the Olympic Games caught the attention of policymakers and prompted them to consider ways to capitalise on the event. The Olympic Games caused a policy window (viz. Kingdon 1995) to open, and stakeholders from the tourism, sport and business sectors acted on the opportunity to include (or, using the garbage can analogy, dump) their problems and preferred actions on to the policy agenda. As a result, problems were randomly coupled to solutions (Cohen et al. 1972) and hooked into the action-channel of policy-making (Allison 1971).

Kingdon (1995) suggested that there is limited randomness in the coupling, which limits coupling possibilities. In the case studies, problems and solutions aligned with agendas of city governments, stakeholders involved in the response, and the personal interests of the planners were more likely to be coupled. For example, Canberra was more likely to couple Olympic-related publicity programs and a repositioning strategy than the construction of sport facilities and pre-Games training, given that government stakeholders were focused on establishing the importance of the city within Australia.

In addition, barriers or constraints on the system can also limit the coupling possibilities (Kingdon 1995). The principal barriers identified in this study included the hierarchy of power and the ability to influence others, resource barriers (including time and energy resources), and policy voids. These limitations explain why some items are never promoted on the policy agenda. For example, although the Gold Coast had the opportunity to use Team GB’s logo in its advertising in the United Kingdom, that opportunity was minimally exploited because Tourism Queensland, not the Gold Coast Tourism Bureau, was responsible for regional tourism advertising in the UK. Here we see how the organisational hierarchy of the tourism industry precluded effective leveraging of an opportunity.

In summary, it is evident that politics play an important role in shaping the policy environment. Given this context, the players formulated and implemented their response to the Olympic Games. In the following section this process is discussed.

A Framework for the Policy Process and Mega-Events
Figure 9 presents a framework for the policy process in reaction to a mega-event. The green box in the flow diagram represents the ongoing attention of policymakers. It is suggested that the presence of a mega-event disrupts the policy agenda and incites policy advocates to put forward proposals. In response, the policy process splinters and a divergent policy process emerges to address the event and initiate a response (Process 2). In the case of the Olympics, a pre-Games training response emerged. Thus, two policy processes occur simultaneously: the ongoing process (Process 1) and the stakeholders and individuals involved in the response to a mega-event event (Process 2). There are also three feedback loops in the policy process: feedback within the group about the success and failure to formulate and implement policies and attain outcomes (Feedback 1); feedback on final outcomes to legitimate the policy response (Feedback 2); and feedback of the lessons learnt by the stakeholders and individuals involved in the policy process which can impact other policy areas (Feedback 3). In the following sub-sections, various aspects of this framework are discussed, and theoretical and practical implications of these findings are presented.
The Focusing Effect of Mega-Events

In the literature, the concept of a focusing event has been discussed (Birkland 1998; Cobb & Elder 1972; Kingdon 1995; Newmann 1998). Focusing events are defined as sudden, attention-grabbing events, which play an important role in attracting attention to problems and pushing items onto the agenda. It has been suggested that a sudden, dramatic focal event has the potential to catalyse policy change as the event prompts policymakers to respond to problems that are dormant on the policy agenda (Birkland 1998). Until now, the literature on focusing events has concentrated on negative events, such as disasters and crises.
This study of pre-Games training shows that a mega-event (in this instance the Olympic Games) can alter the hierarchy of issues on the policy agenda and can compel a response from policymakers. In this sense, the Olympic Games had an effect analogous (arguably isomorphic) to that of focusing events described in the literature (e.g. Kingdon 1995). The Olympic Games were not perceived as a negative feature of the policy landscape, but nevertheless the Olympic Games grabbed the attention of policymakers and reprioritised issues on the policy agenda. As revealed in each of the cases, policymakers altered the position of items on the policy agenda to capitalise on opportunities created by the 2000 Olympic Games. In this sense, the Olympic Games were akin to a focusing event, but a positive one.

Kingdon (1995) suggests that a negative focusing event will mobilise players to form policy communities and will arouse policy entrepreneurs. This study of pre-Games training shows that a mega-event also displayed these characteristics. In the case of the Gold Coast, the Queensland 2000 Task Force and Gold Coast Olympic Task Force formed a group to advocate policies and to stimulate entrepreneurial activities of the Gold Coast City Council in pursuit of the British Olympic Association. In the Hunter, the Dash for 2000 Committee came together, and later the Hunter Olympic Business Task Force, to form a policy community. Stakeholders from sport and local economic development in the Hunter began to look at business opportunities through sport. In Canberra, the ACT 2000 Committee was formed, which later evolved into the Project 2000 Task Force. Within this group, players put forward proposals. As these examples demonstrate, stakeholders and individual players become policy advocates for a mega-event, just as they would for a negative focusing event. Hence, mega-events can mobilise stakeholders to act collectively and bring proposals to the policymakers’ attention.

Birkland (1998) proposed that, through focusing events, less powerful groups can challenge the status quo and highlight problems requiring public discussion. In reaction to the Olympic Games, the policy communities brought dormant ideas onto the agenda by highlighting them as important Olympic-related issues. Kingdon (1995) describes the linking of an issue to the rising policy agenda as a choice opportunity. In the pre-Games training context, players involved with Olympic planning began to manoeuvre their positions to highlight their problems (e.g. the need to create an events corporation). They banded together and utilised political tools (such as the media and personal communication with policymakers) to foster community belief in the importance of capitalising on the Olympic Games. They highlighted the need for policymakers to show that the state, territory, region, and city maximised Olympic opportunities for economic and community benefits. Akin to Kingdon’s (1995) description of creating a growing realisation and snowball effect, these players influenced the agenda of policymakers to drive a response to the Sydney Olympic Games. In many instances, this influence was used to promote their pet proposals on the agenda. For example, the Public Relations Department of the Gold Coast City Council used the attention-grabbing effect of the Olympic Games to capture the attention of the policymakers in favour of establishing a CD-ROM unit. Thus, the Olympic Games provided a choice opportunity for these groups to champion a message.

Mega-events are also different from negative focusing events. Negative focusing events usually result in a change of the dominant issues on the policy agenda after the event (Birkland 1998). For example, a disaster will occur, and as a result, groups are mobilised and a response is prompted. In contrast, the study of pre-Games training indicates that change in policy agenda catalysed by a mega-event will also occur after the focusing event, but before the actual event, a difference that results in a number of implications.

First, in the case of a mega-event, policymakers have significant lead time prior to the actual event (e.g. the Olympics). As a consequence, a mega-event is not characterised by the unexpected nature of a disaster. An earthquake requires an immediate and spontaneous response by policymakers. As this study of Olympic Games indicates, because a sizeable amount of uncertainty surrounded this event, policy communities and entrepreneurs could use the unknown to destabilise the policy process, challenge the status quo, and propel change to the agenda.

Second, the timing of leveraging efforts also differs between negative focusing events and mega-events. When a negative focusing event occurs, the policy window usually opens immediately following the actual event. In contrast, when a mega-event occurs, the policy window opens prior to the actual event, implying that politicians have time to frame their message and defend the status quo. As a consequence, they can contrive consensus on an issue, and subsequently circumvent public appeal.

Given these differences between negative focusing events and mega-events, three implications arise that should be considered by policy advocates. First, they need to place themselves in a position to influence and lobby policymakers in the lead-up to the actual event. It is envisaged that this influence is most effective during the bid stage of an event. Second, policy advocates must gather information to justify their proposals. Finally, to maximise their influence on the policy process, they must have proposals prepared and be organised to respond (i.e. issues of structure and coordination) to the opening of the policy window. Furthermore, the proposals should have a coherent and clear message (i.e. shared vision), and a defined purpose (i.e. what are they advocating and why?). By undertaking this process, it is suggested that policy advocates will be well positioned and ready to respond to opportunities and advocate courses of action for policymakers.
Feedback

Three feedback loops are identified in the policy response to pre-Games training, shown as feedback loops 1, 2, and 3 in the policy framework (Figure 9). As discussed in the literature, feedback loops can exhibit both positive and negative feedback within the policy process (Senge 1990). Positive feedback reinforces (or amplifies) the response engendering growth of a policy, known as a 'snowball effect' (Kingdon 1995). Conversely, an impairing or negative feedback signal dilutes the development of the policy (Senge 1990). In the following sub-sections, each of these feedback loops is discussed.

Feedback Loop 1

The first feedback loop operates among the stakeholders and individuals involved in the pre-Games training response (or the response to the mega-event). In Figure 9, this response is labelled Process 2. These players formulate and implement policies, which produced intermediary outcomes. The feedback loop provided the players with an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of these policies, then modify and tailor their response given the positive or negative feedback received. If the feedback is positive, it will engender growth of that strategy and tactic. For example, in each case study the stakeholders found that building personal relationships with the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and International Federations (NFs) was the most effective way to attract and secure pre-Games training camps, therefore the strategy became focused on marketing efforts. Conversely, if the feedback is negative, that strategy or tactic was diluted or discontinued. Mass marketing to the NOCs and NFs was a strategy pursued in early marketing efforts, but was later diluted as feedback from the pre-Games training market suggested this tactic was less effective in attracting and securing NOC and NFs than the strategy of creating new and building on existing personal relationships.

Allison (1971) proposed that minor modifications of the actions of organisations are constantly being made, although changes typically follow rather than precede events. Findings from this study of pre-Games training indicate that the players began to make incremental or marginal changes to their response prior to the event through monitoring the feedback. Thus, positive and negative feedback was used as a mechanism to gauge success of outcomes from the formulation and implementation of policy.

Lindblom’s (1959) theory of incrementalism provides some explanation of these modifications. Similar to Lindblom’s description of incrementalism, the pre-Games training response were developed through a gradual process. Policymakers described their responses as evolving rather than being a coherent, well-structured plan. They tinkered with their response as more knowledge and understanding of the opportunities became apparent from the external policy environment. Internal to the process, they made marginal or incremental changes to their response over time by monitoring indicators of feedback (e.g. their success at securing teams, the reaction of the media and politicians to policies). Hence, the stakeholder response to pre-Games training was an incremental process driven by feedback from their own processes and information from the external policy environment. Feedback also provided an opportunity for group learning within the group of stakeholders and individuals involved in the response. Evidence of group learning was seen in each of the cases.

Feedback Loop 2

In the ongoing policy process, feedback on the formulation, implementation, and intermediary outcomes of policy is relayed to policymakers. This feedback indicated to policymakers the importance of maintaining a pre-Games training response. Based on intermediary outcomes, final reports on the outcomes from pre-Games training were also integrated into the ongoing policy process after the event. The reports on final outcomes included presentations and written reports for government officials, politicians, media, and personal interactions with policymakers. In each case, these reports were prepared by government stakeholders to legitimate public investment in the city’s pre-Games training response. The reports on the final outcomes legitimated the decisions made by government and justified the public investment. Thus, the positive feedback from loop 2 provides a mechanism for legitimation.

The influence of legitimation on the policy process is implicit in policy frameworks proposed by Kingdon (1995), Allison (1971), and Lindblom (1959), but is not explicitly discussed. This study proposes that the goal of the players in the policy process is to legitimate the policy. Ultimately, the players wanted to demonstrate that they had maximised the potential impact for the stakeholders in the city. In the context of sport and place marketing, these stakeholders included sport, tourism, local businesses, economic development agencies, and the local community.

In the case of pre-Games training, stakeholder reaction was catalysed by the event bidders (e.g. Sydney Olympic Bid Corporation) and event organisers (e.g. SOCOG). These organisations wanted to build consensus within the Australian community that the 2000 Olympic Games would bring opportune remuneration for towns and cities throughout Australia. In agreement with Kingdon’s (1995) description of the national mood, these organisations created a national mood to engender community support for the Olympics. In the bidding process, they had to demonstrate to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) that the Australian community and government were enthusiastic about hosting the Olympic Games in Sydney. Community opinion and political
support for the Games are required by the IOC in its bid application (International Olympic Committee 2001; McGeogh & Korporaal 1994), and from the event organiser’s perspective, public investment in these events must be justified. Bidders and organisers set out to promote willingness in the Australian community to become involved in the Olympic Games, and cities and towns throughout Australia came to see the Games as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. This political pressure also drove the government to respond positively to the event to avoid voter disappointment.

From a regional viewpoint, it was important that government demonstrate to its communities that benefits from the event were being actively sought. This was primarily motivated by the agenda of civic boosterism (Whitson & Macintosh 1996). Cities and towns throughout Australia developed a ‘me too’ attitude toward the Sydney Olympics and pre-Games training, and wanted to get on the Olympic policy bandwagon (Kingdon 1995).

From an organisational viewpoint, the stakeholders wanted to legitimate the expansion of their programs and structure in response to the Olympic Games. Kingdon (1995) proposed that government monitor activities through countable and quantitative measures known as indicators. As shown in this study, a substantial component of pre-Games training outcomes was focused on long-term strategies, such as creating awareness and building relationships, making it difficult for government organisations to provide quantifiable indicators for feedback channels. As a result, evaluating and legitimating the government’s investment in these initiatives and institutions also became problematic (Friedmann 1987).

Both formal and informal pressures from other external organisations are imposed on an organisation. Ultimately, the organisation ‘plays the game’, it is dependent on the other organisations, and has to conform to cultural and political expectations (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). This behaviour has two implications for long-term strategies and tactics in relation to the policy agenda. The first implication is that the use of quantitative indicators to measure the performance of an event should be re-examined. Developing a generic model for all sport activities and events is problematic due to the number of variables and the subjective nature of the data. Consequently, any model or framework developed may oversimplify and eliminate important variables from the equation.

The second implication is that the inability to evaluate long-term strategies and tactics may result in the implementation of policies that are perceived as beneficial, but are in fact detrimental to the city and/or organisation. For example, particular events may not enhance the tourism image of the destination, and even degrade it. To evaluate programs through short-term performance indicators alone may fail to align the program’s outcomes with long-term strategic directions of the city and its stakeholders. The problematic nature of measuring these indicators suggests that a paradigm shift is required.

The criteria to assess an event should place a greater emphasis on policy outcomes rather than on policy impacts, or, in other words, move from concentrating on quantifying results (through statistics, such as visitor numbers and economic impacts) to investigating long-term results of a response (e.g. media activities for tourism development, relationships formed for local business development). This study hypothesises that the focus of planning will shift from exclusively concentrating on short-term tactical responses to long-term strategic responses in order to achieve long-term outcomes as opposed to short-term impacts.

Feedback loop 2 also provides the opportunity for policy communities and entrepreneurs to maintain the momentum created by the mega-event to affect the ongoing policy process and to promote permanent change of the position of an issue on the agenda. These groups use positive feedback to highlight the beneficial aspects of addressing an issue and focus on indicators of success to promote the growth of the issue on the policy agenda. Given that policy advocates are motivated to cultivate growth of the issue on the agenda, negative feedback is absent from the feedback loop, as it would expose errors and weaknesses in the process. As a result, feedback from the outcome of a mega-event to the ongoing policy process is limited to amplifying or snowballing the issue on the agenda, as opposed to questioning and challenging the policy response. Positive feedback alone can create a vicious cycle in which policy mistakes are repeated in subsequent iterations and status quo is maintained. Lindblom (1979) concurs with this finding, and states that: “small [incremental] steps do not upset the democratic applecart; big steps do” (p. 522). Lindblom also suggests that a circle of legitimation and conservative policy-making avoids grand changes to the status quo, therefore rejecting most challenges to fundamental consensus.

Feedback Loop 3
Feedback also provides the potential for learning to occur (Senge 1990). Lessons can be generated from final outcomes, as well as from the experiences of stakeholders and individuals involved in the response. In principal, Lindblom (1979) implicitly noted the need for learning in the policy process when he commented on policy analysis:

"Much is omitted; few issues are pointed to the point of exhaustion; and we take from them not closure but new insights - specifically, powerful fragments of understanding …. Not explicitly directed to problems of policy making, many of them need substantial interpretation and translation before they become effective, as some do, for millions of participants in policy making." (p. 522)
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In an explicit investigation of organisational learning, March (1999), one of the founders of the garbage can concept, states:
"Organisations devote considerable energy to developing collective understanding of history. These interpretations depend on the frames within which events are comprehended.... They are translated into, and developed through story lines that come to be broadly, but not universally, shared." (p. 9)

Although learning occurs simultaneously, implications and lessons must be transferred from those who experienced the process to future participants to conserve the knowledge gained.

Generating lessons from an event is one of the most important stages of the process, but also one of the most neglected. As shown in the study of pre-Games training, in the rush to finalise the venture and move on to other projects, the activities of de-briefing and generating lessons were abandoned. It is to be expected that the first attempt to create a response (in this case to pre-Games training) is new and challenging, but subsequent iterations of a similar process (e.g. future training camps) can become monotonous and tedious. Government stakeholders proceed to new projects, and lessons are not generated for subsequent initiatives. Often the knowledge transferred to successive iterations of the policy process consists only of formal, standardised reports, which can reflect on what should have happened, as opposed to what actually took place. Given resource limitations (e.g. time and energy), these reports can fail to capture the complexity and intricacies of the process.

The event organiser’s final report (such as that of the Olympic Organising Committee’s) often exhibits this shortfall. These post-event reports provide organisational summaries of an Olympic Games event, but fail to include lessons for future host cities. In the context of pre-Games training, final reports in each case were generated and fed back into the ongoing policy process (as indicated in Feedback Loop 2). Yet, none of the stakeholders and individuals involved de-briefed or generated lessons from their experiences to be included in the ongoing policy formulation and implications. As a result, the knowledge remains embedded in the groups and individuals involved in the response, rather than in the city as a whole.

Institutionalising learning is critical as most events have a sunset clause, usually immediately after the event. In all of the cases studied, the pre-Games training projects and units ceased existence within weeks of hosting the teams (less than 8 weeks post-event). In the majority of cases, the individuals responsible for leveraging efforts had their positions terminated. In a few instances, some remained within the organisation in a different role or not involved in events. Most of the organisations lost the individual and group learning that had occurred. Furthermore, a mood prevailed within government that the Olympics were 'old news', and there was no point in reflecting on the experience. Loss of human capital and a disposable mentality can be problematic for the cities and organisations involved in future sport and event initiatives.

Through the Olympics, a commonality of purpose and an understanding of how to complement efforts were developed. However, the groups formed to prepare the Olympic response have now disbanded. In some cases (e.g. the tripartite group in Queensland), individuals may continue to work together, but without a superordinate goal (i.e. the Olympics), keeping the group together may be difficult and even impossible. Although the internal cost of establishing networks has been absorbed, maintaining and managing these networks still require funding.

The findings of this study suggest that internal costs may be perceived as too high to maintain the momentum of the network created for the Olympic Games for future events. Yet, for sport events to become part of the local economic development strategy and to be used effectively to market the city, they should be considered in the city’s long-term strategic plan as opposed to receiving short-term tactical responses. Events should not be seen as independent jolts to the system, but rather part of the continual learning process.

Generalisability

In the previous discussion, the policy process in reaction to a mega-event was described. However, it is also important to consider whether the mobilisation of resources and support occurred solely for the Olympic Games, or if this response can be generalised to apply to other circumstances.

In September 2000, the eyes of the world were on Sydney. During this 16-day event, coverage of the Olympic Games was broadcast to a potential audience of 3.7 billion viewers (International Olympic Committee 2001). It was estimated that a staggering 93% of North Americans, 61% of Asians, and 83% of Europeans watched the Games on their television. In addition, access to the Games at the official Olympics Internet site (www.olympics.com) is estimated to have reached more than 35 million individual users (Australian Tourist Commission 2001). Clearly, the Olympics Games can capture attention of the international community (Miller 1994), and some scholars argue that it is the size of the Olympic Games that differentiates this event from others (Cashman 1999; Rothenbuhler 1989).

Other major events are equivalent to the Olympic Games in their ability to create international media interest and attract television viewers and event spectators. In 1999, the Rugby World Cup attracted over 1.7 million spectators and was seen on television by over 3.1 billion viewers (International Rugby Federation 2001). Similarly, events like the Commonwealth Games and the FIFA World Cup attract audiences estimated in the billions. As these examples demonstrate, other events are comparable in size to the Olympic Games, and it is therefore unreasonable to suggest that the Olympic Games differ from other events in size and magnitude alone.
Other scholars have suggested that the Olympic Games are special because they are seen as sacred and encouraging a sense of international community. The shared symbols, spectacle, ritual and ceremony of the Olympics differentiate this event from others. If the Olympic Games are viewed as a unique event with special characteristics (MacAloon 1981), lessons learned in response to the Games are not transferable to other events.

Chalip’s (1992) analysis of the polysemic structures of sport suggests that the sport, not the Olympics, promotes the audience’s interest in an event, and that sport can represent more than a sport contest. The influence of multiple narratives (e.g. creating stories incorporating non-sport, political, and social concerns), embedded genres (e.g. festival, spectacle, ritual, game), layered symbols (e.g. awards, banners, flags, uniforms, anthems) promotes interest in sporting events. Viewing the Games from this perspective, lessons from the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games are indeed transferable to other settings, with different levels of generalisability.

Future Research Directions

Throughout the world, governments continue to invest large amounts of public money into initiatives to market their cities and stimulate local economies. As this investigation has shown, sport can provide an opportunity to strengthen and build on these initiatives. Through studying pre-Games training, a framework for analysing the issues and challenges of the policy process has been presented.

In accordance with the objectives of this study, in each case, the planning process to generate short- and long-term outcomes from hosting pre-Games training in a city was presented. This report has identified the strategies and tactics aimed at deriving beneficial outcomes for each city studied and its stakeholders. In each case, immediate impacts of pre-Games training were indicated (e.g. the number of pre-Games training camps secured and the estimated economic impact). However, it is beyond the scope of this study to investigate the long-term outcomes of these strategies. Further research is required to assess the long-term effectiveness of these strategies.

This study has provided an illustration of the policy response to a mega-event. Crossan, Lane, and White (1999) state: “A framework defines the territory and takes a step closer to a theory …. Further theory development will expand and deepen these connections and will enable development of testable hypotheses” (p. 523). Although this study has laid a conceptual foundation, the need exists for further in-depth longitudinal research on the politics and processes that underpin the leveraging of sport activities to develop a local economy, and on the role of sport in the product and service marketing mix of a city. Future research can extend these findings and provide a better understanding of this phenomenon.

Conclusion

It is evident that planners must formulate targeted strategies to maximise the impact and leverage the opportunities created from hosting mega-events. Through integrating sport into the city's strategic planning, sport activities and events can be used or leveraged to derive opportunities and benefits. The city’s stakeholder groups, organisations, and interested individuals must continually enhance their capacity to create and expand their patterns of thinking, learn from past experiences (both internally and with others), and generate new lessons from hosting sport activities and events in a city. Hence, strategic planning is imperative to ensure that optimal short- and long-term outcomes are derived. These processes can promote collaboration, learning, and understanding, leaving a positive legacy for the city’s community and local economy.
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AUTHORS

Sarah Gardiner
Sarah Purchase is a Principal Project Officer in the Tourism Branch of the Gold Coast City Council (GCCC), where she manages tourism projects ranging from industry and product development to tourism research and planning. She has worked in the public and private tourism sectors in both industry and academic settings. Sarah has lectured in Sport Marketing at Griffith University Gold Coast and presented at conferences. Her research interests are in planning, policy and marketing in the areas of sport, events and tourism. Email: sgardiner@goldcoast.qld.gov.au

Dr Laurence Chalip
Laurence Chalip is Professor and Director of the Sport Management Program at the University of Texas at Austin. Prior to joining the faculty at Texas, he was on the faculty of the School of Marketing and Management at Griffith University. His research focuses on policy and marketing. He is a Research Fellow of the North American Society for Sport Management, and has won two service awards from the Sport Management Association of Australia and New Zealand. In 2000, he was named to the International Chair of Olympism by the International Olympic Committee and the Centre for Olympic Studies. Email: lchalip@mail.utexas.edu
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